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# Populism in the Baltic States

A Research Report

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## POPULISM IN BALTIC STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project “Populism in the Baltic States” is a small-scale research project which aims to give an overview of the populist dimension of politics in the Baltic States and the successfulness of this political strategy, based on the experience from the previous general elections and social media.

### Theoretical background

Even if widely used, populism is a very contested concept in political science, with rather vague meaning, “populist” sign could be attached on almost anything. This study and analytical elaborateness is based on Edward Shils’ classical definition, according to which populism means the supremacy of the will of the people and the direct relationship between the people and the government. More widely, we claim populism to be a “action/thought that puts people in the center of political life”. For conceptualisation sometimes more narrow explanation is used, seeing populist politics as political action or thought that is responding to elite/people cleavage.

In relations to democracy, populism is seen in literature both supportive (radical and participatory meaning) and dangerous (aristotelian problem of hysterical enthusiasm). In this study we take into account both aspects and propose **a gradational approach to populism**, stating that both the lack as well as the surplus of populism can potentially endanger the democratic system.

Additionally, we developed an instrument of dimensions of populism, based on the already existinig empirical and methodical work asa well as theoretical approaches, summing the dimensions into two prime streams: **identity politics** and **policy**.

### Research design

We chose one general election campaign (2008 in Lithuania, 2011 in Estonia and Latvia) to assess the presence of populist strategies, and a sample of social media pages that had political goals.

### Results

In all countries, populism was mainly the strategy of “newcomers” or “faders”, but with not very high success (in terms of being elected/popular support). Populism was certainly stronger and more effective in Lithuania, the discourse was was closer to populism that is practiced in the Central Eastern European block more widely, and hence. Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, there are clear and successful national chauvinist parties that promote statist governing and presidential regimes, use the securitization paradigm to mobilize voters and undermine more diplomatic competitors, etc. This suggests that the Baltic States should not be assessed as a homogeneous block in terms of populism.

In Estonia and Latvia most parties appeared alike in strength of using populist strategies, with some marginal parties using more populist and a few parties using notably less populist (elitist) strategies. In Lithuania no strong tendency to either side was noted, the “successful populism” in Lithuania (in terms of being elected) was clearly on the policy side. Variation of parties using populist strategies was also wider in Lithuania: there were about the same number of populist/mixed/non-populist parties, while in Estonia and Latvia the level of populism was more alike.

Different from western European experience, **in all three Baltic states, populism is stronger in “policy” dimension rather than “identity construction” dimension.** It is notable that “classical populist topics” were not much present in Baltic States, which confirms the need to analyse populism as an argumentation method and discursive technique, rather than certain area of policies.

The scope of policies were larger and more “radical change” type in Latvia and Lithuania, even though in Estonia also major parties asked for “structural reform”, but in “evolutionary way” (only some cases of minor parties asking radical changes). Criticism against existing system was clearly present in Latvia and Lithuania (“previous decisions have brought us in current situation, we should change it), in Estonia the criticism was more directed towards opposition by condemning any changes as those might derail Estonia from its present (depicted as successful) course; the only “existing system” widely criticized was in taxation policies. It is worthwhile to note here, that economic crises hit quite severely all three states at given time.

Construction of “people” was tied to hegemonic nationalist tendencies (fortified by linguistic aspects, words “people”, “ethnie” and “nation” belong to the same family of concepts). Still, all definitions were rather inclusive and almost no strong or radical measures were proposed against the Other.

The main antagonisms constructed were against other politicians, political establishment, big business owners (in Latvian case: oligarchs). In Estonia and Latvia antagonism against “Russian-speakers” was also to some extent present, and the attacks on “other politicians” was more straightforward than Lithuanian case (names mentioned, specific deeds blamed on them), but not as demonizing. In Estonia the antagonism against “economical elite” was notably absent. The antagonistic discourse strategy was used in all Baltic States mainly to support one's own policy-propositions, but also to delegitimise the opponent. Different from others, in Estonia there was commonly shared discourse conspiracy theoretical discourse in opposing the establishment and their alleged allies (rigging polls, “selling Estonian independence” for creating Eurasian Union)

“Baltic exceptionalism” is present also in usage of the concept “Heartland”, which is not very much argued neither in media or manifestos. Only in a few cases the “first republic” (interwar years 1920-40) was mentioned, usually the “golden age” is something “yet to come”. The “anti-Heartland” concept was stronger, the populist discourse still seems to center on “escaping from the past” (in Latvian and Lithuanian cases, also from the “present”, in Estonian case “present situation” was sometimes viewed as “Heartland”).

## POPULISM BALTI RIIKIDES: UURINGUÜLEVAADE

Uuring "Populism Baltikumis" on väikesemahuline uuring, mille eesmärk on anda ülevaade Balti riikide poliitika populistlikust mõõtmest ning populismi kui poliitikastrateegia edukusest ühtede valimiste ning sotsiaalmeedia näitel.

### Teoreetiline taust

Poliitikateaduses on populism väga vaieldud ja häguse sisuga mõiste: seda saab rakendada peaaegu suvalisele poliitilisele nähtusele. Selles uuringus lähtusime Edward Shilsi klassikalisest määratlusest, mille kohaselt populism tähendab rahva tahte ülimust ning otsest sidet rahva ja valitsuse vahel. Mõnikord kasutasime ka kitsast määratlust, mille kohaselt populism on poliitiline tegevus või mõte, mis vastab "eliit/rahvas" lõhele antud ühiskonnas.

Populismi seost demokraatiaga analüüsitakse kirjanduses nii toetavana (radikaalse ja osalusdemokraatia tähenduses) kui ka ohustavana (aristotellik hüsteerilise entusiasmi tekitamine). Selles uuringus arvestasime mõlemat aspekti ja võtsime kasutusele **gradatsioonilise lähenemise** populismile, mis lähtub ideest, et nii populismi puudus kui üleküllus on demokraatiale kahjulik.

Lisaks töötasime välja populismi dimensioonide loetelu lähtuvalt juba tehtud empiirilistest analüüsides teistes riikide ja konkreetsete liikumiste uurimiseks, ning teoreetilisest valdkonnakirjandusest, summeerides tunnused kaheks põhivaldkonnaks: **identiteedipoliitikaks** ning **rakenduspoliitikaks**.

Identiteedipoliitika juhtmõtteks on "*rahva*" mõiste *konstrueerimine*: mis kirjeldab neid, kes "on poliitilise elu keskmes". Mõnikord kasutatakse selleks *antagonistlikke* meetodeid ("kes ei ole rahvaks", tavaliselt on need eliidid, kuid mitte-rahvaks võib olla ka suvaline muu ühiskondlik grupp (immigrandid, ettevõtjad, teisest rahvusest inimesed jne); siin on eriti oluliseks "teise" vastu suunatud meetodite radikaalsus. Klassikalised populismiuuringud rõhutavad ka "*südamaa*" mõistet: edukaks kogukonnaehituseks tarvilikud müüdid ja paatos, mis rõhutab grupi ühiseid nõudmisi ja moraali: "mingi aja ja koha idealiseeritud pilt, mitte tingimata kooskõlas ajalooliste faktidega". Me lisasime siia ka "*anti-südamaa*" mõiste: "mingi aja/koha demoniseeritud pilt, mida tuleb iga hinna eest vältida".

Mõnikord seostatakse populismiga *spetsiifilisi poliitikaid* (radikaalsed muutused poliitilises süsteemis, teatud ümberjagamis-, maksundus- ja rahapoliitikad, "kodanikkonda" defineerivad poliitikad jne), kuid me leiame, et ühtegi poliitikat ei saa nimetada olemuslikult populistlikuks. Pigem määrab poliitikateprogrammi või ühe individuaalse poliitika populismiastme selle *ulatus, kvaliteet ja viimistletus*. Populistide lähenemine poliitikatele on pigem "visionäärne" kui "administratiivne", lähtudes *olemasoleva süsteemi kriitikast*. Üldiselt toetavad populistid poliitikaid, mis lubavad *suurt süsteemset muutust*, ja seetõttu tavaliselt ei paku täielikult väljaarendatud detailset programmi. Radikaalsel juhul pakutakse lihtsustatud poliitikaid, pakkudes "maagilisi lahendusi" (üks idee/poliitika, mis kõrvaldab kõik probleemid), keskendumine ainult piiratud arvule probleemidele ning mõnikord soovitakse ka vastukäivaid poliitikaid.

### Uurimismeetod

Kuna tegemist on pilootuuringuga, mille elluviimise aeg oli piiratud, siis vaatlesime üht valimiskampaaniat, täpsemalt, viimaseid parlamendivalimisi: märts, 2011 Eestis,

september, 2011 Lätis ja oktoober, 2008 Leedus (2012. aasta valimiskampaania polnud uuringu alates veel käivitunud). Lisaks analüüsisime populistlike retooriliste ja tegevusstrateegiate avaldumist sotsiaalmeedias.

## Tulemused

### **Kõigis kolmes Balti riigis on populism uustulnukate või hääbujate strateegia, kuid ilma märkimisväärse eduta valitukssaamise või toetusbaasi laiendamise mõttes.**

Efektiivseimad ja tugevaimad olid kindlasti Leedu populistlikud strateegiad, nende diskursus oli sarnasem üldiselt Kesk-Ida-Euroopa ruumis praktiseeritavale populismile. Erinevalt Lätist ja Eestist eksisteerivad Leedus edukad selgelt rahvusšovinistlikud parteid, mis reklaamivad statistlikku valitsemist ja presidentsiaalset režiimi, kasutavad julgeolekustamisparadigmat, mobiliseerimaks valijaid jne

Eesti ja Läti erakonnad osutusid omavahel küllalt sarnaseks nii populistlike strateegiate kasutamises kui nende tugevuses, väikese hulga “väga populistlike” või “mittepopulistlike” parteidega. Mõlemas riigis võib suurema toetusbaasiga parteisid nimetada pigem mittepopulistlikuks/elitistlikuks. Leedu puhul ei olnud näha tendentsi kummaski suunas, Leedu “edukas populism” oli selgelt rakenduspoliitikate populism. Leedu puhul ilmnas ka tugev erisus teistest Balti riikidest populistlike strateegiate varieerumises: populistlikke /segatud / mittepopulistlike parteisid oli ümbes samapalju. Seega meie tulemid problematiseerivad eksisteeriva kirjanduse, kus Baltikumi kiputakse käsitlema ühtse blokina: **Leedu on teistest Balti riikidest selgelt erinev, tugevamate populistlike strateegiatega kui Eesti ja Läti. Veel enam, viimaseid tuleks uurida pigem “elitistlikus” kui populistlikus võtmes.**

Erinevalt Lääne-Euroopa kogemusest on **Balti populism üldiselt tugevam “poliitikate” kui “identiteediloomes” mõõtnes.** Kõigis Balti riikides iseloomustas “rakenduspoliitikate populismi” ettepanekute küllalt madal väljaarendatus, mõnikord vastandlikud nõudmised (peamiselt Leedus), mõnikord “maagilised lahendused”. Läti ja Leedu poliitikate muutuste ulatus oli laiem ja radikaalsem ning Leedus nähti muutuste võimalikkust pigem revolutsioonilisena. Erinevalt teistest kasutati Eestis laialdaselt konspiratsiooniteoreetilist argumentatsiooni liiderkonna, riigiparaadi ja nende “kaastööliste” vastu (arvamusuuringute võltsimine, “Eesti iseseisvuse mähmüümine Euraasia Ühenduse loomiseks” jne).

*“Rahva” konstrueerimine* toimus ühtviisi hegemoonilises natsionalistlikus raamistikus valdava enamuse populistlikumate erakondade retoorikas. Samas antagonistlike strateegiaid peamiselt teiste poliitikute, poliitilise liiderkonna ja suurettevõtjate (Lätis ja Leedus: oligarhide) vastu ning vähem vähemuste vastu. Eestis ja Lätis eksisteeris ka mõningane antagonism “venekeelsete” suhtes. Eesti puhul on märkimisväärne antagonismi puudumine “majanduseliidi”, aga ka oligarhide ehk n-ö läbipõimunud majandus- ja poliitilise eliidi suhtes. Üldiselt kasutati kõigis kolmes riigis antagonistliku strateegiat toetamiseks oma poliitikaettepanekuid, kuid mõnevõrra ka vastase delegitimeerimiseks.

“Balti eripära” väljendub ka “südamaa” kujundi peaaegu olematus kasutuses, see praktiliselt puudus nii programmides kui meedias. Vähestel kordadel mainiti idealiseeritud minevikuna “esimest vabariiki”, üldiselt on “kuldaeg” miski, mis peab alles saabuma. Tugevamini kasutati “Anti-südamaa” mõistet, populistlik argumentatsioon keskendub jätkuvalt “minevikust põgenemisele” (Lätis ja Leedus ka olevikust põgenemisele, Eestis “praegune olukord” oli vahepeal esitatud “südamaana”).

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## INTRODUCTION

The rise of parties leaning towards radicalism all over Europe has brought the topics of populism and radicalism back into the limelight of various advocacy groups as well as academic research. Though debates on populism go back into the very early days of political science, the interest of scholars has been growing in time.

Populism has also been an intriguing topic in the Baltic States. Besides being a rather popular term in political debates, it has also been a topic in a number of academic papers, which draw light upon particular aspects associated with populism. For example, Allan Sikk (2009) writes about the 'purifier' parties which he describes as the unifying element amongst the asystemic parties in the three countries; right-wing extremism has been covered in a compilation edited by Cas Mudde (2005) (Chapters by Vadim Poleshchuk, Nils Muižnieks and Giedrius Kiaulakis), Daunis Auers and Andres Kasekamp (2009) write about (the failure of) extreme right wing parties, Evald Mikkel and Andres Kasekamp (2008) about euroscepticism etc.

What is less represented, though, is a systematic approach to the content of populism and populist discursive strategies. Both qualitative as well as quantitative comparative frames have been applied in various contexts, such as Italy and Germany (Caiani and della Porta, 2010), Argentina and Brazil (Groppo, 2002), Taiwan (Schafferer, 2007) and Belgium (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Aside from a conference paper by Ilze Balcere (2011), also a participant in this project, there were no discursive or content analyses available to the consortium.

The importance of such studies becomes evident as soon as we aim to name a particular party populist. As Ernesto Laclau has put it, definitions of populism are often intentional, meant to signify the particular object of study.


Even if there have been some cases of political movements claiming itself "populist" and creating its own hegemony (for example the agrarian populist movement in 19th Century United States succeeded to create its own economic theory, counter-culture, rituals, about a thousand newspapers etc), populism is mostly not an ideology that would have proud and devoted bearers (e.g. Fieschi, 2004). Rather it could be described as an empty signifier (Laclau, 2005): not defined, but used so as to target the particular object of interest for the researcher (or a political opponent). We could thus say that populism is less "political ideology" but more an analytical category attributed by practitioners as well as researchers.

Hence, to study the content of populism, there are two possible approaches – abductive or the analysis of what is considered as populism in those particular circumstances; and

deductive or the analysis of what aspects covered in theoretical literature on populism avail themselves in the chosen empirical context.

This project aims to pursue the deductive logic. The main research question for this project was: **What kind of populist strategies were used by parties and (their proxy) movements in order to manipulate with the support of the public?** By „strategy“ we mean (1) discursive strategies that contain particular rhetorical techniques and ways of approaching a certain topic; (2) policy strategies that contain particular kinds of policy promises; and (3) political action repertoires that contain particular styles of communicative relationships with the audience.

Populism is often referred to as a discursive (Laclau, 2005) or a political communication strategy (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), indicating that there are certain techniques that are used to evoke populist mobilization. But it is not only the rhetoric that has provoked so much debate over populism; rather, it is also the actual or potential deeds of populists once they have mobilized that support (Arditi, 2008). Hence, we also analyze the policy proposals that populists make, and evaluate those according to the literature on populism. The third key question, however is, how does the populist rhetoric reach the audiences altogether? To answer this, also the action repertoires should be analyzed. Although Laclau does not differentiate between action and discourse, we here do so, since it makes yet another dimension visible, though similarly to Laclau, we in general admit that it is also analyzable with means of discourse analysis. Many authors, i.a. Griffin (2003) and Paul Taggart (2004) have noted that successful populism preconditions a particular action repertoire (regarded as structure by Griffin) that combines elements of party practices as well as social movement type of organizations. Hence, populists use a particular type of **action** to deliver a particular type of **discourse** to deliver particular **policies** (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1:** The three populist strategies. *Source: authors*

In this research project we aimed to address all three layers. Albeit, due to a tight schedule and the funder's particular interest in online populism, the organizational strategies were primarily focused upon in the social media settings. „Populism in the Baltic States“ consists of five working packages:

- WP I      development of a theoretical and methodological grid for the analysis (WP-s II-IV);
- WP II      analysis of the electoral manifestos of parties that participated in the last elections;
- WP III      analysis of media performance by senior representatives of parties prior to the previous elections;
- WP IV      analysis of online activities of parties as well as social movements;
- WP V      composing a comparative analysis based on the findings from WP-s II-IV.

This report is the result of WP V, summarizing the results in three primary deliverables: a methodological grid; the content and level of populism in the three Baltic States in the context of the last elections (Estonia 2011, Latvia 2011, Lithuania 2008); and the dynamics of presumed online populism (in August, 2012 and earlier).

# PART I: CONCEPTUALIZING POPULISM

## 1.1 GRADATIONAL APPROACH

Populism is a concept that is often used in political discourse, both practical and academic. Some politicians or (often more radical) movements are termed populist, often speech acts of politicians are referred to as populism (as synonymous with demagoguery), sometimes promises made in the electoral manifestos are termed populist. Paul Taggart (2004: 271) notes that populism is often used as an “off the shelf” concept, or as an “I know it when I see it phenomenon” (Fieschi 2004:235); i.e. a label, not a concept with a clearly defined meaning. Hence, this is a term of very wide usage and also very vague meaning; an empty signifier in Laclau’s (2005) terms.

This makes it an ambivalent concept. There are opponents (e.g. Betz & Johnson 2004, Jagers & Walgrave 2007), who see populism as a threat to democracy and civilized modern society. However, there are also proponents who view populism as an inevitable part of politics (Laclau actually indicates that there is no politics without populism) as well as of democracy. For example, according to Edward Shils’ classical definition, populism means the supremacy of the will of the people and the direct relationship between the people and the government (cf Ardit 2004: 135), which is not inevitably in opposition to the ideals valued in a democratic and open society. For analytical clarity, we depart here from a general idea that populism is “an action (or line of thought) that puts people in the center of political life”. Also, more narrowly, populism could be seen as political answer to “elite/people” cleavage in a given society.

Mentioned problems become particularly evident as soon as we begin to question the relationship between populism and democracy. Margaret Canovan (1999) notes that democracy as a normative principle is torn by the schism between the redemptive and the pragmatic function of democracy: the democratic form of government simultaneously claims wanting to give the power to the people (the redemptive function, not very different from populism), but at the same time needs to legitimize representative institutions and neutral bureaucracy (the pragmatic function) that are actually quite far from the people and operate according to slightly different rules than giving the power to the people would suggest. In this schism, populism comes to focus as the weight that aims to rebalance between the two functions, claiming more power to the people. According to Laclau (2005) populism occurs when the institutional system becomes less and less able to differentially absorb social demands, and the demands and official discourse are asymmetric.

Hence in a way, populism is like a vent for managing ‘organic crises’ (Gramsci) within a political system when the institutional system can no longer handle the needs of the

people. The negative side comes apparent once we look at the alternatives populists propose. Canovan (1999) notes that populists often aim to change the existing structures, that is, to reassess also the foundations for the pragmatic function of democracy, for according to the 'redemptive' idea, the structure is something holding the establishment in its place. Hence, populist forces are prone to criticize representative democracy, or even put forth ideas of changing the structures, and this often means the structures of representative democracy (i.e. the voting system). But these changes do not necessarily give more power to the people. They can also be a mechanism of manipulation with the popular will and of power-play where a particular party simply buys an advantage in respect to its competitors.

Hence, populism has both a negative and a positive relationship with democracy. From the liberalist perspective the aim of democracy is to fulfill the general will, which needs some amount of devotion and knowledge, and hence can be better filled through representative democratic functions. Populism, in their view, is not devoted to fulfilling the general will, but rather, the will of 'the people' (or more precisely, 'some people'), depending on how they have defined the people, and hence, can omit some group interests or rights to benefit their construction of 'the people'.

In the neo-Marxist perspective, populist movements are viewed as the democratizers of democracy – offering checks and balances to the current establishment. However, also they admit that populism can develop pathologic deviations, since the populists themselves might not see the world as pluralistic, and might simply aim to sustain and establish their own hegemony as establishment.

In our approach, we have aimed to take into account both perspectives, and hence, proposed a **gradational approach** to populism, stating that **both the lack as well as the surplus of populism can potentially endanger the democratic system**. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where three ideal typical gradations<sup>1</sup> are marked. "0-populism" indicates a style of politics where all indications of populism are absent. "Democratic populism" indicates a style of politics where the redemptive function of democracy is clearly present, albeit it does not threaten the rule of law and the pragmatic function of democracy. "Radicalism" is the extreme presence of populist tactics that are not simply used in order to put the people in the centre of politics, but in order to create commitment through exclusion of some groups and ideas, distilling all the reactive characteristics of populism.

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<sup>1</sup> Ideal type - .... Hence, the three ranges mentioned are but hypothetical points on a continuum that can according to Zeno's paradox, can always be divided once more.



**Figure 2:** Gradational approach to populism. Source: authors

Developing a gradational instrument would enable us to explore the phenomena related to populism more neutrally and not force into distinguishing between thoroughly populist political forces and those that are allegedly pure of any populist perceptions. Not to mention that such an aim would leave the vast majority of political actors out of consideration, since according to Laclau, none of them can be totally pure of populist sentiment and still be competitive in the political market.

## 1.2 ANALYTICAL DIMENSIONS OF POPULISM

Based on theoretical discussions as well as previous analytical takes on populism, we outlined a number of indicators that have been used to describe populist politics and then summarized them into more general dimensions, as concisely as possible. As the aim of this report is not giving a detailed overview of the state-of-the-art on scholarship on populism, we will simply outline the key dimensions used in the analysis. The more detailed indicators can be found in the Instrument for Analysis in Appendix 1 and under indicators in Table 1.

Briefly, the contents of populism can be allocated between two broader strategies, namely, identity politics and policy. **Identity politics** is a group of political practices that focus on community building and promotion of interests of a particular group. For populism, the centerpiece of identity politics is the construction of “**the people**” or the in-group. Populists always claim to represent the majority, the “ordinary people” (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000) though their construction can be rather particularistic. Populist rhetoric often claims to bring redemption to the people – to give the power back to the people, to represent the real interests of the people etc (*ibid*), using what C.L Stevenson called “persuasive definitions”.<sup>2</sup> Who the people actually are, often remains rather vague and can only be availed through discourse analysis. According to the post-Marxist strand of populism theory, true populists tend to represent those groups in the

2 Persuasive definition, “persuading with definition”, changing the descriptive meaning of a term while leaving the emotional meaning intact. For example, “democracy” is in English language “positive” category, if claimed that Hitler-type of rule is “true democracy”, it would be persuasive definition.

society as “the people” that are underrepresented under the current establishment; perhaps even in conflict with the current establishment. Sometimes it is seen as “politicizing identity”: by allowing those who have never been represented because of their class, religion, ethnicity or geographical location, to be acknowledged as political actors. (Panizza, 2005: 10).

Important part of identity politics is not only indicating the specific group and constructing the in-group, but also indicating oppositions or who is the out-group or “the Other”. In case of populism, the strongest aim is to create an **antagonism** (Laclau, 2005): an opposition that cannot be overcome through compromise, but through dialectics. Classical examples of the “Other” for populists are the elites, the political establishment or the intellectual elites (Rydgren, 2006). However, the “Other” can also be some other social group. For example, a populist anti-immigration party might target their in-group as the “orderly natives”, whereas even more important for the success of their identity politics is keeping the focus on their out-group, the immigrants and their negative characteristics. However, they can also note that their out-group is this group of people regardless of their ethnic background, who favor pro-immigrant and pro-integration policies, and aim to get their potential in-group into taking sides on the issue, hence, to create antagonisms; demonize certain groups and issues. What differentiates moderate populists from radical populists, are the measures proposed against the “Other”, for while more moderate populists might simply use the antagonism to mobilize supporters and apply the opposition as a cleavage at most, radicals embody the sentiment of anti-pluralism, suggesting measures of elimination against the “Other”, oppose any kind of pluralism

Another important part of identity politics constitutes the **Heartland** (Taggart, 2004): the myths and pathos necessary for successful community building, and outlining the group’s mutual demands as well as moral. According to Paul Taggart, the Heartland is a particular place in time and space that might but does not have to be in accordance with historical facts (e.g. an idealized picture of the interwar years or life in the Soviet Union), and is used for community building or creating emotional bond. In other words, it is an instrument for narrative building. However, regarding the twofold nature of identity building, also the Heartland may have its reverse – the Anti-Heartland, or a moment in time and space that is depicted as negative (e.g. the dreadful Soviet time, the horrid era when some particular party governed, etc) that is also used for mobilization as an instrument of politics of fear.

Secondly, populism also has its particularities in **policy**. Though populism is a term that occasionally gets to be used also in policy analysis of particular fields, there is no precise theoretical conceptualization of what populist policy is. However, leaving this out of



consideration would significantly reduce the instrument's capability to describe the potential outcomes of populist politics.

So how to describe populist policy? There are particular policies more often associated with populism, e.g. making changes in the political system (Canovan, 1999), redistributive policies (Taggart, 2004) and particular changes in taxation (see Rydgren, 2006 on tax populism) or monetary system, policies defining the population, e.g. immigration control (Fieschi, 2004), other ethnic measures (Rydgren, 2006) etc, as well as all the measures proposed to put populist identity politics into practice through policy making. However, no policy can be called essentially populist. Rather, it is the scope, the quality and the elaborateness of single policy proposals as well as the policy program as a whole. There are various takes on populism in policy, and most of them describe populist policies as inconsistent and in that, irresponsible. For example, Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1989: 1) described populism in economic policies as such "that emphasizes growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit finance".

Sir Bernard Crick (2005: 627) adds that another key "device" populists use, is simplification: "populists always simplify /---/ issues, and usually have a single magic solution" that often is not that well argued nor thought through, to the problems they raise. And in more negative cases, it may also happen that the populists limit themselves with sole criticism, forgetting to propose even the 'magical solutions'.

Another observation made about the policy programs of populist parties is that they focus more often on some particular issues – especially the ones that are driven and/or support their identity politics and are regarded as relevant by the "ordinary people" (from the elitist point of view – are comprehensible to the ordinary people) – and do not offer a full-fledged program that would also cover more abstract issues (Fieschi, 2004).

As appears from the fondness toward anti-system orientation of populists (Canovan, 1999), it has also been noted that populists tend to support policies that promise a more dramatic change – rather than proposing incremental reforms, they aim for systemic change, sometimes even revolutionary rearrangements.

All of these criteria have also been outlined in Table 1 and were used for analyzing populism in WP II and III, and in a shortened version, also used for WP IV.

**Table 1:** Analytical dimensions of populism: indicators and gradations. Source: authors.

	Criteria	Indicators	0-populism	Democratic populism	Radicalism
IDENTITY POLITICS	The People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Construction of a social collective „people“</li> <li>- Terms used for that group</li> <li>- Relation between the party and the social group „people“</li> </ul>	No identity building, neutral collective denominators (e.g. society), target grouping (e.g. entrepreneurs, families, retirees). No visible relationship between „people“ and the party.	Identity built around inclusive categories, aiming to represent the majority of the population. Sometimes uses loaded inclusive denominators for „people“ that appeal to emotions; party claims to represent the people and their will.	Identity built around exclusive categories that is represented as majority (or the normative majority). Loaded denominators and other language used for identity building. Party claims to represent the true will of the people, often also showing the „people“ as currently unjustly repressed.
	Antagonism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Indicating certain groups that are not included among the „people“ or „we“</li> <li>- Construction of opposition among groups („we“ vs. „other“) and the scope of such an opposition</li> <li>- Usage of politics of fear</li> </ul>	No evident antagonism constructed. Though also groups that do not belong among the beneficiaries of policy proposals might be mentioned (or are hinted through the exclusivity of the „people“), there is no antagonism constructed.	Opposing one political force/socio-demographic group/political ideology to another as a common strategy. Though opposition remains agonistic, indicating disagreement and thus strengthening one's identity, but not becoming antagonistic, where oppositions are principled denial of reaching compromises.	Strong opposition: certain social groups, political forces or ideologies are demonized and antagonized; also measures with direct intent to denigrate the „other“ are proposed.
	Heartland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Narrating a certain time-place situation and relating it to moral and/or emotional qualities</li> <li>- Depiction of crisis</li> </ul>	No such narrative constructed.	A Heartland or an Anti-Heartland is narrated at least in one dimension. May be related to some emotional quality, but is more often a proactive and driving force (e.g. heartland placed in future)	Heartland or an Anti-Heartland is narrated and used to promote some moral and or emotional sentiment. Generally reactive and used to provoke dissatisfaction with the current <i>status quo</i> . Current state a state of crisis
POLICY POPULISM	Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Topics covered in manifesto</li> <li>- Style of presenting prospective policies</li> <li>- Themes often related to populism: ethnic and national policies, changing the political system, welfare and tax policies</li> </ul>	Wide range of issues, consists of non-political, administrative details	Wide range of issues covered (if not a single issue party). Concrete policy proposals, might also include a more visionary paper. Includes also some classical populist policy topics.	Focuses on particular issues rather than outlines a manifold political program. Instead of concrete policy proposals focuses on visionary slogans. Includes also classical populist policy topics, including self-contradictory language or contradicting policies.
	Criticism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Amount of space dedicated to reactive vs. proactive policy talk</li> <li>- Who/what is criticized</li> </ul>	No or practically no criticism.	Some criticism of competing political forces, also some criticism of the current situation, but focuses more on proactive solutions (criticism as only an introductory setter of problematic)	Criticism is central, taking up almost as much space as proactive policy issues (or even more). Criticism is not only directed toward particular political opponents, but also demonizes certain groups and magnifies problems of current <i>status quo</i> .
	Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Whether proactive policy issues aim to change the current situation</li> </ul>	Minimal changes; mostly incremental reforms.	Moderate changes, both incremental as well as structural reforms.	Radical changes, proposes revolutionary reforms
	Elaborateness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Whether policy proposals are argued, adequate and consistent</li> </ul>	Well argued and consistent policy proposals.	Well argued and consistent policy proposals; might include some simplification or policy slogans.	Simplified proposals put forward as 'magic solutions', not explaining (or caring about) how they would actually work.

### 1.3 ONLINE POPULISM

In addition to the discursive identity and policy characteristics, this project also conducted a pilot study on populism in social media. As a number of scholars have stressed (e.g. della Porta, 2012), the World Wide Web in general and social media in particular grant political actors new means to communicate with their particular audiences.

Social media sites, e.g. Facebook pages and groups are quite comparable to the organizational logic of social movements, and hence can also be termed online social movements in terms of research. (The groups might term themselves as a different entity, but that does not change the similarities with social movement as a concept in social research.) Both social movements and Facebook communities are rather loose organizations (united perhaps only by clicks, and not necessarily by socio-demographic and spatial proximity) with a multi-tier organization, led by charismatic leaders and movement activists (Facebook group managers and frequent commentators), who are then surrounded by the more passive and more active supporters (less frequent commentators and people who only like and share the posts, thus promoting the cause to other audiences). The movements can be interconnected to others with similar goals, often also overlapping in participants, both on the supporter and the activist level (there can be a number of Facebook groups on the same topic which are to a large extent joined and followed by the same people, there can be shared posts, mutual promotion of each other, etc). However, there can also be competition and exclusion between movements of a different level of radicalism or naturally, also of different goals and are hence conflicting.

In regards to populism, analyzing online media content enables us to gather a fuller picture of populism in at least four ways. First of all, homepages, blogs and social media accounts are targeted for narrower audiences, and hence, give a different insight into populist discourse – from the rational choice perspective, it might also be that rather radical and populist parties behave in a more mainstream manner in mainstream media simply to find sympathy of broader publics.

Secondly, including social media and other online channels in the sample enables us to look further from parties that are contesting in elections and include also movements that remain outside formal political competition.

Thirdly, particularly social media enables us to also observe interaction between the party/movement and its supporters and to draw more elaborate conclusions on the “action” aspect of populism. Social media observation enables us to conclude over whether the parties and social movements use online means to mobilize supporters into

offline activities or whether they engage with them online; to what extent do they use social media for indoctrination and to what extent for the sole purposes of informing.

And finally, social media also enables us to map a network of different movements and test the hypothesis of a rhizome proposed by Griffin (2003).

In order to do all that, a three-tiered sampling method for identifying the parties and social movements was used:

- 1) Search for websites and social media pages and groups of all parties included in WP II and WP III.
- 2) Social movements were identified according to the search words provided to the research assistants in English (and then translated into the local language) in the social media search engine.
- 3) Other movements that were interlinked with either the parties or movements identified were included in the sample.

The prime channel used as social media was Facebook, which is the most prominent channel in Estonia and also in Lithuania. In Latvia, also the network called Draugiem.lv was used, since the social media scape is divided between Facebook and Draugiem.

For every party or movement, the research assistants filled out a form, indicating the general description of the page, its popularity (likes in Facebook, guests on counters etc) the posting frequency, interlinks with other sites and communities featured in the site, the character of the content and rhetoric of postings as well as topics covered and the vibrancy of discussion (in case of social media)

The more detailed instructions can be found in Appendix 3.

#### 1.4 THE PARTY SYSTEMS IN THE BALTIC STATES – A GENERAL OVERVIEW

The Western scholars usually consider the Baltic States as a unanimous block – both in terms of party systems as well as otherwise. The three states are regarded as very similar to each other – almost identical. Although the party politics three Baltic countries bear some resemblance, their evolution, cleavage constellations, stability and the populist drive have been quite distinct.

Party system analysis is mostly concerned with stability and consolidation. While the Estonian party system is often considered to be one of the most stable in the whole CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), the Latvian one is regarded to be the most unconsolidated. The Lithuanian party system is positioned somewhere inbetween.

There are only four political parties represented in the Estonian national parliament since 2011, while in Latvia the corresponding figure is five. However, parties in Latvia often form electoral coalitions (joint lists), thus there are up to 8 different parties in the legislature. The Lithuanian party system was almost constituted as a two-party system in the 1990's. However, the model of a very concentrated party competition broke down in the 2000's and today there are 7 major parties represented in the Lithuanian Seimas.

In order to examine the major discrepancies between three Baltic countries, we have to provide a more detailed overview on each country's party system separately (see also Table 2).

#### *1.4.1 LITHUANIA*

The Lithuanian party system is to a particular extent founded upon the independence movement-based core parties represented in the contemporary Lithuanian party politics. The two old core parties have been the conservative Homeland Union, which has its roots into the Lithuanian Popular Front and Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, which could be classified as a communist successor party (historical roots into Communist Party of Lithuania). Hence Lithuanian party politics resembles somewhat those of the Visegrad countries, where the confrontation between a national-conservative bloc and an ex-communist bloc has been a visible hallmark (at least in 1990's). There has been a constant swinging of power between the two core parties.

In 1990's, the Lithuanian party system was considered to be the most stable, concentrated and most "Western" among the Baltic States. Indeed, it did resemble very much to the German two-and-half-party system at that time. However, during the next decade both core parties lost much of their legitimacy and in the "earthquake elections" in 2000 several new parties emerged. The surge of the new (often populist) parties continued in the following elections, though the two core parties have managed, over time, to maintain a significant amount of political control in governments. However, the Lithuanian party system is still far from stability and full consolidation. In comparison to Estonia, Lithuania has been heading in an opposite direction: while the Lithuanian party system was stable and consolidated in the 1990's, the Estonian party system was very volatile at that time, but in the next decade the situation was reversed.

The major cleavage in the Lithuanian party politics has been the communist-anti-communist cleavage (or the history cleavage). It occupied a very prominent position in the 1990's, when the struggle between the two core parties was the key element in the party competition. In 2000's the significance of the history cleavage has been diminishing somewhat, and the socio-economic cleavage has become equally important.

However, it is often complicated to describe today's Lithuanian party politics only in terms of social cleavages, because the structural and personality-based issues have also played a tremendous role. In other words a very discernible cleavage has appeared between the core parties (associated with stagnation by their opponents) and the newcomers (who depict themselves as bringing change). Nevertheless, what makes Lithuania special and distinguished from the other Baltic countries is the fact that ethnic cleavage has played quite a marginal role. This has been somewhat replaced by the state-church cleavage (the clerical-anti-clerical cleavage) debating over the importance of Catholicism, which is meanwhile practically absent in more atheist Latvia and Estonia,

The major political parties in Lithuania are: the national conservative Homeland Union (has been a governmental party for several times, including the period 2008 – 2012); the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (who will most probably form the next government after the 2012 elections); the left wing (allegedly populist) Labor Party (founded in 2003, leader businessman V. Uspaskich, successful in recent elections 2012); conservative (allegedly populist) Order and Justice (founded in 2002 and led by a controversial politician R. Paksas); and Liberal Movement (a new party founded in 2006).

To found a new party, a minimum of 1000 registered members are required. Electoral coalitions or joint lists are allowed, but they have not played such a prominent role in Lithuania in comparison to Latvia. There has been state funding for the political parties since 2004. All parties who have received more than 3% of votes in national or local elections are eligible for state grants. Hence the institutional barriers erected against the newcomers are not very as high as in Estonia, but the rules not so loose like in Latvia.

The linkage between the politics and business has not been very prominent, but from time to time it has been brought up as a problem. However, there have been several corruption scandals, where some well-known party leaders have been involved in (Uspaskich, Paksas, etc.).

According to political scientists and experts the populist drive has been quite remarkable in Lithuania. Several major political parties (Labour Party, Order and Justice, Liberal Movement, etc.) are accused of being populist.

There is a mixed electoral system in Lithuania (like in Germany and Hungary), where half of the members of the parliament are elected using the PR system (threshold is 5%) and the second half, while using FPTP system (First-past-the-post system).

#### 1.4.2 LATVIA

Opposite to Estonia and Lithuania there was no substantial split within the Latvian independence movement in the late 1980's and in the early 1990's. Most of ethnic Latvians were supporting the Latvian Popular Front, which confronted the pro-Moscow Inter-movement. While the Inter-movement was banned in 1991, the successor party of the Popular Front, Latvian Way, assumed almost a dominant position. The only serious challengers the Latvian Way faced were some relatively successful new (populist flash) parties, without very solid roots in the independence movement.

The lack of clear bipolar competition and a meager role played by the older movement-based parties explains why the constant incursion of new parties has been a substantial destabilizing factor in Latvian party politics. More clearly: the major political parties lack legitimacy derived from the independence movement, and there has never been a very clear-cut ideological split among the ethnic Latvian parties themselves which had produced a more concentrated party competition within the Latvian camp (the major confrontation has always been between the Latvians versus the Russophones).

The substantial re-organization of the Latvian party system took place in the beginning of the new millennium when the Latvian Way lost its preeminent position and several new parties emerged (the most prominent of them was the New Era Party). A brief moment of stabilization for the elections in 2006 did not solve inherent problems of the party system. The lingering political crisis since 2007 has produced the next wave of brand new parties and mergers entering the political system prior to the most recent elections (2010 and 2011).

However, the major cleavage framing the party competition has little changed since the early 1990's. Like in Estonia the ethnic cleavage has been central in Latvia. Nevertheless, the communist-anti-communist cleavage or the "history cleavage" hasn't been so prominent, because it has been overshadowed by almost omnipotent ethnic cleavage. The socio-economic cleavage has been less significant and somewhat merged with the ethnic cleavage (the ethnic Latvians usually support right-wing market-liberal parties and the Russophones support left-wing parties). In recent elections a new cleavage appeared: so called "oligarch-dominated parties" versus "uncorrupt parties". Because the parties led by the mighty business oligarchs were defeated, it is unclear whether the cleavage will last and will get rooted into Latvian politics.

The major political parties in Latvia are Harmony Centre - the left-wing party predominately supported by the Russophone population (won the last elections, but has never been in government); Unity - an electoral coalition that became a government party in 2009 and whose core force has been the neo-conservative New Era Party;

national-conservative National Alliance (a joint list, whose one core member, For Fatherland and Freedom has been the only independence movement-based bigger party.; Union of Greens and Farmers, the party with a blurred ideological orientation, supported by the business oligarch Aivars Lembergs.

Like in Lithuania, electoral coalitions and joint lists are not banned in Latvia, but they have proved to be particularly viable and successful only in recent elections (2010, 2011). To register a party, a minimum of 200 members are required.

The linkage between the economic interests and politics has been more visible in Latvia than in Estonia. That is the reason why the business oligarchs and their remarkable impact on the politics are often mentioned. One explanation behind that has been the way how political parties are financed: in Latvia, the public financing has not been available for parties until very recently (2012) and therefore the private and corporate donations constituted a major part of the revenues.

The populist drive has been quite significant in the Latvian party politics according to many experts. At different time periods the political scientists have classified many Latvian parties as populists: New Era Party, Greens and Farmers, Zatler's Reform Party, etc.

There is a proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Latvia with opened party lists and 5% threshold.

#### *1.4.3 ESTONIA*

Like in other Baltic counties, the roots of the Estonian party system lay in the independence movements. There were two prominent forces in the Estonian independence movement in the end of the 1980's and in the beginning of the 1990's: the moderate Popular Front and the nationalist and more radical Estonian Committee. Both movements acted as a breeding ground for several political parties and movements, which appeared in the early 1990's. However, the confrontation between the most prominent successor parties of both movements – Estonian Centre Party (roots in the Popular Front) and Pro Patria (origins in Estonian Congress) – has constituted the major axis for the political and ideological conflict not only for the transition period, but also for the present. Until today there is an anti-communist, anti-Russian, nationalist and market liberal camp on the one hand (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, Estonian Reform Party) and rather Russian-friendly, allegedly Soviet-nostalgic and the left the wing camp on the other hand (Estonian Center Party and to date, Social Democratic Party; until 2011 also People's Union of Estonia). Thus the major cleavage in the



Estonian party politics is a peculiar mix of the ethnic cleavage and the communist-anti-communist cleavage (assessments on the communist past – so called the “history cleavage”). The socio-economic cleavage or class cleavage has been quite prominent, but not the key driver for the party competition.

The Estonian party system was fairly unstable and fragmented throughout the first decade after independence. The first promising signs indicating to the subsequent consolidation emerged in the very end of the 1990s. Regardless of many setbacks in the first half of the 2000’s (the rise of a new “purifier” party - Res Publica (Sikk, 2009), etc.), the Estonian party system has grown to be the most stable and institutionalized among the Baltic States.

Many political scientists have noted that Estonian party politics is right-wing inclined. It means that rather the right-wing parties have assumed a dominant position and have usually formed the governmental coalitions, and although all left-wing parties mentioned earlier have belonged to the government for a shorter period of time, these have always been led by a right-wing party.

The stability of the party system is to an important extent cultivated by the legislation concerning parties. It is relatively complicated to found a new political party in Estonia, because a minimum of 1000 members are required to register. The barrier itself is as high as in Lithuania, but Estonian population is almost three times smaller. Rather generous public financing is available for the parties represented in the parliament, but only a puny amount is given to the extra-parliamentary parties (only parties which have obtained more than 1% of votes are eligible for public financing). Electoral coalitions or joint lists between the parties are banned since 1998. Therefore there are substantial institutional barriers for the newcomers and only quite resourceful political groups (resourceful both in financial and in organizational terms) have managed to win seats in the parliament.

Political scientists rarely classify major Estonian parties as populist. Nevertheless, Res Publica (2001 – 2006, later merged with Pro Patria) has often been considered as a populist flash party. Some authors have also highlighted the populist tendencies in Centre Party. In general, the populist drive has been estimated to be relatively low.

There is proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Estonia with semi-opened party lists and 5% threshold.

Currently, the major political parties are Estonian Reform Party (prime minister party) and Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (united in 2006) that form the government and Estonian Centre Party and Social Democratic Party that are in opposition.

**Table 2:** The main features of the party systems in the Baltic States. *Source: authors.*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Stability of the party system</b>	<b>Fragmentation of the party system</b>	<b>Major cleavages</b>	<b>Populist drive according to political scientists</b>	<b>Institutional barriers for new parties to enter the competition.</b>
Estonia	Stable and consolidated	Rather low	Ethnic cleavage mixed with communist-anti-communist cleavage	Low	High barriers
Latvia	Unstable and unconsolidated	Rather high	Ethnic cleavage	Relatively prominent	Low barriers
Lithuania	Rather unstable and unconsolidated	Rather high	Communist-anti-communist cleavage and socio-economic cleavage	Relatively prominent	Moderate barriers

## PART II: CONTENT OF ELECTORAL POPULISM IN THE BALTIC STATES

### 2.1 DATA AND METHODS

This section combines the results from WP-s II and III. Taking into account the short duration of the project and the gradational approach that was used, the last general elections were chosen as the timeframe – these were the general elections held in March, 2011 in Estonia, the early parliamentary elections held in September 2011 in Latvia and the general elections held in October, 2008 in Lithuania. These elections were chosen, since the analysis was conducted in June, 2012 for WP II and in July, 2012 for WP III and the electoral race for The Lithuanian 2012 general elections had not begun yet.

In WP II the electoral manifestos of all parties that participated in the respective elections were analyzed. In case when the party had no long manifesto (which was the case with some parties in Latvia and Lithuania), the short manifestos presented on the homepage of the Electoral Commission were analyzed. For the analysis the instructions (see Appendix 1) and an exemplary analysis were prepared by the project coordinator. The electoral manifestos were chosen for the analysis since these are the ideological documents that represent the respective party before its electorate, the media and the public in general. Although it can be argued that the manifestos are not central in making the voting decision, they are a useful object of research due to their level of formalization and hence, also comparability. In interpreting the results, the differing manifesto culture amongst the three countries was taken into account.

In WP III, the media performance of senior politicians was analyzed. The timeframe for the selection of articles was one month prior to the elections (respectively, 01.02.2011-06.03.2012 in Estonia, 17.08-17.09-2011 in Latvia and 09.09.2008-12.10.2008 in Lithuania). Within that timeframe, only the articles that mediated a politician's or a party's position on political issues were chosen (opinion articles by politicians, interviews with politicians, portrait stories of politicians or news stories mediating a political position of a particular politician or party). That is, the aim was to analyze the firsthand positions of politicians themselves, and not the interpretations of the media, experts or other people. This was also used as a compensatory mechanism to the manifesto analysis, since not all parties viewed the electoral manifesto as an important instrument for propagating their views. Media, however, tends to be the central source of political information for the voters in the contemporary situation (Norris, 1999; Norris, 2000).

For the analysis, different types of mainstream media were used: a broadsheet mainstream newspaper (Postimees in Estonia, Diena in Latvia and Lietuvos Rytas in Lithuania), an online portal (Delfi in all three + 15min in Latvia and Lithuania, and Respublika in Lithuania, Õhtuleht in Estonia) and a popular pre-electoral TV debate were chosen. In addition, the research assistants were allowed to choose other mainstream news channels in case the parties were underrepresented in the primary three. The contents were analyzed according to the instructions for analysis (see Appendix 2) and an exemplary analysis.

Both the manifestos as well as the media were analyzed by native speakers who submitted a separate report on every party.

## 2.2 LITHUANIA

DP+J	<b>Coalition Labor Party + Youth</b>	<i>Koalicija Darbo Partija + Jaunimas</i>
FRONTAS	<b>Political Party "Front"</b>	<i>Fronto partija</i>
JL	<b>Young Lithuania</b>	<i>Jaunoji Lietuva</i>
LCP	<b>Lithuanian Centre Party</b>	<i>Lietuvos Centro Partija</i>
LiCS	<b>Liberal and Centre Union</b>	<i>Liberalų ir centro sąjunga</i>
LLRA	<b>Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania</b>	<i>Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija</i>
LRLS	<b>Liberal Movement</b>	<i>Liberalų Sąjūdis</i>
LRS	<b>Union of Russians in Lithuania</b>	<i>Lietuvos rusų sąjunga</i>
LSDP	<b>Social Democratic Party of Lithuania</b>	<i>Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija</i>
LSDS	<b>Lithuanian Social Democratic Union</b>	<i>Lietuvos socialdemokratų sąjunga</i>
LVŽS	<b>Lithuanian Peasant and Popular Union</b>	<i>Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga</i>
NS	<b>New Union (Social Liberals)</b>	<i>Naujoji sąjunga (socialliberalai)</i>
PDP	<b>Civic Democratic Party</b>	<i>Pilietinės demokratijos partija</i>

### Abbreviations used:

TPP	<b>National Resurrection Party</b>	<i>Tautos prisikėlimo partija</i>
TS-LKD	<b>Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats</b>	<i>Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai</i>
TT	<b>Order and Justice</b>	<i>Tvarka ir teisingumas</i>

**Table 3:** The percentage of total votes gathered by parties, the length of manifestos (in pages) and the number of articles analyzed in the case of Lithuania. The red line symbolizes electoral threshold. *Source: authors.*

TS-LKD	TPP	TT	LSDP	DP+J	LRLS	LiCS	LLRA	LVŽS	NS	FRONTAS	JL	PDP	LRS	LSDS	LCP
19,72%	15,09%	12,68%	11,72%	8,99%	5,73%	5,34%	4,79%	3,79%	3,64%	3,24%	1,75%	1,11%	0,86%	0,86%	0,70%
230pg	4pg	6pg	40pg	13pg	10pg	14pg	9pg	135pg	6pg	5pg	1,5pg	12pg	1,5pg	20pg	0,5pg
14art+TV	9art+TV	7art+TV	9art+TV	7art+TV	10art+TV	9art+TV	2art+TV	9art+TV	11art+TV	4art+TV	6art+TV	5art+TV	0	3art+TV	6art+TV

### 2.2.1 THE PEOPLE

The equivalent of “the people” in Lithuanian can be addressed by using different words and hence, varying in the meanings that are ascribed to the people. One of the often used terms is *tauta*, which also bears a meaning of a nation as a loaded and somewhat exclusive category. There is also a more neutral word, also meaning humans, *žmonės*. In addition, the people were also addressed as citizens or *piliečiai* that can be both a broad and neutral category (as in “ordinary citizens”) as well as a more exclusive category (as in „Lithuanian citizens”). Other synonymous words to address “the people” were residents/population (*gyventojai*) and everyone (*visi*), a more exclusive category for “the people” would be *nacija*, a nation/an ethnies.

Though the more exclusionary and more inclusionary words were sometimes used interchangeably, the discourses were still quite clearly distinguishable according to parties. The discursive cleavages clearly run between a nationalist (and somewhat more exclusive) construction and an insistently open construction that rather aims to create a socio-economical common identity (e.g. middle class, working people, etc.)

The more exclusive depiction of people was characteristic of more conservative parties such as the Homeland Union (TS-LKD) and the Lithuanian Centre Party (LCP) who stressed the characteristics of patriotism and national citizenship. Some right-leaning parties, however, used mixed discourses. For example, the National Resurrection Party (TPP) starts off with “*every citizen of Lithuania regardless of race, religion or nationality, would be proud of his homeland Lithuania, and would make her name famous by his good deeds*”, but then continues with statements such as “*we are born as Lithuanians*”. A similar strategy is also used by the party Order and Justice (TT). Such an ambivalent and

somewhat self-contradictory address confines with the logic of propaganda (e.g. according to Dennis Murphy) and in terms of identity discourse, carries a notion of obligations that is in literature more often associated with republicanism and communitarianism. The most exclusive and nationalist conceptions of “the people” come from the party Young Lithuania (JL), who use slogans such as „*Lithuania for Lithuanians!*“ and „*We are Lithuanians, the descendants of the ancient Aesti, and we have to be proud of it!*“. However, such more obliging slogans were also used by the social democratic wing, e.g. by a rather marginal party Lithuanian Social Democratic Union (LSDS) that stated „*any citizen of Lithuania could say "Lithuania is my country, she needs me, Lithuania – is me"*“.

More inclusionary addresses were characteristic of liberal and social democratic parties such as the Coalition of Labor Union + Youth (DP+J), Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS), New Union (NS), Social Democratic Party (LSDP) and the Social Democratic Union (LSDS), addressing their policies „for every people“, „for every person“, „all people of Lithuania“. That was also characteristic of ethnic parties such as the Union of the Russians of Lithuania (LRS) and Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) who should by definition address a narrower population, but aim for broader coalitions (which is also the thing to do according to the strategy of populism). For example, the LLRA depicts themselves as a party representing all the inhabitants of the Vilnius region in the mainstream media, and the Union of the LSR sees itself as a party representing „all citizens“. An exception to some extent was made by the Political Party Front (FRONTAS) that mostly identified as the representative of the working people, and the NS who mostly restricted itself to particular groups and rhetoric circulating around the middle class. However, as characteristic to populist movements, also they mainstreamed the concept, addressing everyone working for a salary as the working people (not a particular minority segment of unskilled workers) or depicting the middle class as very broad and the fundamental part of the society (including teachers, scientists, cultural workers, doctors, small and medium businessman, etc).

Hence, the appeal to the people was constructed either as deliberately open or patriotically exclusive, but some kind of identity politics was present in every manifesto and in a number of media addresses. What enabled to analyze the strength of populism in those identity politics were the commitment of the party to the people as well as the strategies used for winning the commitment of the people to that construction.

To do the latter, parties use the Gramscian technique of mobilizing “organic intellectuals”, searching allegiance to certain groups vital for the functioning of the society, and seen as being “respected by the people”. The more often recurring examples

are teachers, doctors, cultural workers and policemen, who were usually treated as important members of the society whose contribution should be valued more.

Several parties also outlined wider segments of society, e.g. families (some with clauses e.g. marital families or young families, working parents), youth (e.g. highly educated youth), pensioners, business people (e.g. small business owners and potential entrepreneurs) and a more unorthodox group of emigrants (or Lithuanians abroad) to get them to re-immigrate back to Lithuania. However, these groups were addressed using the rhetoric more characteristic to political marketing discourse rather than a populist discourse, offering particular benefits to the group, e.g. raising the salaries of teachers, cultural workers (PDP), child support for young families (NS) etc.

When putting these groups into perspective – whether they are favored also by the current power elite or even found the power elite, then by objective terms, these groups definitely do not found the power elite, but neither are they socially rejected (although are often not economically best well off). Almost all parties claim to represent the same “people” who is essentially and by definition not the same as establishment and hence not responsible for their malpractices. Perhaps the only exception that outlined a different perspective of the people is FRONTAS, who claims to represent the workers/working people rather than the whole society or the middle class which was more common. However, also they defined the working people rather broadly.

More populist stance becomes evident when looking at the relationship the parties construct between the people and themselves. There were clear protest parties such as TPP who put their peer group forward as people that are disappointed with the current system: *“average person disappointed with everything”*; and the Liberal Movement (LRLS) who claims to represent *„those who are tired of the hypocrisy of rulers and want better conditions for business, want to earn more money, get a better education, better quality health services“*. Even stronger rhetoric was used by FRONTAS that is fighting for the “working man” and being *„against any human exploitation“*, LRLS and LRA defending the ordinary people, LSDS defending the *„socially weaker ones“*, though they simultaneously try also to appeal to the majority, claiming to fulfill the *„expectations of the majority of the nation“*.

### 2.2.2 ANTAGONISM

In general, some kind of antagonism was presented in the case of every party analyzed. This was expected, since opposition with other political actors, the need to distinguish oneself from competitors as well as the need to mobilize the people, the potential voters, are the fundamentals of all politics. However, the actual levels of antagonism practiced

differed according to parties as well as according to the material analyzed. One clear general trend was the higher level of antagonism in the media than in the manifestos. The most ardent example of this is the NS who were very balanced and proactive in their manifesto, but in the media, they became rather colorful and attacking in their speech. However, the media analysis also revealed differences between individual politicians, also within the same party which can be a sign of work allocation within the party, but also induced by media who proposes topics.

In case of antagonism, an evident gradation of parties emerges. There are parties that do not articulate an “Other” at all. One example could be then government party LSDP who, could not legitimately argue against “the system in general”<sup>3</sup>, but who apparently choose not demonize opposition groups as well.. Also LiCS emphasizes it’s being non-antagonist political power and rather elaborates over the problems in Lithuania (through which an indirect antagonism can still be constructed, though the party does not aim to gain from the opposition in the populist sense, demonizing them). Also the LLRA and DP+J (in their manifesto<sup>4</sup>) use a very indirect construction of the “Other”, talking about the problem, but not referring to particular social groups or political forces:

*But unfortunately in our country is sometimes feared, say, some solutions, that somebody would not be accused of gratifying ethnic minorities or other social ideas of some sort. Unfortunately that happens in our country. (Tomaševski, 01.10, LLRA)*

The Peasant Popular Union (LVŽS) also tries to put up a very positive rhetoric primarily listing their own good deeds and not opposing and criticizing someone else, although some of the praise they give themselves is not exactly fully accurate. (E.g. they ascribe Lithuania’s joining the EU as their favor.) This party also aims to depict itself as an insistently non-populist and anti-populist party since one of the two „Others“ they construct both in their manifesto and in their media performances, are the “pseudo-reformatory new populist parties” that emerged prior to the 2008 elections. The opposition toward the allegedly populist parties in Lithuania is rather widespread – such remarks were also made e.g. by the TPP.

The next group of parties on the antagonism scale express moderate antagonism. They oppose other parties based on ideological differences and party competition. Such an opposition is not necessarily an indication of clear populism that begins to obstruct the “healthy democratic competition”, although this opposition was often accompanied by

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3 Government parties could argue against certain part of the system, for example Berlusconi's “magistrates are not letting the government govern freely”.

<sup>4</sup> In media discourse, DP+J expressed a much more antagonistic position



also more stringent systemic critique or even demonizing particular social groups. In moderate cases though, the Other is not demonized though is criticized. For the Homeland Union, the social democratic parties are an antipode. The new parties criticize traditional parties etc.

However, what was particular in Lithuanian party competition, many political forces were avoiding ideological self-positioning – for example the TPP manifested that they are not on the left, right or in the centre, but up front, leading political changes; the LLRA also abstained from defining themselves on the left-right scale. Others, particularly the Liberals' Movement who distinguished itself from other liberal parties (there are two other parties whose names contain the word „liberal“) and the revolutionary Marxist movement FRONTAS on the other hand defined their ideological distinction quite clearly. In other cases, however, parties and politicians preferred other dimensions of differentiation, namely between „traditional parties“ and Self, „new populist parties“ and Self, parties holding power and Self etc.

More radical antagonisms were constructed either against the (political) establishment or particular social groups; however, those social groups were not seen as mere groups in the society, but rather like a symptom of a disease which was the main problem to be fought against.

#### *Who is the Other?*

In general, there are three main groups that are opposed and three other that are also opposed, but not as unanimously (hence, let them be claimed the *secondary fiends of the Lithuanian people*):

- politicians/political elite
- bureaucrats/civil servants
- big business owners/monopolies
- Other states: Russia and Poland
- particular minority groups – homosexuals, immigrants, double citizens
- criminals

The antagonism most often constructed, irrespective of the level of opposition was between the Self and other politicians or political parties, particularly those in government or in the parliament (also called systemic parties). Though this issue paves way to antagonisms of various gradations (in some cases it was just an indirect hint, e.g. by LiCS; in others a direct attack, demonizing the political forces, e.g. by PDP).

The political establishment is ascribed with vices such as corruption, stalemate and viewed as an autonomous system more related to each other than the woes of the

people. For Example, Rolandas Paksas, the leader of TT used a classic narrative of the mainstream political forces that have become mutually beneficial for each other, constituting a closed political class, using the metaphor of an hourglass:

*Lithuania's political, economic, public administration life all 18 years after restoration of independence was counted like time is counted in a hourglass. Conservatives at the top - sand is flowing into the container of Social Democrats and vice versa. During those 18 years Lithuanian people were robbed all the time and with each year there were less and Less order and justice. Banking collapse, EBSW robberies - the Social Democrats on the top. Mažeikiai Oil, Williams' affair - the Conservatives on the top. A change after election again - Alita privatization, famous LEO affair - the Social Democrats find themselves once again on the top. [Paksas 09.10, TT].*

In some cases, the dissatisfaction with the so-called traditional parties was also translated into dissatisfaction with the fundamental institutions of the political system. For example, the parliamentarians were depicted as the „ship of fools“ by a member of the TPP, a member (Atra) of JL refers to the selfish „Seimas lunatics“, a member (Masiulis) of the LRLS talked about the „sleeping government“ which sometimes makes „absolutely stupid decisions“.

However, in most cases, dissatisfaction was aired about politicians as actors, not with the political system as a whole (which would be more populist). This can be illustrated also with a quote from the manifesto of JL:

*In Lithuania such "systemic" as they call themselves, or traditional, what also should mean something, as we know there are two - the Conservatives and Social Democrats. <...> What is common between the two "systems"? That eternal genteel pomposity and support for each other against the populists, that "threat from the outside." You see, in their view, only these two outgrowths can manage the state, while the populists, that evil, would only destroy everything. [Manifesto, JL]*

The primary negative characteristics of such politicians were alleged dishonesty, irresponsibility, corruption and the pursuit of power, buying elections etc. A more particular discourse had to do with the Soviet past and the former elites or people associated with them. Particularly members of the Soviet successor party, the LSDP as well as the TS-LKD were depicted as the converts of Komsomol members. Communist nomenklatura was more of an issue to liberal parties trying to appeal to younger electorate: DP+J, JL, but also TT who refers to KGB reservists as a threat and their antipode. However – and this differs a lot from Estonia and Lithuania – party is the level of highest specificity – in general, neither the candidates nor the parties mention specific names.

The opposed political elites were also termed with the word „statesmen“ – PDP opposes the “statesmen clan” („valstybininkų klano“). The word that has respectable denotations in English language (and particularly in the American tradition) is rather used as a

negative term, equal to that of „apparatchiks“ from the Soviet time. Here, the distinction between politicians and civil servants begins to fade, since they share the vices with politicians – by deciding not in the interest of the people and being corrupt – although they are sometimes mentioned as a separate group.

Another group that was mentioned almost as often and particularly by left-leaning parties and political newcomers were the entrepreneurs, or more specifically, „monopolists“, big businesses etc. The arch enemy in this field seemed to be a retail group Maxima, which is also one of the biggest corporations in Lithuania; but also the Lithuanian Electricity Organization, or a then new monopoly in its field was often mentioned. As a representative of FRONTAS put it, „the real lawmakers are cunning business companies“ (Palecis, FRONTAS, ex-LSDP member).

But also interest groups, lobbyists and everyone else trying to have a say in politics are often demonized. For example, TT depicts them as the ones ruling Lithuania instead of politicians and hence responsible or at least an accomplice in corruption and other vices. A similar grudge against lobbyists and other activists is born by the PDP who tends to include them in the same line with criminals.

The external other is most often Russia. As formulated in Homeland Union's manifesto, „It is light-minded not to see the dangers and their changing nature, raised by Russia's neighborhood“. But also Poland is sometimes treated as a threat by parties that were more radical in their discourse, primarily due to the fact that the Lithuanian oil refinery was bought up by a Polish company (sic). This is also seen as a threat to Lithuanian statehood (PDP). The third Other is the European Union, which is in most cases directly opposed, but rather nuances of its organization are opposed. E.g. PDP opposes the euro, „which together with current inflation increases social exclusion“, JL demonizes European bureaucrats, etc. However, there are other parties (LSDP, LiCS) that deliberately stress that there is currently no military or other external threat.

Finally, there is a numerous section of Others that do not fall under the aforementioned categories. These are often minority groups in the society – ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, immigrants (and people who want to buy land in Lithuania), multiple citizens etc. These are usually depicted as a threat – for example, TS-LKD writes in their manifesto that the Polish always go to vote and if Lithuanians will not, the Polish have a „real opportunity to get over the 5 percent threshold“. In general, this kind of incitement tends to be more characteristic of smaller more marginal parties, particularly JL and LCP.

A group that is sometimes related to populist antagonism is the intellectual elite that are often challenged by populists. In this case, such an Other was almost never mentioned –

the exception comes from DP+J who criticizes also the president and the intelligentsia in the media. Rather, what is opposed are the politicians from the entertainment sector<sup>5</sup>, opposed to experts, specialists and public figures (LRLS) who were seen as part of Us or the ally of the party in some other perspective.

In general, parties were not very specific about the measures to be applied toward the other – it was more about threatening and demonizing than taking direct action. Most parties saw the prime measures in seizing power (e.g. TT – „we hope, prepare and surely it will be, we alone will form the ruling majority in the next Seimas”, Mazuronis, TV debates).

### 2.2.3 HEARTLAND

The Heartland was not elaborated in much detail. Although most parties expressed their prime values and a picture of a normative societal order could be constructed on the basis of most manifestos, there was little resemblance to Taggart's idea of a narrative of a golden age. Rather, heartland was almost always depicted to be in the future, as an aim or a policy goal. For example, TS-LKD whose main slogan was „Different Lithuania“, which would embody people who „would be better to each other and homeland“, a responsible state that treats its citizens respectfully, honest, unselfish and flawlessly behaving state officials and civil servants; strong families and strong moral society; equal justice for everybody; „uniform democratic order“; more compassion, solidarity and unity; unpolluted nature and public life spaces, not destroyed cultural heritage and environment as a whole; „honest government devoted to serve honestly“; and where „children, looking with confidence to the future, will be able to create a fortune here in a free Homeland“. Similar slogans were put forth by LiCS whose motive was „Better Lithuania“.

More frequent than the narrations of Heartland was the depiction of the current situation as being in crisis. This was most evident in the manifestos of the marginal parties PDP and LCP. In some cases, there was also an Anti-Heartland constructed that was sometimes positioned in the recent years, but also negative scenarios of the future were put forth. The starkest example was put forth by FRONTAS who articulated an Anti-Heartland of emigrating country where everyone is suffering while the oligarchs and „thieves“ are ruling the country. But also recent history was viewed in drastic colors by some parties, most notably, by PDP who depicted Lithuania as an „ill“ patient who

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<sup>5</sup> Which can also be considered as an indirect attack on the TPP whose leader, Arūnas Valinskas is a former performer and producer.

would need to be healed: "Our homeland Lithuania has changed dramatically in eighteen years. It became a free state, and we – its free citizens. It is the greatest value and our most important achievement, so we can worthily be proud of our country." Pride in country is also a recurring theme, also present e.g. in JL's manifesto.

Slight differences from the progressive view that the future is bright were put forward by TPP and TT. For TT, the future is built on heroic past; in TPP's discourse, there is an important place for the term „preservation“ – their image of heartland twirls around the preservation of national culture, language and identity. For example, TPP cites a Lithuanian humanist and one of the creators of Lithuanian written language, Mikalojus Daukša (1527 or 1538 – 1613):

*The development of Lithuanian culture, the fostering of regional identity and the preservation of native language – is the basis of survival of the Lithuanian nation in the world community of nations. After all, "the nations are alive not by the strength of towns and castles, but mostly by maintaining and using their language..." [Manifesto, TPP]*

According to topics, the most desirable features of the heartland are welfare, educated people, and a state that is more responsive to citizens. One of the more marginal parties, Social Democratic Union goes so far as to suggest adding a declaration that Lithuania should be a welfare state to the Constitution. In addition, some parties, e.g. LiCS, TT, JL and LCP narrate a strong state as an ideal, others, e.g. in DP+J, LLRA, JS's view „European style democracy“ is an ideal.

In several cases, the visions had to do with longevity – „seeking to preserve Lithuania for future generations“ (JS), being “a free, prosperous state, where it has to be good and safe to live for us, our children and grandchildren” (Grauziniene 09.10) – are also a recurring motif.

#### 2.2.4 POLICY ISSUES

In Lithuania, the breadth of policy proposals varies to a great extent. As also visible in Table 2, the length of the electoral manifestos varied from half a page to 230 pages. However, when leaving aside the ethnic parties LRS and LLRA, there are no single issue parties, for all propose a somewhat broader political program. A narrower focus is proposed by such parties as TPP which instead of a policy agenda proposed their version of the Ten Commandments; JL, LRS and LCP whose manifesto was only half a page long and who put forth only twelve promises.

Concerning the content of the policies, then almost all policies that are classically viewed as populist were present. The most oft-mentioned kind were redistributive policies (that

in many cases were presented in manifestos that also promised lowering taxes), the most colorful example being perhaps the manifesto of JL who proposed clearly Robin Hood type of policies - taking from the rich and making everything free (health care, extracurricular activities for children, state regulated and reduced commodity prices, progressive taxes, but also some tax reliefs for companies and making easier starting up businesses). However, there were also numerous examples of policy proposals backing up the populist dimension of identity politics.

Conservative parties – TS-LKD, TT and TPP – that were the winners of those elections proposed policy programs that clearly transcended every ideological boundary. In fact, they tended to be more generous with various benefits and welfare policy than the social democratic LSDP and DP+J. However, in addition, they also proposed quite a broad selection of policies promising a political system reform and also pursuing policies that would back up their identity politics – the strongest example among those were the anti-Russian policies of TS-LKD, the party that scored the most votes and who amongst other things proposed higher taxes to cultural products from Russia or in Russian, e.g. Russian movies that were not dubbed. A more radical example comes from the marginal LCP who promised to deport immigrants once their work contract in Lithuania ended.

Otherwise, the most radical propositions came from parties proposing political reform. For example, TT promised large structural changes particularly in governance, but also in redistribution. They clearly favor a presidential political system, propose key reforms such as constitutional reform, public administration reform, legal system reform, restructuring regional governance and changing the electoral systems, initiating direct elections of mayors, elders, judges, prosecutors and senior police commissioners – in other words, propose changing the political system fundamentally. In addition, they propose smaller reforms such as reducing the number of signatures needed for referendum, and propose several new rules for the Seimas – e.g. reducing the number of MP-s by half, “to eliminate all benefits and privileges to members of Seimas”, “a law on the cancellation of Seimas member in case of poor representation of the interests of voter” etc.

Their policy catalogue also includes several other reforms, e.g. simplifying the tax system, but also promises of social benefits - more redistribution, higher pensions and salaries for teachers, early retirement for teachers (after 25 years of teaching), as well as promises in the style of distributing goods from airplane such as providing free internet for everybody. In addition, the party promises to implement media control (ensure that it will “help develop a healthy attitude to human life, its purpose and responsibility in society”) – hence also the catalogue of moral promises is also present.

Other, more marginal parties that also proposed changes in political system, were FRONTAS, also promising reducing the number of seats in Seimas, LSDS, proposing mandatory participation in elections and DP+J who promised to lower the age census for running for the parliament. In addition, several of these parties made declarations about policies that would tackle the problems with their constructed Other – namely, the corrupt politicians and officials, monopolies but also lobbyists and interest groups wishing to affect policy making, as well as lustration, that is policies against the Soviet time functionaries. What was lacking though, were the concrete measures against corrupt politicians as well as monopolies or the power of business interest groups in politics. The only example here was the otherwise rather moderate DP+J who proposed outlining the politicians' code of ethic. Things were somewhat more concrete (but still more slogan-based than policy instruments) with tackling media that was seen as a trouble maker by some parties. In addition to TT, this was put forward by the LVŽS who otherwise tended to be rather proactive and moderate in its proposals, as well as the more radical and marginal PDP:

*We will create a public and strict evaluation system, based on the spiritual values of society, of every print, radio or TV station, according to its loyalty to the State of Lithuania. [Manifesto, PDP]*

The least populist policy proposals were made by the liberal parties, i.e. NS, LiCS and LRLS. This is also utterly predictable since in most approaches, liberalism and populism are the ultimate antipodes. Also, the social democratic LSDP that was the prime minister party before the elections remained rather modest

In addition to the classical policy issues, it seems that two additional policy fields are a terrain for populist policies in Lithuania – namely, energy policy and cultural policy. Energy sector An issue mentioned in almost all manifestos was the then topical closing down Ignalina nuclear power plant which the EU had demanded and had also financed. The majority of parties, however, opposed this and proposed keeping Ignalina running, some with the clause of as long as it is safe. Although this would be a classical example of a populist policy – opposing a government policy that is rather unpopular with the people as that would result in a number of people losing their jobs and increasing the energy deficit – it did not run along the lines of populism present with other topics. For example, one of the few political forces favoring the shut-down was TPP.

Cultural policy seemed also to be on an important position. Naturally, this was not as topical as the shut-down of the Ignalina power plant, but it often coincided well with the identity politics of particular parties. Examples of policies were raising salaries of cultural workers (as the cultural workers were depicted similarly to the policemen and teachers etc, i.e the organic intelligentsia), reorganizing administration of culture, decentralizing it, etc. (e.g. TT, TPP)

### 2.2.5 CRITICISM

The amount of criticism varied broadly according to similar lines with the proactive proposals that were proposed. Some parties – e.g. LSDP, LLRA, NS and LVŽS rarely used criticism in their manifestos. There was somewhat more attacking of opponents in the media, however, also there they in general remained more proactive than their opponents. The more remarkable examples in terms of the amount of criticism were FRONTAS, LCP and TT who devoted a lot of their energy on criticism both of the current situation as well as other actors, e.g. other parties, the current establishment etc. The LCP devoted almost half of its manifesto on criticism while only the other half remained for proactive solutions. In addition, also the more mainstream TS-LKD used a lot of criticism. And although this was rhetorically rather laden, it also exemplifies its position back then as an opposition party:

*The current electoral system does not guarantee that competent, honest individuals, able to deal with state and local communities, would be elected to the Seimas or councils. [Manifesto, TS-LKD]*

In general however, policy criticism was used on principal issues and used to express rather strong opposition. For example, the whole political system was seen as “rotten”, there was quite a lot of criticism over the lack of (Christian/Catholic) moral in politics, particularly brought forward by LLRA, PDP, LVŽS.

In general, the smaller and less eventually, less successful parties (e.g. LCP, LSDS, JL, PDP etc) put more effort into criticizing policies than offering proactive ones.

### 2.2.6 SCOPE

The number of parties proposing rather revolutionary policy measures was remarkable in the case of Lithuania – a lot of propositions were made to radically transform the political system, e.g. install presidential party system; revise the administrative system, e.g. abolish some ministries or create new ones, greatly reduce the number of bureaucrats etc; install new radical entitlement measures, e.g. average salaries for mothers; deport immigrants once their work contract ends or propose censorship over media.

In several cases, however, the scope of the party's policy is difficult to assess, since either they have not proposed concrete measures, or the measures they have proposed do not live up to their policy goals they have outlined. For example, FRONTAS aims to change the balance between the workers/poor and rich/businessmen. How this will be



achieved, is not clear. PDP on the other hand proposes a number of concrete measures, but the expected outcome or aim remains vague:

*We will legally regulate only general principles of life, with more confidence and applying the mutual agreement, generally accepted social norms in daily activities. It is necessary to return to the principle in the lawmaking: "what is not forbidden - that is allowed." Let's create the country, developing in harmony, which relies not only on legal regulation, but also on the generally accepted norms of morality: which distinguishes what is right and true and what is immoral and reprehensible. [Manifesto, PDP]*

### 2.2.7 ELABORATENESS

All in all, the elaborateness of policy proposals was more or less in line with the length of manifestos as well as with the percentage of the vote gathered.

Although the elaborateness of manifestos is not always at top level, are not very many „magical solutions“ in the manifestos. The superficial manifestos tend to leave measures out of question altogether and simply postulate that „we must achieve X“. If any magical solutions, then some parties see a heavy-handed government as such, promoting centralization, nationalization and dependence of large sectors of society on state aid.

One key question concerning the elaborateness of the manifestos is: where do the funds come from to cover the promises made? Only a couple of parties have provided a concise answer to the question, adding a calculation or indicating a source that could also serve in practice. Several parties indicate EU funds as the source, while others give no indication, particularly among the parties who aim to cut taxes and increase benefits simultaneously.

### 2.2.8 CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, it is visible that populist discourse tends to be more widely presented amongst more marginal parties below the electoral threshold. The more radical parties include LCP, PDP, JL and FRONTAS, but from amongst the more popular ones, also TT. The key characteristics that seem to unite Lithuanian populists are the aspiration for a strong state and more moral society, but they also aspire for more equality and economic welfare. Populism in Lithuania also brings forth the deep condemnation of current economic affairs and it seems that despite the state funding for parties, particularly TS-LKD and LSDP are associated with business interests and intermingling between politics and economy.

**Table 4:** Gradations of populism according to parties in Lithuania. The red line indicates threshold, different shades of orange demonstrate the less populist (lighter) and more populist (darker) discourse. *Source: authors.*

	The people	Antagonism	Heartland	Policies	Criticism	Scope	Elaborateness
TS-LKD							
TPP							
TT							
LSDP							
DP+J							
LRLS							
LiCS							
LLRA							
LVŽS							
NS							
FRONTAS							
JL							
PDP							
LRS							
LSDS							
LCP							

## 2.3 LATVIA

### Abbreviations used:

BBND	<b>Freedom. Free from Fear, Hate and Anger</b>	<i>Brīvība. Brīvs no bailēm, naida un dusmām</i>
KDS	<b>Christian Democratic Union</b>	<i>Kristīgi demokrātiskā savienība</i>
LPP/LC	<b>Latvia's First Party/Latvian Way</b>	<i>Latvijas Pirmā Partija/Latvijas Ceļš</i>
LSDSP	<b>Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party</b>	<i>Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskā Strādnieku Partija</i>
NA	<b>National Alliance "All For Latvia!" – "For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK"</b>	<i>Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” – „Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK”</i>
PCTVL	<b>For Human Rights in United Latvia</b>	<i>Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā</i>
PP	<b>Last Party</b>	<i>Pēdējā partija</i>
PPR	<b>For Presidential Republic</b>	<i>Par prezidentālu republiku</i>
SC	<b>Harmony Centre</b>	<i>Saskaņas Centrs</i>
ZRP	<b>Zatlers' Reform Party</b>	<i>Zatlera Reformu Partija</i>
ZZS	<b>Union of Greens and Farmers</b>	<i>Zaļo un Zemnieku Savienība</i>
TK	<b>People's Control</b>	<i>Tautas kontrole</i>
V	<b>Unity</b>	<i>Vienotība</i>

**Table 5:** The percentage of total votes gathered by parties, the length of manifestos (in pages) and the number of articles analyzed in the Latvian case. The red line indicates the electoral threshold. *Source: authors.*

	SC	ZRP	V	NA	ZZS	LPP/LC	PCTVL	PP	PPR	TK	LSDSP	BBND	KDS
% of total vote	28,36%	20,82%	18,83%	13,88%	12,22%	2,41%	0,78%	0,49%	0,31%	0,28%	0,28%	0,22%	0,22%
length of manifesto (pages)	1,5pg <sup>6</sup>	59pg	55pg	37pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg	1,5pg
media coverage (articles + TV debates)	20art+TV	18art+TV	19art+TV	22art+TV	19art+TV	15art+TV	1art+TV	1art+TV	2art+TV	2art+TV	1art+TV	1art+TV	1art+TV

### 2.3.1 THE PEOPLE

The construction of people in Latvian 2011 elections was in general, rather open and present on a rather broad scale. It was usually depicted as inclusive, admitting the differences, and addressing it with rather open terms – the society, humans, individuals, voters, but also as *tauta*, which, similarly to the same word in Lithuanian, represents a more loaded category of a nation.

This is varied only by some more radical parties, e.g. the National Alliance (NA) also used the concept of a nation/ethnie (*nacija*) instead of the people, also calls it the „original nation“, and even talks about the „national voter“, someone who chooses to vote for “Latvian” parties and considers the interests of Latvian state in the first place; “national voter” by definition would never support “Russian” parties.

One of the parties associated with Russophone electorate, Centre for Harmony (SC) on the other hand, remains very open in its conceptualization of people (as did the ethnic parties in Estonia and Lithuania), although does carry a populist note in depicting the people as being in trouble and presenting themselves – though implicitly – as the saviors:

*Our major problem – poverty and increase of social tension – exists independently from nationality and language. [Manifesto, SC]*

The other party representing the Russophone electorate, For Human Rights in United Latvia (PCTVL), on the other hand, deals only with the problems of non-citizens and Russophones – both in declarations and in policy proposals. However, also they aim for

<sup>6</sup> In Latvia, all parties are obliged to present a short version of the electoral manifesto (4000 characters, that is approximately 1,5 pages) to the Central Election Commission of Latvia. Some parties did not present a long manifesto at all or this was not accessible by the researchers at the time of the project.

broadder respectability, by using the “organic intelligentsia”, the teachers and policemen also to appeal to wider masses, not just a single ethnic group.

In general, the rhetoric concerning the people is rather moderate. There are implicit hints that the parties aim to represent the people and their interest, but this is made explicit only by some. The most classical examples of populism are the parties For Presidential Republic (PPR) and People’s Control (TK) who call themselves the true representatives of people and demand power back to the people. PPR provides a classic elaboration of the people and its relation to the party:

*Latvia – it is me, you, we! Do not let politicians spoil your life, who remember about the people once in four years. Come and do it together! For presidential republic! [Manifesto, PPR]*

Other parties who claim to stand for the people or endorse the groups that are currently underrepresented or whose interests are not prioritized, include a broader spectrum of parties, including PPR, TK, SC, LSDSP, and PCTVL. These groups include “deprived and less-secured families”, “state inhabitants who are sliding in poverty”, the unemployed, the owners of small enterprises, pensioners, families, disabled people, large families, poverty-stricken people and other „socially unshielded groups“.

What is also evident in the case of Latvia is the great variance in rhetoric of party members. While the leader of SC, Nils Ušakovs remains a moderate who is willing to compromise, other party members, e.g. Anderjs Elksniņš feature much more toxic rhetoric:

*Horriifying is the understanding how was it possible that the nation who was so high in their intellectual level could for many years support those few, by giving them the best and also the last, that we had, those who driven the same nation until such a disaster. (...) Our people are again becoming a toy for the countless parties. (...) People are tired of these countless fights and want to obtain a strong leader, who will save our nation from the ominous chaos. [Elksniņš 26.08, SC]*

The same is evident in reverse with the Zatlers’ Reform Party (ZRP) where other members of the party remain more modest and moderate, but Valdis Zatlers himself uses more populist rhetoric.

### 2.3.2 ANTAGONISM

As in Estonia, the antagonism tended to be more of a means of political debate than radical exclusion. It tended to rely more on political opposition between the various ideologies of parties etc. Of course, for Latvia, the stage was also set by the dissolution of parliament that delegitimized the sitting politicians (or legitimized their delegitimation), and hence bears some resemblance also to Lithuania where the ruling political elite was

frequently demonized. This was used as a justification for bringing new people as well as new parties to the arena. Also PPR advertised itself as the „new generation party“. The most spectacular example of this was however, the ZRP that was a newly established party who brought in a number of new people, also setting up a political newcomer as their prime minister candidate.

*Unawareness of the old system is his advantage that will allow implementation of a new platform. If we want to break the old, corruptive system, a new Prime minister must come, who is able to create new relations between entrepreneurs and the government. [Sprūdžs 01.09, ZRP]*

Ironically, a similar strategy was used by the alliance formerly called Latvia's First Party (LPP/LC), though which changed its name into Šlersers' Reform Party LPP/LC prior to elections, hence also directly opposing ZRP. (Such a strategy in creating oppositions was of course, not unique – Latvia's First Party had been an inspiration for the naming of The Last Party (PP) – a protest party that also ran in 2011 elections.)

*The people just recently have said no to the current parliament and, in my opinion, there should be people who have not previously worked there. (...) Of course, sometimes the impression is that the state is not for people, but the people are for the state. Last year and also before the impression emerged that the budget consolidation is an aim in itself, where there is no thinking how the increased taxes and decreased wages will concern the common man. [Jukna 01.09 LPP/LC]*

More populist parties took the advantage of criticizing all parties that had governed, thus trumping the more mainstream. This was used for example by the PPR, where they explicitly opposed themselves to the existing parties who are depicted as intertwined with oligarchs and business interests:

*In contrast to the power parties and their unions that have lead people into poverty, we are a new political force, free from oligarchs and international capital, and truly represent exclusively and only the interests of the people. (...) We return the power to the people! (...) Do not let politicians who remember the people once in four years spoil your life. [Manifesto, PPR]*

TK used a similar approach, though is more focused on particular examples and hence resembles more the discourse of mainstream parties.

*"When the first alarm bells ringed in Latvia as the demographic problem was felt, the then president Guntis Ulmanis said: "There is nothing I can do about it". That was in the beginning of 90's. In 1993 the prime minister Birkavs from "Latvian Way" (currently again the representative from "Latvian Way" promises us everything) said that the government has foreseen the need for an elaborate demographic program and so forth. Where is it? There is none. I feel pity for the viewers, because to listen this, it is so pitiful. (...) In 2009 here were 50,000 socially deprived persons. Currently this number has risen to 190,000. The situation had worsened because of governing parties." [Jablokovs 12.09 TK]*

One of the accusations the politicians and parties used against one another was the label of an oligarch – a concept notorious in Latvia. The usage of the term was not as symbolic

and indirect as in Lithuania – it is a more concrete title ascribed to particular political personalities, for example, the long time leader of the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS), Aivars Lembergs, but also his fellow party members. However, they aim to defend against that – in the LTV1 pre-electoral debate show, deputy candidate from ZZS Inese Aizstrauta was forced to respond several times to critique that ZZS is an oligarch party. She responded that in contrast to other person, referring to Valdis Zatlers, she has not visited an apartment of George Soros, a person also labeled an oligarch, implying on the ideological background and contingency of the tag.

The concept of oligarchs was the driving force behind ZRP's campaign, though not in a radical sense. Even if it opposes the system literally in its public performances, this concept means something rather narrow, more the style of politics or the power relations within the government, for they do not oppose that much the policies implemented, but rather just the people who have implemented them and not the fundamentals of the system.

*I [Valdis Zatlers] have gathered into Zatler's Reform Party new, educated and capable people, who have not participated in privatization schemes in the 90's and in other dirty deals of these countries' politicians. These people have a new way of thinking and new values. [Zatlers 15.09 ZRP]*

Another characteristic that got some criticism has to do with a shifting ideological position. Hence it is ambition for power vs. ideological clarity. This is also what Ainars Šlesers (LPP/LC) used against Valdis Zatlers:

*Valdis Zatlers is like a like limber eel, like a vane [constantly changing his mind]. At one moment he is in favor of same sex marriage legalization, in another moment against, and then again in favor. This only again proves ambidexterity of Zatlers, and him following political conjuncture. This is one of his many pseudo-reforms that is intended to cover up his lack of propositions of importance to the state. [Šlesers 31.08 LLP/LC].*

However, leaving direct accusations between politicians and parties behind, a second important and recurring theme among antagonisms was the depiction of the relationship between the people and the state. Concerning this issue, there seemed to be two opposing positions, one of them clearly populist, the other less so. Some parties, e.g. the Unity (V), ZRP and SC are seeking an equilibrium between the interests and needs of the state and the people – which they therefore admit as being oppositional, particularly in the context of the financial crisis. However, they aim to develop both, as also symbolically manifested in the title of V's electoral program – “For Latvian people and state” and SC-s search for a compromise between fiscal discipline and social stability:

*It is important to observe fiscal discipline but social stability is of the same importance, to maintain at least some kind of level if income for pensioners, to help those who are not able to help themselves. [Ušakovs 06.09 SC]*

The more populist parties on the other hand do not treat equilibrium as an option and declare the clear preference of peoples' interest over the interests of the state by seeing them as synonymous in ideal circumstances or also in practice. For example, TK proposes the classical slogan of populists also manifest in their name – to give the power back to the people:

*It is time for the people to take power in the country! People in the referendum expressed they will and 10th Saeimas deputies are dismissed. (...) We will fight, that Latvia in the future will become socially responsible, just and strong peoples state with one of the highest levels of welfare, education and economy in the world. [Manifesto, TK]*

While in Estonia, this discourse was more antagonistic (the cleavage along the parties tended to run between the parties for the people's interest vs. the parties for the states' interest, there was quite a lot of criticism about forgetting the people's interests over state's interests by the ruling coalition), in Latvia, this search for the equilibrium appeared more sincere.

However, hence, also criticism was stronger – the Latvian government was criticized for not pursuing neither the state's nor the people's interests, and hence failing. For example, Ainars Šlesers (LPP/LC) criticized his successor's work:

*Prime minister Valdis Dombrovskis and his team fighting against Latvian success story that was created by Ainars Šlesers totally ignored interests of the state. The government has demonstrated remarkable incompetence and continues to do so also in these days – in the moment when fast and decisive decisions are needed, they are postponed to the period after elections. On the time when all are busy with coalition formation. [Šlesers 14.09 LPP/LC]*

Šlesers continued to criticize the government and work of Dombrovskis (V) by writing an open letter to the president, opposing the way current political leaders were dealing with this important problem:

*Shocking facts appeared in public space about the inaction of the government of Valdis Dombrovskis and inability to resolve the financial problems of national air company airBaltic. (...) However, the government and prime minister do not act. This proclaims about inability of the Valdis Dombrovskis government to take on decisions or about malicious inaction. (...) In time when only post allocation will be in the minds of politicians, and airBaltic perhaps will no longer exist. [Šlesers 15.09 LPP/LC]*

Third major antagonist discourse depicts the opposition along ethnic lines and ethnopolitics. The strongest rhetoric was used by National Alliance who opposes "Russified minorities", "Russian compatriots", "guest workers from post-soviet countries", "illegal immigrants", "Russian-speaking minorities" as well as people „who are disloyal to the Latvian state“, which mainly implies to those who cannot speak Latvian. Among other parties, also Unity and Union of Greens and Farmers expresses some, though milder and more implicit opposition. The antagonism created by the

National alliance is radical, also demanding deportation of people who do not speak Lithuanian.

Ethnic issues are also the core the National Alliance judges other parties by:

*Our propositions were supported only by one party, that is "Unity". All other parties had this cynical attitude. Once more I want to emphasize that one of those parties was "Centre of Harmony" who tries here to look fluffy and innocent. (...) Centre of Harmony reminds a two-head chicken, who to Russian media says that all Latvian parties are fascist and to Latvian media – that we are the biggest Latvian friends. [Rasnačs, LTV1 debate 29.08 NA]*

However, as usual, there were also attempts to streamline themselves and rather draw the cleavage based on mindset than primordial characteristics:

*If we were to say that all Russians must go to Russia, then hardly in our party list there would be Ludmila Socneva, member of Russian intelligentsia (...) [Džintars 18.08 NA]*

The example also demonstrates the discursive strategy where the intelligentsia is used as a prominent concept, hence demonstrating that ethnic and class-based populism (or populism related to cultural production) is kept separate, while the latter does not seem to be very important. Another strategy that is used to soften the anti-Russian stance is using general categories, e.g. putting Russians in line with other ethnic minorities and depicting those as harmless and acceptable, whereas the Russian minority de facto has stepped over a "reasonable" line:

*We need to advocate the real minority schools – Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Jewish (...) and also Russian. But there is no need to use Russian language as contrast to Latvian language. This is what supports the "post-soviet space". [Žile 31.08 NA]*

This quote also demonstrates how the Russian minority is related to the narrative of one of the Anti-Heartlands discussed in the next section – the (post-)Soviet time.

However, one party amongst the more curious and more marginal cases was the party Freedom. Free from Fear, Hate and Anger (BBND) that negates, even antagonizes antagonism.

*Differences in language and nationality are not barrier for state unity. Population should not be divided according to nationalities. People have right on their identity, to create unions and schools. (...) Latvia was occupied but today there are no occupants living here. [Manifesto, BBND]*

The only issue where some aversion is implicit is the issue of corrupt bureaucrats or officials serving for very long terms, though also this is rather seen as curable problem. Perhaps this is related to the fact that there is practically nothing political about the so-called party – it is an initiative by a psychic who obviously is battling with battle, trying to depoliticize or mitigate the political struggle rather than put forth clear political goals.



And even though BBND scored only a marginal number of votes, its presence still demonstrates discontent with political antagonisms that are used to mobilize a particular segment of the electorate.

Such an opposition is also manifest in another marginal party, the Last Party (PP) that advocates politics without parties (opposes party democracy) and claims to achieve this according to an evolutionary logic.

In addition, there are other mentions of „the Other“ – e.g. foreign capital (FPR), the economic crisis (V) interest groups (ZRP) – that bear some resemblance to both Lithuania and Estonia – and some other factors, though these were not as prevalent.

The external other that was present in the discourse of multiple parties was Russia. Though this was usually not elaborated to depth and was present implicitly, through policy proposals, e.g. the need to develop a gas market to reduce dependency from Gazprom that is depicted as the instrument of Russian foreign policy (ZRP). Interestingly, the European Union was appreciated even by the nationally minded and populist National Alliance.

### 2.3.3 HEARTLAND

Almost no party gave a straightforward narrative of the Heartland. However, outlining the Anti-Heartland was quite widespread, particularly in the media. The Anti-Heartland was very often seen in the momentum, in the state-of-the-art of politics during the electoral campaign (e.g. by ZRP, TK, ZZS) – hence the depiction of a *crisis* was clearly present – but even more negative rhetoric was narrated within the whole independence time as well as in the Soviet past. This was particularly evident in Unity's campaign, but also described by candidates of NA. For example, Unity used a depiction of the "thick years" – the time of exponential economic growth and the increased possibilities this created for the government in office back then. However, this narrative also included the parties that were in the government back then (they most likely hint at the government led by Aigars Kalvitis and his predecessors) because of the policies and their indecision that made Latvia tumble so deep into the economic crisis.

The closest idea to a Heartland was usually located somewhere in the future. This is also echoed by the article by Valdis Zatlers (ZRP):

*In these elections we have two choices. We can vote for some of the old parties and then, most plausibly, everything will be as it was. The same faces in TV, the same justification, allocation of offices, intrigues and other nonsense. Nothing will change. And we can vote for Zatler's Reform party. And in spite of what the*

*others try to tell us, finally altogether to believe that wise and honest state governance actually is matter-of-choice. [Zatlers 15.09 ZRP]*

The strongest narrative of heartland however, lies behind the metaphor Lettic Latvia, used by the NA and ZZS. NA's Lettic Latvia is associated with nostalgia of Interwar period and program for reaching the „Fourth revival“ (*Ceturtā atmoda*). In several aspects, the inter-war period is perceived as an ideal State with strong leader, patriotic education, strength of Latvian language and traditions. However, understanding that times have changed, party offers ten rules which should be followed in order to reach the “Fourth revival”.

Also ZZS is there to:

*„take care of responsible education of Latvian citizens and patriots. (...) To strengthen the role of Latvian language as a state language and culture of its use in all spheres of public action. (...) To exalt Lettic traditions, labor virtue, sense of own yard and master of land.“ [Manifesto, ZZS]*

A more utopian future Heartland is outlined by the PP who is aspiring towards politics and governance without parties, but rather as a direct and participatory democracy. ˇ

#### 2.3.4 POLICY ISSUES

The range of policies and the reach of the manifesto depended to some extent on whether the long manifesto was accessible, or whether only the short compulsory version was used. Hence, ZRP, V as well as NA can boast with a rather broad range of policy issues, whereas the analysis e.g. on SC was limited to a narrower perspective on their policy proposals. The participation in debates in the media bridged this deficit to some extent. However, it must be noted that in the case of Latvia, the media very much played the role of a gatekeeper and dictated the themes discussed. Particularly in online and print media, the media discussions dealt to a large extent with the topical issue of Russophone schools. Hence, the possibility to compare parties based on the broadness of their perspective on various issues is restricted. However, there were also forces that principally positioned themselves as a single issue party, e.g. PP who positioned itself as the protagonist of extinction of party democracy, as well as forces that could be dubbed as no-issue party, e.g. BBND who mostly preached mutual understanding and harmony, not particular policy proposals. Also a rather clear divide emerged between more pragmatist mainstream parties and smaller more populist/redemptive parties.

In general, however, the classical populist policies were rather on the background. This might be linked to the financial crisis and the austerity measures which were recognized

by a rather broad specter of parties. However, Latvian party system is in general rather right-leaning and hence, the modest presence of these issues is ideological.

The promises of welfare or increased redistribution were on the background, although present. A characteristic example comes from a more centre-leftist ZZS, who promises merely to increase pensions and social benefits at the same pace as inflation grows; ZRP promised to reduce inequality etc.

If an emphasis on social measures was present in manifestos, then in somewhat deviated forms, e.g. LPP/LC promises simultaneously to cut taxes and increase redistribution.

*[We] will decrease the taxes, so as everyone would be interested to pay them. In three years time will decrease resident income tax till 20 percent. Thus we will decrease shadow economy and increase incomes, salaries and pensions. (...) Return abolished "Mothers' salaries". Latvia will have pensions, not "pauper" benefits! Principle of Baštiks: "Till the pension you subsist the state. After that the state subsists you."*  
[Manifesto, LPP/LC]

The more socially oriented parties are PCTVL and PPR. PCTVL claims to fight for "social justice" and uses very critical rhetoric against the rising retirement age, privatization and the abolition of pre-crisis support schemes. Also PPR (reinforce redistribution through progressive taxation, free welfare services for some and raising pensions, restoring benefit schemes that were abolished with austerity measures etc).

The other extreme was marked by Unity, the prime minister party. In the media discourse, while every other party declared the necessity to increase all pensions, minister of finance, Andris Vilks (V) openly announced that "while the situation in social budget will not stabilize, we cannot allow indexation of pensions" [Diena 31.08.2011.].

Changing the political system is more on the forefront. A number of (otherwise) moderate parties stressed the need to reform democratic institutions in order to make the government more accountable to the citizen or simply to make citizens more heard. The most popular topics were participatory and direct democracy and local autonomy. The reasons for this can be derived from the circumstance, since the vibrancy of the civil society grew particularly in the wake of the financial crisis when a number of demonstrations took place and civic initiatives were made. However, it is also a good topic to raise by the government parties who can't really boast about wellbeing, economy and other such issues.

This was pre-eminent even with the most mainstream and pro-establishment parties, primarily with an emphasis on more participatory democracy and more local autonomy.

These were the most elaborated topics in the manifesto of ZRP who spoke for reforms in both direct and representative democracy:

*It is not tolerable that the importance of people's direct democracy institution – referendum – is obscured by attempts to influence voters with campaigns or other propaganda, using unknown financial sources. This regulation should refer to all political parties, apart from whether it is represented in Saeima or not. /---/ We will change current practice, where ministers are interested only in their sector not the government work and success in general. /---/ Unfortunately, until now all governments have been working according to principle that responsibilities of the ministers are strictly separated and often sectoral interests of the minister or party are set higher than interests of the government. [Manifesto, ZRP]*

Also Unity proposed legislation dealing with the rights of initiating a referendum, strengthening e-democracy by introducing e-consultations and e-petitions. In addition their manifesto includes considerable emphasis on fighting corruption.

However, changing the governance system was not limited by such rather modest reforms. There were also a number of parties who were not unified in many other issues, but campaigned for a directly elected president. Naturally, this was one of the fundamental statements of PPR, but also, for example, NA saw the directly elected president as a way out of the legitimacy crisis as well as other problems currently haunting the administration of Latvia.

*President should have bigger role in realization of state power. (...) Necessity of directly elected president rises from the current historical situation in which the state stands. (...) Amendments in constitution will let Latvia overcome constitutional crisis that is associated with a lack of trust in state institutions. [Manifesto, NA]*

Also one of the few concrete policy measures proposed by the BBND was the directly elected president and change of electoral system by introducing majoritarian electoral system.

NA also promoted giving more power to the people with the statement that people should have more direct say in deciding important issues and that it is important to “reduce bureaucracy” and “depoliticize state governance”. This is somewhat controversial according to populism theory, since politics is the means for gaining populist ground and essential for the people in the democratic settings to achieve a change in the leading course of politics. However, in this case it rather serves the issues that are perceived as negative in politics – conflicts, horse trading etc.

In addition to de-politicization, also reducing the impact of various interest groups on politics was argued for. Jānis Urbanovičs from SC asks for more control over wealthy (and hence powerful) interest groups:

*We think that irresponsibility of power in times of proportional party electoral system allows those, who have bigger resources financially and administratively selfishly use this democratic opportunity. That is why we would like to decrease the chances for oligarchs, sponsors, party bosses to directly impact electoral results, by grouping according to electoral district popular artists, excellent scientists together with necessary party people [Urbanovičs 24.08 SC]*

In addition to the aforementioned, there were also propositions to shrink the number of ministries (LPP/LC), abolish the 5% threshold in general elections, reduce the number of seats, give the right to recall elected deputies (TK), party finance and restrictions in campaigning (PP)

*Parties must be financed from the state budget. The political advertisement and pre-electoral spending should be forbidden in total, because we do not see the point, why in the station's square the portrait of some person should be placed. Political advertisements can be completely replaced with political discussions. [Goša, LTV1 debate 29.08, PP]*

However, there were also controversial promises proposed, e.g. PPR proposed presidentialism as a means of getting closer to the Nordic countries, TK on the other hand saw centralization as a measure of decentralization:

*we will perform centralization of states' economic and financial resources, by widening municipality rights; (...) we will implement changes in Satversme (Constitution) [Manifesto, TK]*

Also, the propositions by TK to abolish the 5% threshold in Saeimas elections and to decrease the parliamentary deputy seats are somewhat controversial, since the reduction in the number of seats actually increases the practical electoral threshold. And in addition, TK was the only one to hint on euroscepticism that was explicitly not at all present – “*we will review international cooperation with IMF and EU institutions*”.

There were also some issues which were meant to promote the parties' identity politics, however, only a modest number could be related to populism. This was used in regards to the external Other, Russia – for example in planning energy policy, there were hints to Gazprom or in foreign policy, the policy line pursued by the Russian Federation – though the hints were much more careful and implicit in comparison to Lithuania.

The domestic “Other” that was addressed by the parties that proposed to abolish bilingual educational system and bluntly finalize the transition to education in Latvian. The justification of this policy offer was presented rather in populist terms. This issue was very important in pre-electoral campaign of VL-TB/LNNK. However, even they aimed to rationalize this in more pragmatic terms than identity politics, e.g. as economic considerations. As Raivis Dzintars notes:

*Other thing – we must eliminate the situation that in Latvia Russian language is self-sufficient (...). For instance, our proposal for very gradual Lettification of schools, prevent expensive bilingual system, that currently functions in Latvian education system. [Dzintars 18.08 NA]*

An opposite, it could even be said that an anti-populist proposition was put forth by SC who proposed – by populist means, changing the constitutions – to milden the impact of identity politics on policy making:

*We propose until the end of 11th Saeimas term to prescribe a moratorium to any legislative initiatives that refers to nationally and historically sensitive issues. Parties, who sign government declaration, must pledge to observe and protect the Constitution as it is at the moment. SC also declares that they welcome other political forces to devote all attention in on solving topical issues, and not to involve in “discussions about controversial historical issues. [Manifesto, SC]*

### 2.3.5 CRITICISM

Criticism used in two dominant ways. Firstly – and this could also be seen as a more proactive approach – criticism was used to legitimize own propositions. In stronger cases, it was the particular policies or political goals of the political establishment or other parties that were used to indicate the shortcomings. For example, LPP/LC very much opposes policies of former government, blaming them for being able only to cut expenditures and economize, but not being able to earn; they also blame them for experimenting by pointing “There is no time for experiments!” This could be due to the fact that former governments changed tax system for several times, also the austerity measures were introduced for several times. The tax policy, namely the high taxes, is also criticized, since LPP/LC themselves promise to decrease taxes so that everyone would be interested to pay them. The last point of criticism is directed towards particular institutions (ministries of finance and economics), which they themselves wish – as positive program – to abolish.

In milder cases, it was merely the current circumstance that was criticized. This strategy was used by Unity. Protest or anti-politics was not their main message also because they were the government party. However, criticism is visible when party talks about the education sector, situation in health care, economy, state governance, corruption and democratic process. For instance, in case of education and health care V points that “for a long period of time education and health policy has been lacking balance and purposefulness”. In case of economic issues, party seem to criticize existence of bureaucratic barriers and to implement fair competition, that is not interrupted by corruption. There was also a quite broadly used form of criticism that was directed at political culture, societal dispositions etc, which remained indirect and very general, used e.g. by Unity, PP as well as ZRP.

Secondly, criticism was used to note one's antagonists in politics and there was less emphasis put on the solutions to the problems that were described. This was used by more radical parties such as PCTVL that criticizes the establishment, naming it "national-oligarchic regime" and positions itself as a guarantee for national co-ordination and social justice. Also the violation of minority rights, nepotism, wrong economic decisions where foreign goods were preferred over local production etc.

In general, the usual tendency occurred that more established parties (V, NA, SC, ZRP) were less critical than the more marginal and somewhat anti-establishment parties (PCTVL, PPR, TK, PP but also LPP/LC), however, there were also clear anti-establishment parties like BBND that avoided using any criticism at all (and that was also their key message in the campaign).

The key issue that triggered criticism was the economic crisis. Here, the main criticism was that the government had acted inadequately and had different priorities. For example, NA thinks that economic crisis has deeper reasons – lack of state goals, non-observance of national priorities, corruption, wrong priorities of national economy and mission. Due to that Latvia needs change – change in governance, education and national economy, as well as changes in society itself.

ZRP and ZZS criticized the government in narrower cases, namely for the problems around airBaltic. SC criticized the government's policy line which thinks "more about the euro and less about social matters" [Delfi 18.08b, SC] as well as taking the loan from IMF. As Andrejs Elksniņš points, the majority does not approve of such a step:

*Because of these reasons Latvian people did not understand and also did not agree to the loan received by the International Monetary fund. The aim of this loan was a bearing of permission for the realization of financial control of foreign world powers, whose aim was to even more impair Latvian society, and it resulted in sale of nations' properties for the sake of foreigners, in uncontrolled subjection of our economy in the interests of capital of others. This loan was like an axe upon peoples' material existence roots. [Elksniņš 26.08a, SC]*

In addition to economic problems, also the issues related to potential misuse of power were criticized. For example, V holds a critical attitude toward party financing and the role of money in Latvian politics. Sarmīte Ēlerte (V) uses very antagonistic and critical language to point that the amount of money in Latvian politics is too large [LTV1 29.08.2011] (more on this issue also in the next section). On the other hand, PCTVL criticizes Unity itself for being a "national-oligarchic regime". However, both of them are rather critical about civil servants. In the words of a representative of PCTVL,

*The number of civil servants must be decreased at least for twenty percents, and no one will even notice that they have been decreased. We have them about seventy thousands. [LTV1 debate 08.09 PCTVL]*

ZZS also sent some criticism towards some parties who cooperated to object their propositions.

*ZZS feels disappointed that in Saeima Social and labor commission session, obeying categorical objection by the finance minister Andris Vilks, proposition of ZZS to index the pensions was not approved also by the deputies of Everything for Latvia!-TB/LNNK and Centre of Harmony and thus this question currently is removed from the agenda of Saeima. This makes concern that free resources in social budget might be used for the consolidation of the state budget of 2012 and removed from the welfare budget. [Political ad, Diena 17.08, ZZS]*

### 2.3.6 SCOPE

With the exception of the then prime minister party V and ZZS, most parties tend to promise a more significant change in politics. ZRP tries to justify its very name - reformers – and thus also policy proposals include number of new, previously non-existent policy innovations.

The more radical parties include PPR, proposing revolutionary changes such as a shift in the whole political system, and PCTVL who argues for a radical shift in minority policy, but also in taxation, civil service etc. The manifesto of PCTVL proposes fast, immediate and uncompromising action in order to change the constitution and to allocate citizenship status to all noncitizens. PP advocates a radical change where the parties are substituted by civil society groups and experts, but they do not perceive revolutionary change to accomplish this, but rather, as an evolutionary development. In general, the issues where the most radical reforms are proposed have to do with the political and/or governance system.

However, another field where only an evolutionary change is possible, is political culture. Parties more often emphasize the need to change the political culture, change of moral or code of ethics. E.g. SC (political culture), ZRP and V (attitude and ethics of officials and ministers). For example, Andrejs Elksniņš (SC) provides the position of the party by saying:

*Political culture must change, that means, politics should be filled with ethics and moral norms. Corruption should not only be combat but also prevented. And the chance of prevention is given to those young people who involves in politics, because all previous politics is dirty. And those people who were in the previous Saeima, Saeima sessions, have participated, cannot continue the mentioned politics. State finance for political parties will not change anything the people's minds must be changed. Clear perception should make to society on what decisions and for sake of who are adopted. [Elksniņš, LTV1 debate 29.08, SC]*

### 2.3.7 ELABORATENESS



As also mentioned in the section on policy issues, the capacity to analyze the depth of the manifestos and parties media performance may be somewhat restricted due to the availability of the long manifestos. However, it is also known that a number of smaller parties did not submit a long manifesto.

As ZRP advertised its candidates with the lack of previous political experience (sic) in the media, they propose more technocrat type of politicians who have to demonstrate most importantly their knowledgeability of issues. And except for some vague aspects, they succeed, particularly in the fields of education and economy. The same goes for Unity. As in every manifesto, there is part of policy proposals that are vague. However, in contrast to other political parties that were analyzed, V offers large proportion of proposals that are argumented on the basis of describing the current state of affairs within the particular sector. For instance, speaking about the situation in education sector V illustrates its argument with the OECD data; speaking about birth rate party indicates the tendency with quantitative data.

One less elaborate strategy could be termed as “creating tools with no function”. For example, PPR uses this strategy, indicating that only presidential regime is the key to success. Party is not describing what is so special about presidential regime and why parliamentarianism appears to be ineffective. In other words, reader is not able to receive more grounded facts why Latvia needs such embracing changes except for the fact that it was practiced in the interwar republic. Also a number of welfare issues were not argumented. Parties often proposed installing benefit schemes (or restoring the schemes that were abolished during the time of austerity), but they do not elaborate on what would those benefits improve.

However, PPR’s depiction of presidentialism could also be dubbed as a “magic solution”. They even indicate that presidentialism would somehow transform Latvia into a Nordic country, which is an oxymoron in itself, since one of the clear characteristics of Nordic politics is parliamentarianism and particularly, consensual parliamentarianism that cold not be further from a presidential system).

The LPP/LC’s manifesto also rather includes magic solutions than functional tools. They promise to decrease the taxes, so as everyone would be interested to pay them, although there is no more ground provided to this assertion than alleged common sense. The proposition by PCTVL member Jakovs Pliners is rather similar:

*Starting with the next year taxes must be decreased. (...) Through the mass media we should try to convince people so that everyone would pay the taxes and with strict laws we must accomplish that. [Pliners, LTV1 debate 16.09 PCTVL]*

### 2.3.8 CONCLUSIONS

Populism tends to be rather modestly represented in the party manifestos as well as in media. The main conflict used for populist mobilization is the ethnic cleavage and language issues, however, also those are rather modestly touched upon. There is much less demonization of issues or social groups than in Lithuania and antagonism tends to be used to position parties in relation to one another, particularly between the new and “pure” parties and old and “corrupt”, “oligarchic” forces.

In general, there is more populist sentiment amongst smaller parties, and also in terms of policy proposals, which are used to turn identity politics into policy amongst smaller parties and also demonstrate the lack of elaborateness of the proposed policies.

**Table 6:** Conclusion of gradations of populism according to parties in Latvia. The red line indicates threshold, different shades of orange lighter and stronger gradations of populism. *Source: authors.*

	The people	Antagonism	Heartland	Policies	Criticism	Scope	Elaborateness
SC							
ZRP							
V							
NA							
ZZS							
LPP/LC							
PCTVL							
PP							
PPR							
TK							
LSDSP							
BBND							
KDS							

## 2.4 ESTONIA

### Abbreviations used:

EER	<b>Estonian Greens</b>	<i>Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised</i>
EIP	<b>Estonian Independence Party</b>	<i>Eesti Iseseisvuspartei</i>
EKD	<b>Party of Estonian Christian Democrats</b>	<i>Erakond Eesti Kristlikud Demokraadid</i>
ERL	<b>People's Union of Estonia</b>	<i>Eestimaa Rahvaliid</i>
IRL	<b>Pro Patria and Res Publica Union</b>	<i>Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit</i>
KE	<b>Estonian Centre Party</b>	<i>Eesti Keskerakond</i>
RE	<b>Estonian Reform Party</b>	<i>Eesti Reformierakond</i>
SDE	<b>Social Democratic Party</b>	<i>Sotsiaaldemokraatlik erakond</i>
VEE	<b>Russian Party in Estonia</b>	<i>Vene Erakond Eestis</i>

**Table 7:** The percentage of total votes gathered by parties, the length of manifestos (in pages) and the number of articles analyzed in the Estonian case. The red line indicates the electoral threshold. *Source: authors.*

	RE	KE	SDE	IRL	ERL	EER	VEE	EKD	EIP
% of total vote	28,6%	23,3%	20,5%	17,1%	3,8%	2,1%	0,9%	0,5%	0,4%
length of manifesto (pages)	82pg	25pg	32pg	46pg	6pg	12pg	<1pg	5pg	7pg
media coverage (articles + TV debates)	10art+TV	9art+TV	16art+TV	18art+TV	10art+TV	8art+TV	6art+TV	1art+TV	1art+TV

### 2.4.1 THE PEOPLE

In most cases, the construction of people is rather inclusive and not very much oriented to mobilization. There also seems to be a clear ideological division between the more left-leaning and right-wing parties in respect to populism in the construction of people – may those be named populist discourse and liberal discourse. Populist discourse is evident in the rhetoric of Centre Party (KE), People's Union (ERL), Social Democratic Party (SDE) and the Russian Party in Estonia (VEE): all of these parties serve themselves as the protectors of the people and people's interest. ERL even uses the slogan "Power to the people!" Another more populist strategy is used by VEE, who is aiming to mobilize their sympathizers (the Russophone minority) to act together:

*We live together in Estonia, we pay taxes together – we have to lead the country together! Only together are we capable of preserving our language, education and culture. Only together are we capable of restoring the economy and social justice. [Manifesto, VEE]*

However, the intensity of victimization of the people is rather low: though the parties admit that some policies have not been benefitting the people, there is little loaded

language on the issue. Somewhat distinct from the other parties are the Estonian Greens (EER) who use the same discourse, but indicates that the ones who need protection, are animals, and the protection is needed from the people, not state policies or the threats in the economic/social realm.

In general however, the people are more like subjects in the manifestos and in the media rather than the addressee. However, the opposition between the people and the establishment is still visible through the latter's priorities. An example of such an approach comes from the SDE:

*Many people in Estonia have been excluded from the success that supposedly belongs to us all, and been suffering for no reason. [Manifesto, SDE]*

This group of parties also tends to show their commitment with protecting the people, and particularly the less represented groups in the society.

The other, more liberal discourse depicts the people as individuals who can stand for themselves. This was characteristic of the Reform Party (RE) and Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL). What is peculiar, though is that the policy promises of IRL are not consistent with the idea of a liberal individual, but proposes also restrictive legislation. Estonian Christian Democrats (EKD) fall between the two groups, since their view of the people also indicates that a number of people need the state's help, but at the same time, the larger narrative indicates that their view of the people mostly indicates a small self-sufficient community, that functions in a way a congregation does.

In a way, the discourse of the people tends to take place rather in an economic than in a democratic discourse. People are treated more as the recipients of the policy proposals (beneficiaries of social schemes, entrepreneurs etc) rather than citizens who are in classical populist discourse depicted as fed up with the current political system or current politicians.

Also particular target groups that are mentioned include mostly the same target groups, though mostly economical groups – like low-wagers, middle class and the rich for the KE, working people, retirees and young families for RE etc. The latter even views the intellectual elites, that is, artists and scientists as the subjects of fund allocation. EER is more similar to Lithuanian parties emphasizing openness and inclusion and valuing small businessmen, teachers etc, but also rescuers as the prime mobilizing argument.

Also, what is characteristic (and quite different from Lithuania is little mobilizing calls in manifestos). Similarly to a number of Latvian parties RE even calls for more de-politicization, though does so only in particular policy fields. Again, this can be seen as oppositional with the populist discourse.

The construction of the people tends to be quite open and inclusionary. Almost no party sets strict ethnic or other exclusive boundaries explicitly. Though the ethnic tension is there, it is usually expressed by referring to the opposite case. An example of this is the manifesto of the Estonian Independence Party (EIP):

*The improvement of integration policy is not necessary. Who wants to assimilate can do it at ease. Compulsory Estonianization only creates inner resentment and tension. [Manifesto, EIP]*

Interestingly, IRL who is a national conservative party only avails its nationalistic construction of people in relation to policy proposals, which aim to preserve the nation-state and the Estonian nation.

And although almost all parties have contained a separate section where they describe their commitment and tolerance to minorities (hence also including them among “the people”?), the cultural or dispositional depiction of the people is rather widespread. For example, the Centre Party depicts its people as a Northerner:

*Estonian people are a Nordic people. And not only on the map but also in spirit. Work and fastidiousness to ourselves, good education and peaceful conduct unite us with the more developed peoples of Europe. Government that is cold, inhuman and bureaucratic with its back to the people and that does not lead the country towards a sustainable development in long term. [Manifesto, KE]*

Also the tolerance toward minorities is somewhat rhetorical since all those speech acts simultaneously carry about the precondition of assimilation (in more inclusive cases, full integration)

#### 2.4.2 ANTAGONISM

Instead of mobilizing people with inclusive rhetoric and catchy slogans calling people into action, parties place their bets on exclusion and opposition. The main antagonist groups are:

- Other politicians (other parties, their policies, ideology, individual politicians)
- Socialism and the Soviet mindset
- Irresponsible, short-sighted, self-interested etc decision(-maker)s
- Immigrants.
- Implicitly also Russia as the external “Other” and Russophones as the internal “Other”

To a smaller extent, also groups such as public servants were mentioned.

Attacks on competitors are much more straightforward than in Lithuania (but more or less comparable to Latvia) – names are mentioned, specific deeds are blamed on them.

Parties often mention, even in manifestos, who they oppose, not to mention debates in the media. For example, RE stated that they will not cooperate with Edgar Savisaar (KE). The most radical example comes from Andrus Ansip (RE) who repeatedly portrayed Savisaar as a traitor, associating him with Russia and Russians and hence, in his text, densely laden with parallels from past, depicted him as a threat to Estonia's independence. Naturally, this kind of rhetoric also indicates another "Other" – Russia as the external other and Russophone minority as the internal one.

*If a vote is given in the elections to the one who is prepared to increase the influence of a foreign state for a third in cash<sup>7</sup>, then our country is in danger. Then even the recurrence of 1939<sup>8</sup> is not totally excluded. [Ansip 23.02, RE]*

However, it must be noted that with the exception of demonizing Savisaar (which is also depicted as a personal grudge between the two leaders of the parties, Savisaar and Ansip), RE, the prime minister party, remains rather modest with the criticism.

On the other hand, also KE directly names RE and IRL in their manifesto and criticizes the results of their ideological disposition. And this does not apply only for parties from opposite ideological camps – even IRL, although mildly, criticized its coalition partner RE, though more emphasis was put on criticizing KE and SDE for their generous promises in manifestos that would sink the national economy. However, there is much less demonization of the governing elite and much less vague criticism than in Lithuania.

The main negative characteristics describing the "Other", manifest in the rhetoric of most parties is being self-interested and short-sighted, hoping for an easy gain, being not sustainable or advocating non-sustainable solutions. It seems as if all the political parties are promising blood, sweat and tears. This is understandable, taking into account the post-crisis context and austerity. However, this is also clearly a comfortable position for the supporters of *status quo* and even the parties who did not approve of such austerity (e.g. SDE) still emphasized the same values.

As also in other states under consideration, intellectuals are present in the rhetoric rather as allies and not antagonists. The most oft-mentioned group of intellectuals was scientists. They represent objective knowledge and wisdom that KE would bring to the

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<sup>7</sup> Ansip refers to the so-called „Eastern money scandal“ according to which Savisaar had asked an influential Russian millionaire to support his party financially.

<sup>8</sup> 1939 – when the then president of Republic of Estonia Konstantin Päts responded to the ultimatum from the Soviet Union and allowed the USSR to plant its military bases in Estonia.

government by involving them in policy-making. There was no antagonism with intellectual elites in any manifesto.

One discourse strategy in opposing the system and the current ruling elite that was common in Estonia (but not with the other Baltic states), is conspiracy theoretical discourse in opposing the establishment and their alleged allies. This was more often applied by KE and EIP, but it was somewhat noticeable also in the quote by Andrus Ansip above. Below, there is an example from Edgar Savisaar who depicts opinion polls as instruments of manipulation rigged by the government (parties).

*Thirdly, what is noticeable is the more intense manipulation with the public opinion surveys during voting. The survey firms, their clients and the publishers of their results have already lost those elections up hand. [Savisaar 04.03, KE]*

EIP uses such discourse primarily to oppose the establishment, their foreign policy positions as well as two external others – Russia and the European Union (hence being practically the only openly euro-skeptic party in all elections considered in this report):

*...in the beginning total visa exemption between Russian Federation and the EU, that will then be a common economic area (Germany and France have already approved it), then a political union will be formed or Eurasian federation in which Estonia will inevitably become an ethnic area with Estonian aborigines. There is maybe four or five years until this scheme is realized. We consider it our duty to inform of the consequences of joining the EU: loss of independent statehood, loss of homeland through the buying up of economy, resources and most of all, land, the loss of control over border, territory, immigration, language, defense, economic and foreign policy. As a result of all that Estonian people will fast become incapable of statehood and turn into indigenous people in their homeland. [Manifesto, EIP]*

Clearly, EIP was the party most radical in its opposition, which included besides the establishment, the EU and Russia, also foreigners. In fact, foreigners and immigrants, particularly immigrants of Muslim background were the “Other” that was opposed by a number of Estonian parties – it was most evident with EIP, but also with the ERL, EKD, and even with SDE. This was also used to contrast between the “indigenous minority” or “traditional minority” (which was in no case defined more precisely but who most probably are the Russophones) who is incorporated among the people having similar problems to others, while potential future immigrants were viewed as a threat. However, in most cases, the hints to this “Other” were not used as a threat per se, but rather as an inevitable issue in the future that needs to be dealt with policy-wise.

The opposition between Estonians and Russophones are mostly not used explicitly. The only exception is the VEE, who quite clearly admits that there is a grudge between the two communities and victimizes the Russophone minority who is scapegoated and harassed by the current legislation:

*The community of Estonian Russians should be recognized as a subject in the integration policy and not prevent the self-organizing processes that take place in it, especially in relation to the application for cultural autonomy. /---/ In front of the integration-wagon the layer of indigenous Russians must be places, who have generations' long experience of living in Estonia and enough competence to consider the way of doing these things in Europe. Only then the integration policy can be productive, motivating integration, not forced and counterproductive – as a gesture of good will /---/ I would immediately eliminate the Language Inspection. /---/ Surely, by eliminating provisions that discriminate the naturalized citizenry compared to the privileges provided to the indigenous minority of “first grade” citizens. It is time to consider legalizing double citizenship and all children born in. (ERR, 16.02, VEE)*

In their manifesto, VEE also depicts the Russians who are willing to go for a compromise with the ethnic majority as traitors:

*Mediators are the Russians themselves as well as representatives of other national minorities, who step into the service of authorities and other parties for personal gain (career, social status, protection from Estonian parties for Russian entrepreneurs). They imitate national rapprochement and integration, in other words – they are selling out the interests of the Russian population. The mediators deceit Russian voters and thus do a disservice to Estonia. [Manifesto, VEE]*

Opposition against bureaucracy is rather a wish to make public services more efficient than opposition against a certain social group or power elite – this is not a discourse of power or antagonism with a certain type of power elite as in Lithuania where the discourse of *apparatchiks* still prevails. Corruption as an allegation was only used by VEE, KE criticized the media and public opinion research companies for being corrupt.

However, fear was still applied – this had to do primarily with the Soviet time– e.g. RE depicts its opponent as the June communist who betrayed the republic prior to 1939; IRL uses socialism's red flag to scare people and depict its opponents in a bad light, etc.

### 2.4.3 HEARTLAND

As also with other Baltic States, the narrative of Heartland is usually not very elaborate. In comparison to Lithuania, there are some nostalgic parties in Estonia that envision the heartland to be more in the past, particularly in the time of the First Republic. This was most evident in the manifesto of ERL, but also the EIP.

For others, however, the Heartland relies in the future. One of the constructions of the heartland has to do with a desired belonging among the Nordic countries. Two opposing parties, RE and KE both envision a Nordic type of state as the ideal – the main aim of KE is the Nordic Welfare state, while RE is striving towards Estonia becoming “the Nordic Tiger”. However, in the case of RE, the term “Nordic country” does not imply a welfare state, but a wealthy state with a top notch education or high level of technology. Thus the heartland is Nordic, but it also has Tiger-like qualities, which implies to the Asian



Tigers such as Singapore who are famous for their economic competitiveness rather than social wellbeing.

For KE, appealing to the Nordic model helps to distinguish from other socialist models that otherwise would become associated with Soviet type of socialism that is the founding principle for IRL's Anti-Heartland.

However, for IRL as well as RE, the Heartland is not far from the reality, or if there are still some issues to be criticized at present, then the course taken in broader terms will inevitably take us toward their depiction of Heartland.

*As citizens in our everyday life we rarely realize that the Republic of Estonia is a very bold and dignified country, he said. Estonia is a remarkable island of stability in the midst of a revolting world sea. [Ansip 23.02, RE]*

While the Social Democratic Party opposes this and claims that it might only seem so from afar, and that the current state of affairs is perhaps not exactly anti-heartland, but still a long way from the ideal:

*The story of Estonia during the last 20 years has been impressive, however it is so mostly for those who observe it from outside. Many people in Estonia have been excluded from the success that supposedly belongs to us all, and been suffering for no reason. Estonian social welfare expenses per capita are one of the Europe's lowest. /---/ Already today we can witness the poor quality of healthcare system accessibility. Long waiting lists for health services, bad service quality, expensive drugs and the merge of public healthcare system with private has left many people without healthcare. [Manifesto, SDE]*

#### 2.4.4 POLICY ISSUES

Concerning policies, a clear divide in the contents and topics of policies emerged between the four parties (RE, KE, SDE, IRL) who managed to enter the parliament and those (EER, ERL, EKD, EIP, VEE) who remained below the threshold. While the former proposed a rather balanced policy selection that did not contain much populist sentiment, the latter seemed almost as forced to improvise and propose "innovative" (which often also meant populist) policy proposals. However, in comparison to Latvia and Lithuania, practically all parties had a broad spectrum of policy proposals, covering a wide range of issues.

The most popular policy field that could be related to populism, were social entitlements and benefits. These were proposed almost by all parties (the main exception being RE, also, these were on the background for VEE and EIP). These included raising the amount of benefits for families (SDE, KE), raising pensions (KE, IRL), installing a "mothers' pension" (IRL), covering more medical expenses (IRL, ERL) up to the most radical proposition of institutionalizing a benefit called citizens' salary (EER):

*Successful integration can only be based on common solutions for common problems. One of the measures would also be the citizen's salary. [Lotman 16.02, EER]*

*We replace child and income support with citizen's salary to reduce poverty. This is a much more efficient measure and enables a great number of people to deal with real social work instead of inefficient paper work. [Laane 21.02, EER]*

In case of EER, it must be noted that their manifesto is very much balanced and practically does not carry a populist sentiment, however, their deliverance in the media is much more radical.

In most cases, the parties also envisioned the sources from which these should be covered – progressive income taxation (SDE, KE, EIP, EER) as well as pollutant excise (EER). The only question concerning the resources remained with IRL who instead promised to cut taxes.

Secondly, there were also a number of prepositions that were ought to democratize the governance system as the parties put it themselves. A number of proposals were promoted which exemplified a different level of populism in them. The least populist propositions came from RE and SDE who primarily promoted means of e-democracy, more consultations etc:

*We will ensure a say in the works of the parliament commissions for the nation-wide citizens associations. We will increase the democratization and openness of the parliament's work, we will make decisions based on public discussion and influences and we will involve representatives of citizens associations and specialists into the preparation of decisions. We will create a juridical base for the patronage organizations and free associations to protect the rights of their target groups in court. [Manifesto, SDE]*

However, in case of the Reform party, the aims and means seem somewhat more ambivalent, since their proposal that they perceive as a means of democratization actually proposes reducing the number of elections:

*To raise the quality of democracy we will decrease the number of elections [Manifesto, RE]*

In addition, also modest reforms for more engagement were introduced by RE – “increasing local democracy”, “making public administration more simple and effective” as well as “development of e-democracy to increase involvement and transparency”. These resemble somewhat the propositions also made by Latvian right wing parties, however, remain more modest.

Somewhat stronger initiations were made with curbing the parties' freedom to campaign; e.g. SDE proposed curbing the amount of money parties are allowed to spend on campaigns to 30,000 euros per party and 3,000 per candidate. IRL on the other hand proposed legislation that would curb the candidate's right to enter with the

compensation mandate and proposed raising the quota of votes that need to be gathered for that purpose.

More populist measures were proposed by IRL who proposed broadening the right to vote. However, the propositions were rather ambiguous and not clear, perhaps indicating the wish to reduce the voting age or giving more votes to parents with underage children:

*“considering the proportion of minors in elections and the lowering of the electoral threshold /---/ Representation in elections for every child!” [Manifesto, IRL]*

An even more radical proposition was made by KE who proposed “direct popular election of the president”. Another quite drastic package of measures was proposed by ERL, proposing the reduction in the number of parliamentarians as a measure for saving public money:

*We have to think of our own people and country. Firstly – the costs of government are still too high. Let's start with the parliament. The number of those bringing people's voice to the parliament does not have to be 101, instead 51 good representatives is enough and a large amount of tax payer's money is saved. Secondly – our bureaucracy has gone crazy! When starting a small firm it is incomparable how much time is spent on it here and how much in Germany. When I left the government job in 1997, then the administrative apparatus of ministries has grown significantly compared to previous times. This needs to be reduced. [Toots 02.02, ERL]*

Other measures that were proposed e.g. by IRL, EIP and others were reducing “politicization” of various fields of life which was claimed to be solved by prohibiting politicians to participate in advisory boards of companies (and public enterprises).

In addition to social and democracy-related propositions, there were also some propositions from a number of different fields that were all related to preserving the Estonian nation and nation state. These dealt with economy, security and culture, and were more connected to right wing and/or conservative parties. These can all also be considered as measures against the perceived antagonist.

This group of policies was rather heterogeneous and primarily consisted of policy proposals made by more marginal parties. For example, ERL proposed limiting land sale as a security as well as an economic measure, which would reinvigorate their perception of a nation state they aim to retain:

*Unlimited sale of land is linked to unforeseen security risks which have lately been pointed to by our northern neighbors the Finns. Namely, in Finland the foreigners have bought lands near important infrastructures and according to military officers this could be threat to independence in a crisis. [Blok 15.02, ERL]*

*Create Estonian People's Bank that is based on national capital. Estonian communal economic enterprises must have at least 49% of Estonian capital. Depoliticize all city and state public enterprises. [Blok 25.02, ERL]*

This aim was also shared by EIP who expressed their antagonism toward foreign investors and business and proposed policies that would improve the position of the persecuted group (forced tenants) in Estonia and persuade foreign capital to leave:

*To reimburse damages to forced tenants the state needs ca 10 billion kroner (3-5 people in a family, ca 25 000 mainly wood-heated apartments). For example, in 2007 alone foreign investors took 37 billion kroner of net profit out of the country – that means that the state has a possibility and an obligation to reimburse the damages to forced tenants in full in reasonable time in the magnitude of five years. The party proposes reduction of the overall tax burden in order to increase the state's competitive capabilities by stimulating enterprising. [Manifesto, EIP]*

Though the propositions were not as radical as the above mentioned, also IRL used national identity as the basis to argument for their policies, namely, educational policy:

*IRL is a national conservative party, hence we are unequivocally against propositions to transfer to professional (paid) army and paid education [Laar, 13.02, IRL]*

*I treat education as a national project. [Lukas 04.02]*

In addition, several national conservative parties (IRL, EKD, EIP) viewed defense policies as the retainer of the national Self.

In the cultural policy, the strategy of creating insecurity is used via pointing out threats of globalization on small nations:

*The aim of the cultural policy of the Reform Party is to ensure the lasting of Estonian nation, language and culture through ages. Globalization puts pressure on all national cultures, the mission of Estonian culture is balancing the international mass culture with the good and Estonian. [Manifesto, RE]*

#### 2.4.5 CRITICISM

Criticism as a form of policy formulation was more popular with oppositional parties as well as those who attracted less support. The least critical among the parties were the government parties RE and IRL, who obviously did not criticize government policy, but occasionally aired more critical opinions on various policy issues. Even IRL who is the smaller counterpart in the government avoided criticism on the address of public policy (also in segments where it's curated by RE) and instead drew attention on the success stories their party has managed to achieve in the respective field.

RE, having been a ruling party for a while, instead of demanding change they condemn any changes as those might derail Estonia from its successful course. This pertains to their heartland idea. The issues discussed in media generally deal with economic and tax policies, probably because these issues are attacked the most by the non-ruling parties.

As well as those are of the highest importance for the RE since their heartland would realize thanks to great liberal economic basis.

The more popular issues that attracted criticism were the tax policy (which was criticized by practically all parties that did not belong into the government) as well as inequality and social issues. For example. Mai Treial (ERL) noted:

*However, the unfair tax policy has placed all the burden on the simple working person, due to fatal cuts on the expense of children and parents people are forced into scarcity, to live below the line of human decency. [Treial 17.02, ERL]*

*We did not support the raising of retirement age even to 65 years. The poor health of our people does not enable the raise of retirement age. Raising of retirement age is not a miracle cure with which to treat the mistakes of employment and family policies, nor is it an opportunity to create more workers. [Treial 02.03, ERL]*

In addition, ERL also criticized peripheralization of rural regions, outsourcing Estonian economy, failures of Estonian state subsidizing of enterprises (EAS),

KE's main protest is aimed at the ruling government's employment policy, economic and tax policy, local government and regional policy, healthcare policy. This relates to the identity of the "Other" as being cold and uncaring. Employment policy is the first addressed in the manifesto and examples from it are already given above. They criticize "the government for making the laying off of employees easier and cheaper" with the new employment law. In healthcare the party opposed private funding as it "deepens inequality among the people". Current tax policy is labeled as primitive, outdated, a reason for ongoing difficulties and in urgent need of reform: "It is time to admit that Estonia's primitive and unexceptional tax system has become one of the causes of our difficulties. Our tax system needs an emergent reform." Regional policy also is said to be suffering from the budget and "economic policy of RE and IRL that has led to the point that their ability to emerge from the crisis is limited to the extreme"

Media statements are more concerned with pointing out everything that is wrong in current government's policies. There are close to none concrete measures presented in the statements, mostly they include general complaining and blaming. The proposals and criticism are greatly oversimplifies and based on general knowledge.

SDE's criticism is equally distributed in the entire manifesto, as its separate chapters always begin with the description of what is wrong in the current situation. The main issues that are criticized include social, economic and tax policies.

In media, most critical attention is given to the social issues. For example, the chairman of SDE Sven Mikser criticized the government's current understanding where lowering

the 2000€ upper limit for parental salary is seen as stripping poor people from their entitlements whereas paying the 19€ child support is depicted as pointless sowing money from an airplane.

So – there is criticism, but it is criticism directed at government policies rather than the whole establishment.

EKD's criticism revolved around social policy issues, salary problems of public workers and policies concerning alcohol and tobacco. The opposition towards policies and decisions is based on claims that these do not in some way follow Christian principles, thus being unfair, unjust, immoral, unethical; and Islam is framed as a danger to all of the principles

Hence, naturally, the more critical parties were the oppositional parties and particularly the more marginal parties, who proved to be a rather good and well founded criticizer (e.g. ERL), illuminating the social problems in the current policy line, however, not as successful in proposing functional alternatives.

#### 2.4.6 SCOPE

Analyzing the scope of change the policy proposals entailed proved EIP and ERL as the providers of most radical solutions. The solutions proposed by EIP (and also covered in some examples above prove to be rather revolutionary). In addition, they involve restricting free market economy, leaving the European Union and selectively participating in NATO's activities. The problems regarding the system are solved by removing the ruling parties from power and criminal investigations. In short, everything that the party considers as a potential threat to Estonia must be prohibited. In addition, the party implies the possibility to reduce (or cancel altogether) the social entitlement programs, as the state need not to worry about those who are responsible for their own problems or simply are a burden. ERL also proposes radical changes to the banking system (community banking), political system, social benefits system as well as taxation system.

A number of other parties, e.g. KE who is also rather critical towards government's action, proves rather evolutionary than revolutionary changes. For example, on the issue of integration they note:

*As all policies the integration policy has to become people-centered. A pleasant wish and interest must be created for people to integrate, forcing can create an opposite effect. [Eesmaa 16.02, KE]*

In general, however, KE, but also IRL, SDE as well as EER propose a number of structural reforms that should be implemented. More marginal parties such as VEE and EKD have not proposed very concrete measures, rather they talk about policy goals (or problems that need to be solved). Hence, it is difficult to measure on the scale of policy change. However, most of their propositions require at least structural reforms. Here is an example from VEE:

*To end the forcing of ultra-liberal economic policy, to stop the degrading of human capital and its destruction by the predatory capital. To rise multiple times the effectiveness of social security and investments of risk-capital. To determine the critical factors that intensify economic discrimination and socio-economic stratification. (ERR, 16.02, VEE)*

RE as the dominant government party primarily promises to continue with the current policies and proposes only incremental reforms and changes.

#### 2.4.7 ELABORATENESS

A number of parties – and not only marginal ones – operated with magic solution type of proposals. The strongest example of this was IRL who operated with catchy terms such as mothers' pension and free education, although their contents were usually not elaborated further. In addition, they also proposed writing fiscal stability into the constitution, that is quite similar with propositions made in other Baltic States (though usually welfare-related issues were the item to be constitutionalized in other countries).

The other party that also somewhat operated with catchy slogans was KE. Their manifesto is organized into fifteen chapters which deal with different policy areas and are titled with slogans like "Realistic and productive economic policy is the key for Estonia's success"; "All of Estonia has to live" or "Free, available and good education for everyone". However, these were mostly followed by rather elaborate explanations of problems, policy goals and policy measures.

Another means that demonstrated somewhat lower levels of elaborateness was basing one's arguments on common sense rather than particular sources. This was again characteristic of e.g. IRL's promises, but used by almost all parties. ERL depicts their knowledgeability on agricultural and agrarian social issues, though do not base themselves on particular sources:

*Because of unfairly high duties the price of agricultural fuel is three times as high as minimal in Europe, that most state use. This has directly influenced the raise of food prices and put our farmers into unfair competition. Among other things the free sale of rural lands to foreigners increases the rent of land and with it the food prices. [Treial 17.02, ERL]*

*Right now we would have 2,1 billion kroner for child support. One of the sources for it is the saving on governing expenses. [Treial 26.02 ERL]*

SDE's sources from article to article from references to academic sources and statistics to "common sense" proposals. Also KE sometimes references various reports and statistic resources:

*Even the WHO stressed that funding healthcare solely from the social tax is not sustainable in Estonia and that healthcare funding needs a profound change. [Tuus 02.03, KE]*

One of the most peculiar strategies of argumentation is used by EIP, whose argumentative line rather follows the format of a conspiracy theory (this was occasionally also visible in KE's rhetoric, see above). One of the most colorful examples of the level of elaborateness in EIP's manifesto are the statements about the reduction of unemployment and the legalization of cannabis:

*Reducing the unemployment in one or other group is a useless activity. The economy must simply be fixed, because after all there is nothing complicated about it, if there is will to do it. The party does not support the legalization of cannabis. The youth should be shown twitching drug addicts who have injected themselves insane and add the medical history, which as a rule begins with milder drugs. [Manifesto, EIP]*

All in all, as also the length of manifestos indicates, the policy proposals of Estonian parties are rather well elaborated on a broad scale of issues.

#### 2.4.8 CONCLUSION

All in all, the populist discourse was rather modestly represented in the electoral political discourse. There are some parties that used stronger discourse, e.g. ERL, EIP and also KE, but all of this tended to remain in the tradition of liberal electoral democracy.

Rather, what stood out in the Estonian context in comparison to Latvia and Lithuania, was the lack of populist discourse in manifestos. The prime example of this was RE who practically did not use populist identity politics, nor did they propose any significant policy change. Hence, rather the lack of populism which can also turn into a negative characteristic, could be mentioned.

The usage of antagonism was in many cases rather difficult to generalize. In most cases, it was not a central strategy for the parties, but it prevailed occasionally, making generalizing of the overall level of antagonism rather difficult. For example, RE who was essentially a non-populist party, still used rather radical antagonisms in rare occasions, when threatening voters with Edgar Savisaar and demonizing him. The rest of the discourse, on the other hand, was insistently non-antagonistic.



Otherwise, as also evident in the case of Latvia, there seemed to be a significant difference in the contents of electoral proposals made by the parties that were elected and the extra-parliamentary parties; particularly in terms of elaborateness of their proposals.

**Table 8:** Conclusion of gradations of populism according to parties in Estonia. The red line indicates threshold, lighter shells indicate a lower level and darker shells a higher level of populism. *Source: authors.*

	The people	Antagonism	Heartland	Policies	Criticism	Scope	Elaborateness
RE							
KE							
SDE							
IRL							
ERL							
EER							
VEE							
EKD							
EIP							

## 2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is clear from the analysis above that there are some differences between the three Baltic States, and hence, it would be misleading to offer homogeneous conclusive remarks that could be used as a single guide to populism in the Baltic States. However, the analysis exposed some similarities as well as a number of interesting differences between the three states.

### *The people*

The discourse of people as a homogeneous entity mobilized by the parties was present in all three states. However, in Estonia and to an extent also in Latvia, it was less dominant, since instead, a political marketing discourse prevailed, depicting particular and separate groups in societies (not opposing them, but creating separate instead of unifying identities).

Some parties, e.g. the Front (LT), People's Control (LV) and to some extent, also People's Union of Estonia (EST) featured more redemptive discourse where the party depicted itself as the last instance to protect the people. However, all of those parties tended to score a rather modest result, hence indicating that the political marketing strategies prove to be more successful than populist discourse.

## Antagonism

Antagonism, on the other hand, was widely used in all three states. In a way, constructing the “Other” tended to be a more important tool in identity building than construction of the “Self”, or the people.

The main groups that were constructed as the Other were

- (Other) politicians – politicians themselves were the group that was most often opposed. In more populist discourse (particularly in Lithuania) marginal parties opposed mainstream parties, core parties dismissed small parties as populists or radicals etc; in Latvia and Estonia, ideological opposites excluded each other, but there was also criticism towards potential allies (albeit, in that context, very mild antagonisms were constructed).
- Oligarchs – this discourse appeared in Latvian and Lithuanian context, but not in Estonian context. In Lithuania, the discourse was stronger and more demonizing, but simultaneously also anonymous. In Latvia, “oligarchs” were concrete politicians who were demonized.
- Russia(ns) – The main external Other that was mentioned was naturally the large Eastern neighbor of all three states. However, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, this antagonism was constructed rather implicitly, hinting that Russia may cause problems, but not elaborating on them openly. Lithuanian politicians were somewhat less interested in Russia (and rather, used Poland as their external other), but also dared to make stronger policy propositions against Russia. The ethnic conflict was also present in all three countries, but was explicitly exploited only by smaller and more radical parties. Implicitly, most of the parties in Estonia tended to differentiate between “loyal” and “good” Russophones and Others, implying that a segment of Russians is still a threat.
- Monopolies and entrepreneurial interest groups – these groups were mostly used in Lithuania and also in Latvia, they were often mentioned in the same comments with oligarchs.
- Immigrants – particularly in Estonia (especially Muslim immigrants) and in Lithuania (immigrants from CIS and the Post-Soviet space in general), which is rather interesting, since these groups are small in practice. However, these groups still function as scapegoats in rhetoric.
- Criminals – particularly present in Lithuania, but to some extent also in Latvia, criminals are sometimes used as the Other, particularly by more radical parties who use them to mobilize support for more restrictive policies. Particular attention was drawn to pedophiles.

- Various minorities – particularly sexual, religious and ethnic, but in case of Lithuania, also multiple citizens – are mentioned in manifestos of more radical parties.

However, it is noteworthy that apart from mainstream politicians who were sometimes criticized by newcomers or more marginal political forces, there was rather little critique toward the establishment, and particularly, intellectual establishment.

### **Heartland**

Heartland in its classical form was constructed only on rare occasions. Rather, what was more often present, was the anti-Heartland – which in most cases was related to the Soviet Union, e.g. Soviet Union per se, (Soviet type) communism, treason of the First Republic (enabling the Soviet Union to take power), or post-Communism, since also the years of re-independence were often quite hardly criticized, particularly in Lithuania, but to some extent, also in Latvia.

In many cases, however, a Heartland-like narrative was constructed instead, into the future, idealizing Western and particularly, Nordic type of society and politics. Depending on the political ideological background of the party, different aspects of the Nordic model were exemplified.

### **Policies**

The policy proposals that could be termed as populist more often dealt with putting identity politics into practice, proposals to change the political system, and there was also some welfare populism.

The policies dealing with identity politics were mostly restrictive proposals to deport, imprison, abolish or restrict the Other in some other way. Amongst proposals to change the political system, the most popular one in Lithuania (and this was somewhat present also in Latvia) was to install a presidential political system, but also to fight corruption and nationalize various fields of business. This also resembles the populist propositions made in CEE more generally. In Estonia, on the other hand, such propositions were rather rare, and the most scarce ones had to do with reducing the number of members of parliament (this promise reoccurred also in other Baltic States – paradoxically, together with the demand to lower the electoral threshold).

Concerning welfare policies, a “Robin Hood type of taking from the rich and giving to the poor” (represented e.g. by FRONTAS in Lithuania) was present side by side with contradictory promises to simultaneously increase welfare spending as well as cut taxation.

## **Criticism**

Criticism instead of policy proposals was used in a number of cases, but was more prevalent with marginal parties that often lacked the capability to put forth a proactive programme, particularly in Lithuania. In Latvia and Estonia – despite the environment of the economic crisis – there was much less criticism.

## **Scope**

Also in this case, there was substantial difference between the three countries. Whereas in Estonia, revolutionary propositions were practically absent and rather, incremental reforms tended to dominate, hinting a lack of alternatives, Lithuania and also the more marginal parties in Latvia proposed rather revolutionary means, which, in some cases, remained rather vague and not very elaborated.

## **Elaborateness**

The manifesto cultures of the three states differed to an extent, also resulting in manifestos of different length. This also determined the depth to which the proposals were elaborated and argued.

However, leaving the differences in the depth of argumentation aside, there are also some similarities evident: particularly, in the magic solutions. These were:

- Prohibition – to abolish, prohibit or restrict something was often seen as the magic solution for problems from migration to tax fraud
- Entitlements –these were often viewed as the means to set justice back on its feet in the society. And although there was rather well elaborated reasoning behind some subsidies, others were not even related to the good they should do. It should also be added that in several cases, also parties conservative and liberal by declaration viewed subsidies as the magic solutions.
- Writing principles into constitution – from fiscal balance (IRL) to admittance of occupation (LLRA) to welfare statism (LSDP).
- In Estonia, also liberalism, leaving the decision-making to the people themselves could be regarded as a magic solution (IRL, RE)

## PART III: ONLINE POPULISM IN THE BALTIC STATES

### 3.1 DATA AND METHODS

This segment of analysis primarily relies on the social media analysis conducted by the research assistants. As this is a qualitative pilot study, the aim was not to encompass every political movement

The analysis encompassed Facebook groups and pages (and in case of Latvia, also some Draugiem pages) that dealt with political issues. For this the social media portal's search engine was used. First search was done, based on the list of parties analyzed in WP II and WP III. The parties' pages were analyzed according to the instructions in Appendices. The pages were also analyzed for interlinks, or other social media groups they were connected to. Next, those political movements were analyzed that were interlinked with the parties, and the sampling via using such a snowball sampling method was continued.

In addition, a search was conducted with the social media search engine, using words derived from a five-fold political movement typology taken from Snow, Soule & Kriesi (2007, see text box below). The keywords provided by the coordinator were translated into Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, and the search was conducted with these keywords. After that search, snowball sampling was again used, based on interlinks.

#### ***TYPOLGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS***

In the literature, there are various typologies of social movements offered, depending on the view-point. In data gathering, we use the distinction between six major social movements, proposed in the social movements reader, edited by David Snow et al (2007): the labor movement, feminist and women's movements; environmental movements, antiwar and peace movements, ethnic and nationalist social movements and religious movements. Kitschelt has also distinguished between four types of right wing radicalism: Nazi nostalgia, welfare chauvinism, right wing authoritarianism and populist anti-state movements. The following list proposes possible keywords, but the actual list depends on your country's linguistic specifics.

- Labor – labor, Marxist, workers, socialist, trade union, employees, solidarity, capitalist,
- Feminism – feminism, women, feminine, gender, equality, segregation, chauvinism, sexual minorities, gay, LGBT
- Peace – peace, war, anti-war, military, army, troops, bloodshed,
- Environmental – environment, climate, animals, animal rights, nature, green, sustainability, earth, ecosystem, communitarian
- Ethnic or nationalist – national, nazi,
- You can also use general denominators, e.g. party, movement, political, union, community, activists etc.

However, these words can also overlap, e.g. the word 'socialist' might indicate a nationalistic movement, etc. The keywords are not the basis for outlining cleavages or networks later on.

Although there is not much research on the reliability of social media search engines (which can probably be manipulated by promoting pages and the user's previous action history), it still provided a more or less neutral ground for such an investigative pilot study.

The sampling was carried out in the second half of August and first half of September<sup>9</sup> and primarily, the contents from the year 2012 up to September were analyzed, though the exact scope was not the main aim due to a very different frequency of posting (e.g. if there were a community that began functioning in 2009 and it contained solely 10 posts for the three-year period, all of these were taken into account for content and discourse analysis).

The functional structure of Facebook was easily combined with the various aims of this working package. Every Facebook group or community has its followers – the users that have “liked” the particular page. This is usually posted as a number and we treated this as quantitative data. For observing the content and rhetoric, the information the group provided about itself as well as their Facebook page Wall (where the posts are visible) was analyzed. There both the group manager(s) as well as guests (in most cases) can post content – make status updates, i.e. write a longer or shorter text, share links, photos or videos with other users (also commenting and thus framing them with a status update), but it is also possible for the page manager to create interactive appliances – i.e. post questionnaires, game apps, etc and visitors can in some cases also write recommendations for the page.

The interlinkages between particular groups result from pages “liking” other pages. For example, a Facebook page of a party can “like” its youth organization's page (which can also “like” the party's page), but also other pages as means of positioning oneself through one's preferences, e.g. like more abstract pages like “Lithuania”, some world famous politician (e.g. Barack Obama), etc, hence also showing its sympathies as well as connections and also attracting visitors to other sites they might be interested in.


The followers can in turn be active either by posting their content on the page, or by reacting to the posts made by the page manager or other followers – all the posts can be commented (using text, links, etc), but they can also show their attitude more passively, by “liking” individual posts, or “sharing” them on their own (personal or page) Wall.

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<sup>9</sup> In case of Estonia, some sampling was done also in October, but the analysis of content relied on articles from September and earlier.

All the content retrieved was then analyzed, using open coding. For better observance, the pages were divided into types of movements that seemed to resemble each other most and give the key characteristics of these groups.

The illustration of how a Facebook page looks like is in Figure 3 below.



**Figure 3:** A commented example of a Facebook page. *Source: Reform Party Facebook page, edited by Authors.*

## 3.2 LITHUANIA

### 3.2.1 *THE POLITICAL SCENE IN SOCIAL MEDIA*

The analysis indicated that the scene of online politics is rather vibrant. Although not all the parties and party unions that contested in the 2008 elections had an active website nor were they active in social media, but the major parties and those that also contested in 2012 were quite active on the line. Altogether, 48 Facebook pages were analyzed.

In case of Lithuania, the parties often had multiple Facebook pages and groups – both for general use as well as for local units; in addition, sometimes there were pages also for individual politicians which were also integrated with the party communities in their design as well as through interlinks. However, this was the case with larger mainstream parties that have a large membership and an established organization. In addition to those, also a number of newly emerged political parties that ran in the 2012 elections and were rather active on Facebook.

The number of followers the pages attracted was on average, the largest in the Baltic comparison: a group had on average around 1,396 followers in Lithuania (based on the 48 groups investigated). This number may also be affected by the fact that Lithuanian (-speaking) population is the largest among the three Baltic States and that its population is not as divided between various social network environments as in Latvia). The least popular pages belonged to the marginal party Lithuanian Social Democratic Union (LSDS), which attracted a mere 16 sympathizers and the New Union, whose most popular page was the local page of the Šiauliai district with 35 likes, (perhaps indicating that the supporters and members of the party are simply not as active on Facebook). Amongst social movements, the least popular group were the anti-war movements, which scored 25 likes (group “Aš už taiką // Taika // Peace”) and 40 likes (group “For the withdrawal of Lithuanian troops from Afghanistan”).

The pages with most followers belonged to three distinguishable groups. First of all, the most supporters were gathered by **mainstream** liberal **parties** such as Liberals' Movement (their page is called Liberals) with 7,579 likes and Liberal and Centre Union with 6,530 likes. Both of the parties were frequent posters and served content that attracted users as well as discussion. For example, Liberal and Centre Union uploaded a game application (see Figure 4) on Facebook in the context of the political campaign. The title is “the fingers of Antanas”, referring to the candidate A. Nedzinskas (politician, singer, journalist, comedian, seen by many as a comedian-politician not to be taken seriously). The idea of the game is that you have to hit the fingers (and toes) of Antanas and try not to miss any.





**Figure 4:** Political game app from the Facebook page of LiCS. *Source: Facebook.*

Second type of Facebook sites that also proved to be rather popular with the users were the **newcomer parties** such as Christian Party (4,927 likes), political party “The Way of Courage” (3,130 likes) and The Union of Lithuanian Emigrants (2,365 likes). All of these also featured very active discussions. Their popularity was quite interesting when put into comparison with other marginal parties that had participated also in earlier elections, e.g. the party LSDS (16 likes) and Lithuanian Centre Party (203 likes), though the latter also featured rather active discussions in the pre-electoral period. Young Lithuania, also a contender in 2008 elections fit in-between the two extremes with 1,462 followers. In addition to the mentioned, there were also other marginal parties though these did not attract as much followers.

Thirdly, Facebook is clearly *the* environment for **political youth initiatives** – in our sample there were four larger organizations and some smaller ones, most of which had also oriented themselves politically: Lithuanian Youth Council (3,634 likes), Lithuanian Liberal Youth (2,992 likes), Youth Organization “Labor” (2,232 likes), The Union of Social Democratic Youth (2,183 likes) Association of Youth Organizations in Klaipeda (1,082) as well as The League of Young Conservatives (861 likes). Additionally there was a number of more marginal youth-related initiatives.

These pages dealt with general topical political issues as well as with more specific themes closer to them as an interest group (see Figure 5).



**Figure 5:** Poster from the Facebook page of The Union of Social Democratic Youth. The text on the poster says: “Hear a young person!” The text below says: “A typical internship of a law student. Four years of law studies teaches how to bring coffee? Only speaking together the voice of youth will be heard. Join us!” *Source: Facebook*

Lithuanian Liberal Youth on the other hand, rather uses its Facebook page as an instrument of indoctrinating, uploading photo manipulations and memes that propagate liberal worldview (see Figure 6).



**Figure 6:** Images shared on the Facebook page of Lithuanian Liberal Youth. *Source: Facebook*

Other initiatives on Facebook featured a number of topics. One type of pages dealt with **general issues of political participation and information**. This included pages such as The Movement of Seimas Election Boycott (244 likes), public discussion forum “The people, the citizens, the state” (425 likes), group “What is going on in politics” (2,950 likes), group “I am voting – not emigrating” (231 likes), group “What a government does” (1,962 likes), page “A day with a parliament member” (206 likes) and page called “Critical mass of citizens who have not fallen out with logic” (1,629 likes).

Interestingly, **energy** was also a key topic in debates in social media. The illustration below is taken from the website of the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union, demonstrating the choking power of the heating monopolies, but there were also devoted pages, e.g. Youth Movement for Lithuania’s Energetic Independence (120 likes) and page ““Vilnius Energy” makes me sick” (1,017 likes).




**Figure 7:** Image shared on the Facebook page of Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union, illustrating the power of energy providers. *Source: Facebook.*

The **labor movement** had a rather modest number of followers – Vilnius Trade Union “Solidarity” with 182 likes and Lithuanian Trade Union “Solidarity” with 364 likes.

A movement type that gathered somewhat more followers was the **patriotic and nationalist movements** – e.g. Patriots.lv with 1,955 likes and Lithuanian National Centre with 597 likes. This group would have been numerous if a separate cluster of extra-parliamentary parties would not have been formed, since a number of parties featured a very similar discourse to the nationalist movements.

The cluster of **feminist movements** was only represented by one community (Women Information Centre with 263 likes), but since this was the sole representative, it was included under the category “Other”. Three other pages allocated under this category were a fan site for a Polish Lithuanian politician Waldemar Tomaszewski, the page of the Lithuanian Jewish Community (838 likes) and a page promoting a single initiative, The Grand Vilnius Referendum (109 likes).

Hence, there is a variety of topics that are addressed by online movements. Next we will analyze the content and pattern of interaction according to movement type.



**Figure 8:** Types of online movements on Facebook in Lithuanian. The numbers in brackets indicate the amount of movements in the respective groups, the number on the diagram is the total of likes the pages in the respective groups accumulated<sup>10</sup>. *Source: authors*

### 3.2.2 RHETORIC USED IN SOCIAL MEDIA GROUPS

The **youth groups** mostly use rather non-populist rhetoric, that is, Facebook is more of a channel for distributing information, some of them also being open to more proactive deliberation. The Facebook pages are very often also linked with offline participation and are used to invite people to offline events or post pictures from offline events (e.g.

<sup>10</sup> This number is not the total of likes for all pages on Facebook that could be allocated into this group, but simply within the sample of 48 pages that were analyzed in the frame of our pilot study.

Lithuanian Youth Council). The more ideologically inclined groups that are also related to parties, e.g. the Liberal Youth or the League of Young Conservatives also use more indoctrinating forms of discourse, often using images for that function (see also Figure 6 above) – in the first case (Liberal Youth), valuing liberty and loathing big government, in the latter, i.a. valuing the politician Ingrida Šimonytė, (but loathing Russia and dependence on Russia, as evident from images used by the movement). An example of this is featured in the picture below. The picture referring to the Minister of Finance Ingrida Šimonytė – the name of the cream is Ingrida, and the words below read: “regenerates dried out budget”. I. Šimonytė does not belong to any party. The picture is supposed to be funny, but not criticising or mocking, since she is highly valued by TS-LKD as a good and professional cabinet member. In the right hand corner the TS-LKD logo can be identified, also indicating the connection between the League of Young Conservatives and the party.



**Figure 9:** An image retrieved from the Facebook page of the League of Young Conservatives. *Source: Facebook.*

However, in terms of discussion, the pages tend to remain rather phatic. While the pages are actively used for informing, and to some extent, also for indoctrination (albeit rarely using populist rhetoric), the followers engage only modestly, writing short phrases as responses, e.g. “Right on!”, “Congratulations!” or “When will the pictures be posted?”. Hence, the online youth movements are rather modest in their power to engage their followers in online activities.

The **mainstream parties** had often gathered a number of followers, and use this to keep them informed about information published in other media, but also to keep the people up to date with their own positions on those issues. The largest followership is attracted primarily by social democratic and liberal parties, but also the conservative TS-LKD has gathered a number of followers. All the more popular pages tended to be very active, but this can partially also be explained with the approaching elections.

Despite (or perhaps on the contrary, due to) the amount of posts made by the moderator, there is usually not much discussion on the walls of the party pages. If at all, then phatic exclamations such as “keep on going!” or also some more critical remarks are made below the posts.

The character of rhetoric used by the moderator varies from party to party, e.g. while TS-LKD is rather informative in its rhetoric, availing only some elements characteristic to populist discourse, then Labor Party uses rather classical populist discourse, e.g. opposing themselves to the “political clan”, “political elite”, the “rulers” etc.

The Labor Party also uses Facebook to make first hand political statements (while others just share what they’ve said elsewhere in the media). In general, the posts have very different rhetoric. Some of them are matter-of-fact posts just informing about events or inviting to participate, watch, vote, etc. Others are more provoking –short questions, asking for approval or opinion of the readers like, “do you think that an excursion to Seimas is a bribe?” or “Do you think that Lithuania should promote the consumption of biofuels?” Still others are even more provocative, populist, or even accusing the Other, like “The clan has moved, but good news for the voters that Labor party does not belong to the clan” or “What we see these days in the public sphere is more like a circus to V. Uspaskich than serious political events” or “What good has the current government done for Lithuania?” This kind of communication however, tends to be an exception rather than a rule among mainstream parties, nearing Labor and their rhetoric rather to the extra-parliamentary parties whose rhetorical strategies are more indoctrinating and engaging.

The group of **extra-parliamentary parties** includes all those parties that were extra-parliamentary at the moment of the analysis in September 2012, and that means also between the elections of 2008 and 2012. However, we acknowledge that this group is not a unanimous entity. Amongst them, there was a clear difference between the new parties such as “The Way of Courage” and longer established parties like Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union or the Centre Party. First of all, the difference was evident in the number of followers, which differed more than a dozen times between some parties, but



on the other hand, also posting frequency and liveliness of discussions tended to differ according to the similar lines.

Also, the topics that are discussed differentiate the extra-parliamentary parties from mainstream parties and near quite a few of them rather to the nationalist movements, since they are not discussing the topics that make the headlines of mainstream political news, but rather cases of cultural conflict, pedophilia, crime, etc. For example, Centre Party posts news like “Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos has allocated \$2.5 million for homosexual lobbyists to fight against the traditional family” on their wall.

Extra-parliamentary parties often use more populist discursive strategies as well. There is a lot of antagonism which is built upon intolerance – both as an abstract category as well as a practical conviction. For example Young Lithuania campaigns emotionally against some worldviews, labeling them “tolerist” or “tolerastia”, but also against immigration, sexual minorities etc. But they also use more revolutionary rhetoric and construction of the people. For example, the Centre Party uses very heroic and praising rhetoric when addressing the people – “brothers and sisters”, “believers don’t give up”, “The most important strategic goal is always the people of Lithuania”, etc. Similarly to the Labor Party there is a significant amount of anti-establishment sentiment. For example LSDS calls for uniting anti-establishment forces to go into elections and to change the traditional parties for completely new ones (the ones which were not in power). Moreover, they put the responsibility on citizens, justifying, that the people want this revolution and this is the reason for their actions:

*Lately, in communicating with the public, as well as in the public sphere citizens more clearly express the goal to overcome the currently dominant nomenclature of political party system in the democratic elections, which did not fulfill the expectations of people and meet the interests of the State. [Lithuanian Social Democratic Union’s Facebook page]*

However, also the discussions are more content-related, not just phatic. The strongly indoctrinating posts provided grounds for people to show their attitude toward particular issues and express themselves, and do so in longer posts than just the “cheers” that were used by the followers of mainstream party pages.

As noted, the **patriotic and nationalist movements** are quite similar to some extra-parliamentary parties. In addition to having a rather radical stance, Lithuanian nationalist movements also make a bet on the external threat. A nationalist movement page, Lithuanian National Centre seems to depict itself as the saviors, protectors and creators of the national state and feel the constant threat from the outside forces, which “asperse the national movements” or “plan provocations”. The organization is also

rather proactive – it organizes and invites to different patriotic processions, summer schools and similar events.

On patriotai.lt, the discussion is rather active on the page (quite many posts are liked, shared and commented). There are both supportive and criticizing comments – mainly because of the different understanding of patriotism, radicalism and support for different political parties. The comments are sometimes rather strong in emotions and words, for example:

The **political activism groups** can be divided in two according to the rhetoric used. One group features pages where discussion is rather active. These mostly use ironic language, photo manipulations etc. For example, the group “Critical mass of citizens, who are not fallen out with logic” posts articles on politics and then labels them ironically, e.g. an article on the sudden illness of one officer after being officially criticized by the President is termed “a joke”, a politician’s fight against the gig by Marilyn Manson in Kaunas is termed “stand up comedy”, and so on.

In case of some groups, it is also visible that they have clear antagonisms with particular parties and worldviews, or on the contrary, there seems to be emanation of particular parties. For example, the group “Critical mass of citizens...” seems to be directed against such parties like the Labor Party and Order and Justice that they term populist, but there is also criticism on the address of other parliamentary parties. While for example the group “One day with a Parliament member” is clearly directed to popularizing the Labor Party with young people. The public discussion forum “The people, the citizens, the state” has added the party “National Union” under its likes and there are mild hints of some support to their perspective also in discourse, though in general the forum retains a rather neutral discourse. The page “I am voting – not emigrating” is clearly a supporter of liberal world-views and opposed to the two core parties LSDP and TS-LKD, who they are mocking (see Figure 10).



**Figure 10:** Image from the page “I am voting - not emigrating”, manipulating the logos of the party TS-LKD and Soviet Union. The slogan reads: “Pensioners – the future of the state”. *Source: Facebook.*



Another group not visibly related to any particular political interest group is The Movement of Seimas Election Boycott that states about itself:

*Movement is for the rights of direct democracy which were not granted to the nation after the Independence" and primarily features ironic and mocking type of discourse. [Movement for Seimas Election Boycott Facebook page]*

In general, there is no visible construction of people characteristic to populism. Rather, community building is based either on antagonism or on an engaging moderator. In comparison to other types of movements, this tends to be the only type that has undertaken a more participant strategy.



**Figure 11:** A caption from the wall of group "What is going on in politics", featuring comments by participants. *Source: Facebook.*


The **energy initiatives** are in this instance groups where dissatisfaction with energy providers is aired. Hence, the groups are founded on antagonisms. And this must be used in plural. For example, the group ““Vilnius Energy” makes me sick” is against energy firms like Dalkia and Rubikon, but also against politicians who are claimed to support the companies and their possibilities of making a profit. For example, the group ““Vilnius Energy” makes me sick” opposes Vilnius mayor and the prime minister, who are ironically called the “energy workers” (*energetikai*).

However, another group, Youth Movement for Energetic Independence which seems to be related to the League of Young Conservatives (which again is related to TS-LKD) sees a different prime antagonist, and in this case it is not the energy monopolists, but rather, Russia as the energy provider and external enemy.

Energy initiative groups, particularly ““Vilnius Energy”...” use rather populist rhetoric in their construction of people. The group introduces itself with the following words.

*We have a dream that every person pays for the service only as much as they are worth. We hope that people come together in groups can turn the situation in their favor. We want the person to dare to stand for himself and firmly say - enough! We feel that the time has come already! One person in the field is not a warrior. One angry customer is not a force. Let's change the word today together and let's make it cozy and affordable! Hooray! ["Vilnius Energy" makes me sick Facebook page]*

The people are depicted as victims, and aims to engage them. The group uses Delacroix's painting *Liberty Leading the People* as their profile picture (see Figure 12), also suggesting a rather populist (or even revolutionary) approach. In practice, however, it tends to remain merely an expressive community where the frustration with the situation is let out, so it is neither a consumer protection information source neither a practical revolutionary movement taking practical steps toward solving the situation.



**Figure 12:** Facebook profile of page "Vilnius Energy" makes me sick. *Source: Facebook.*

The **labor movements** are clearly less popular than nationalist movements, but they are also less frequent posters and have chosen a slightly different communication strategy. In addition to information about their activities such as demonstrations, repost articles from the media that shape or demonstrate attitudes and deal with other types of indoctrinating communication, they also share information about employees' rights – for example, they share instruction videos, e.g. “lawyer’s advice” and other “tips” for employees.

The group of **peace movements** was represented by two pages – “Peace” and “For the Withdrawal of Lithuanian Troops from Afghanistan”. Both of these rather used indoctrinating language and shared pacifist images, most of which originated from international sites and were not directly linked to the Lithuanian context. There is practically no discussion; only a few comments in the thread of “For the Withdrawal of...”.

Other movements not classifiable under the previous groups represent e.g. a page called “Women’s information centre” and is functioning in a way as a page for the women’s rights movements, a personal page of Valdemar Tomaszewski, a Polish Lithuanian politician, some particular initiatives such as The Grand Vilnius Referendum and the home page of the Lithuanian National Community.

### *3.2.3 INTERLINKS*

The analysis of interlinks between the various groups indicated a varying level of interconnectedness amongst the groups. Some, e.g. the Ronald Reagan Club use this function to demonstrate allegiance, e.g. being connected to pages of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Irving Kristol or Pope John Paul II. Also, non-political pages, e.g. general pages as “Lithuania” or “NATO”, but also news portals and even political science competence centers are often added among likes e.g. by TS-LKD.











However, there were also different kinds of links identified between political organizations and/or movements. Amongst parties, the most common were links to local and youth organizations and some particular initiatives. For example, TS-LKD links to Young Conservatives and Labor Party to Youth Organization “Labor”, but also to “Lithuanian Student Union”. From amongst initiatives, for example, the Youth movement for energy independence was interlinked by The League of Young Conservatives, and most likely also managed by them, since both the rhetoric and content overlapped. The


initiative One day with a parliament member was clearly linked to the Labor Party, the page “Vilnius Energy” makes me sick” led to the Liberals’ Movement and so on. Also, some parties, e.g. Labor Party had interlinked personal pages of party politicians like V. Uspaskich, V. Gabšys, and V. Fiodorovas, but these were left out of the analysis. But there were also some pages, e.g. the page of LiCS that had a large number of followers, but did not represent any significant network of political communities on Facebook.

However, the networks of the mainstream parties still remained rather modest. The most thoroughly networked group of pages were the nationalist movements, which were interconnected with some of the marginal parties, that also received a notable number of followers. Some movements, e.g. Lithuanian National Centre, Young Lithuania and National Union seem to work as hubs connecting the group of pages, and seem to feature quite evidently the kind of networked structure Griffin (2003) described. It has to be noted also that these movements do not regard each other as competitors. For example, it seems that the National Union is not a real union, but a one person initiative. Since the creation of the page, the “Union” decided to create the “Party of Emigrants” and initiated the process of it. However, it seems that the Union strongly supports the political party “The way of Courage” instead – most of the likes are connected to it, the posts are frequently connected to it and the rhetoric is quite similar. Nevertheless, the target group of the Union is definitely the emigrants.

Labor movement on the other hand appeared to be both small and disconnected – even the two branches of the Solidarity labor union were not interconnected with each other online. The two peace movement pages were interconnected to each other though did not feature any other domestic links.

**Legend for Figure 13 (for figure, see next page)**

	Parliamentary parties		Energy initiatives
	Extra-parliamentary parties		Trade unions
	Youth groups		Peace movements
	General political attitude groups		Other
	Nationalist movements		Groups interlinked, but not analyzed



### 3.3.4 CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, the Lithuanian social media scene appeared to be a rather vibrant political platform for keeping the followers indoctrinated and informed, and in a few cases, also engaging them in discussions. Facebook has developed into a considerable scape for debates particularly for more ideologically conservative and nationalist movements and parties on the one hand, and on the other, for more liberal and youth-oriented initiatives.

With the exception of Youth groups who used Facebook often just to promote their offline activities, or the labor unions that primarily provided handy information for followers, most of the more interest group type of initiatives remain expressive communities where one can therapeutically let their frustration out or postulate their dissatisfaction e.g. with the energy production. However, these movements do not translate into offline nor even online activism that would actually aim to change the situation.

Amongst the parties there were both movements who kept their communication close to neutral (particularly among mainstream parties), but also those who took a more populist approach (e.g. Labor Party, Young Lithuania, The Way of Courage etc), engaging followers in discussion, but also using indoctrination. Perhaps this is related to their coverage in the mainstream media (at least posts on the Labor Party wall indicated their irreverence of the mainstream media news), which is modest and not depicting them in the best light, and hence they have turned to alternative media where they can set the agenda themselves.

## 3.3 LATVIA

### 3.3.1 THE POLITICAL SCENE IN SOCIAL MEDIA

The political social media scene in Latvia seems to be more modest than in Lithuania. This can be affected by Latvia's smaller population (and also the fact that a large population in Latvia is Russian-speaking, and hence probably using also different channels for communication, e.g. Odnoklasniki.ru. Also political movements are drawn between competing social media environments such as Facebook, Draugiem and Twitter and no dominating hegemonic environment dominates. This, however, also restrains the building of networks.

All in all, 27 social media pages were analyzed in the case of Latvia. The average number of followers of particular communities differed, being four times smaller than in Lithuania – around 300 likes per page.

As also in the case of Latvia, one prominent group among social media sites was the party pages. All in all, pages of eight parties out of the 13 that ran in previous elections in 2011 were detected. The four larger parties or unions – Centre of Harmony (528 likes), Unity (103 likes on their Facebook page, 352 in their Facebook group), Zatler's Reform Party (809 likes) and Everything for Latvia – For Fatherland and Freedom (184 likes) – had their own Facebook pages. Additionally, some counterparts in unions, e.g. Everything for Latvia (353 likes) from VL-TB/LNNK and The Latvian Green Party (28 likes) from ZZS had separate pages.

In addition, there were three extra-parliamentary parties that ran in the previous elections – The Last Party with 612 likes, Christian Democratic Union with 26 likes, and For Presidential Republic with 7 likes. In the case of both groups a large variation in the number of followers can be detected. This is probably most of all related to the target groups of the parties – The Last Party and Zatlers Reform Party are both newer initiatives (and hence, Facebook was probably one of the pioneering channels in reaching the audience), and both have probably oriented themselves to the younger cohort of more frequent online users.


Additionally, there is a number of more loose movements. The scene seems rather blurry and it is difficult to classify the movements according to types, since according to the classical typology that was used for finding the movements, in general only fills one category – the nationalist movements. However, it is necessary to distinguish between at least two kinds of movements – one revolves around more exclusive Latvian nationalism, the other around soft and incorporating nationalism.

In comparison to Lithuania the exclusive Latvian nationalism is somewhat different. In there the historical notes were often more elaborate; and the central demands of a number of movements centered around changing the constitutional rules, e.g. the constitution itself (change it for the one installed in 1922) or the constitutional order from being a parliamentary democracy to being a constitutional monarchy. These movements included e.g. the National Patriotic Union “God Bless Latvia” The Third Way (196 likes), Latvia's Revival – Riga's Party (53 likes), Democratic Centre and non-partisan social workers (49 likes), Latvian Parliamentary Monarchy (1197 likes), Veterans and Supporters of National Power Union (164 members), group “Yes, for the renewal of the Latvian Constitution from 1922”, seeking actually to reinstate that

constitution (256 likes) and Made in Latvia (896 likes). Additionally, this group features the most popular sites amongst followers as well.

The other type of pages engaging with nationality discourse is a block of pages that deals with the linguistic issues and citizenship legislation, incorporating pages such as Non-Citizens (60 likes) and Common Language (221 likes) which deal with the problems of the Russian minority, but also the page Patriots.lv (194 likes) can be allocated in this group, since unlike its Lithuanian alternative, the Latvian version envisions patriotism as a multiethnic phenomenon.

In addition to the pages already mentioned, there were five others, three of which set a perspective of socio-economic issues as the primary. This rather homogeneous group includes pages such as Solidarity (427 likes), ATTAC Latvia (266 likes), a local branch of the anti-globalization movement and page “Usurers out of the temple” (314 likes) dealing with the issues of loans and support in the context of the debt crisis.



**Figure 14:** Types of online movements on Facebook in Latvia. The number in brackets indicates the amount of movements in the respective group, the number on the diagram is the total of likes the pages in the respective groups accumulated. *Source: Authors.*

The two that remained outside the above mentioned categories are Beautiful Future (55 likes) which introduces itself as “Latvian youth progressive party” and Demokrati.lv (392 likes) that tended to post about a broad scale of issues, perhaps most focusing on the economic crisis in Greece. These two were hence categorized under Other. The number of likes for every movement is summed up according to movement types in Figure 14.



### 3.3.2 RHETORIC USED IN SOCIAL MEDIA GROUPS

The **mainstream parties** primarily used social media to share news articles and comment on topical issues. Posting was moderately active (though with some less active gaps) particularly on the ZRP Facebook page, and some posts also called for citizen engagement offline (e.g. Everything for Latvia!, Latvian Green Party). However, the online engagement was practically non-existent. The only mainstream party whose rhetoric could be seen as indoctrinating was Latvian Green Party who advocated “green ideas” and “green energy”. Discussion remains modest, Posts are mostly by page managers and the feedback they receive are occasional likes and phatic comments of particular posts by a limited number of activists. Occasionally, there are posts from page visitors as well, e.g. on ZRP site, one asking why still the old label “Zatler’s Reform party” still appears; another post asks about the proposed plans of Ministry of Environmental protection and regional development how to promote the involvement of the people in the entrepreneurship, and the third one is a share of a video mocking the austerity measures adopted after the banking crisis.



**Figure 15:** A caption from the video posted by guest user on the wall of Zatler's Reform Party. Full video available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdLQ9L01CNU&sns=fb> Source: Youtube.

The **extra-parliamentary parties** are less frequent posters and also attract even less discussion. The most active amongst them is The Last Party whose six posts attracted a total of six comments during the three summer months. Since the posting is so rare, it is difficult also to assess the content and rhetoric of posts, but in general, informing content tends to dominate. For Presidential Republic preaches its main aim (presidentialism in Latvia). Posts of the Last Party in the last three months largely deal more with social issues (invitation to demonstrate in support for “Pussy Riot”; reflection

of gay parade in Riga and Ljubljana), and less with political issues that were topical in their election campaign.

The **nationalist movements** form a much more vibrant network of pages with more explicit content even with the fact that there are more than nine of such pages (9 incorporated into this analysis). Posting, however, tends to remain rather passive also on this pages, ranging between 2-3 posts per week to 2-3 posts per month. The content that is most often posted, are shares of news articles (mostly from Latvian mainstream media, but sometimes also less common channels, e.g. *tautasforums.lv*, *tautas-satversme.lv*, etc.) which are then interpreted with an accompanying status update, which can range from a simple slogan to a longer elaboration. Longer statements are also quite frequently posted independently. For example, the manager of page “Yes, for the renewal of the Latvia Constitution from 1922” has posted a 738 word manifesto on its wall in two languages (so it is actually twice as long), demanding the review of the current Latvian Parliamentary Elections Act.

Unlike in Lithuania, the followers of the pages are rather passive – there is practically no discussion in the pages; nor even likes, but occasionally, the posts are shared by a couple of activists. However, also the aim of the page managers does not seem to be hosting debates and engaging people through deliberative participation, but rather, calling them for offline rallies and events.

In general, the main aim of these movements seems to be not just to debate over nationalist values or moral issues and treatment of minority groups (like in Lithuania), but rather, change the governmental system. The role model here is the interwar republic of Latvia which is very much idealized in the discourse. For example, there is a numerous group of pages that aim to reinstall the 1922 Constitution “in which nothing was said about parties and election thresholds” (Latvian Parliamentary Monarchy). The reign of Karlis Ulmanis is remembered with great deal of respect, his speeches are posted, etc. The goals vary from “*Reestablishment of openness and utility of the state governance. Liquidation of party monopoly in the politics. Fight for democracy, coordination, juridical and against the fission of society.*” (Latvia Revival – Riga Party) to “*through the referendum, introduce changes in regime – Latvian Nation Parliamentary Monarchy with directly elected Crown – V.V.F.*” (by which the undoubtedly mean the former president of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga). The latter was proposed by a group called “Latvian Parliamentary Monarchy”, which also scored the record of 1197 likes.

It must be stressed that there is practically no ethnic tension envisioned on these sites – posts are made in Latvian and in Russian interchangeably or posted with translations.

The overall ideological disposition within this group, however, remains murky. For example, the content on the page of “Latvia Revival” ranges from posts informing about the 5th anniversary of Russian radio station “Baltcom” or visa-free regime with Russia and ending with a link to the speech of Rainis, a famous Latvian poet, defender of social-democratic ideas, member of Constitutional Assembly that in February 15, 1922 approved the Latvian Constitution (Satversme). Hence, from the posts it is problematic to establish clear picture of what this organization is about. Meanwhile, the ideological orientation seem to be social-democratic, since party refers to Rainis, as well as in various posts it explains the policies of social-democracy.

What unites the whole group is the rather high level of populism in discourse. For this, both a nationalist construction of the people as well as opposition with the political establishment is used. But most of all, there is a lot of nostalgia related to the interwar republic. For example, the group “God bless Latvia” has posted speeches from Karlis Ulmanis, And they also depict the current situation as a crisis:

*Until now the slogan of the power could be – rip and rule! And bellows were sufficed with that. Parties divided not as left-right, centric but Latvian and Russian and so it continues all these 20 years. [God Bless Latvia Facebook page]*

On the wall of the Democratic Centre, there is also resentment toward the Soviet time, but also negative notes concerning contemporary politics – the political system and policy decisions made. There is also a significant amount of euroscepticism. For example, the group “For the people, belief, truth and homeland” seems to dread most that the government introduces Euro without putting this decision on a popular vote. Community sees the Euro as unnecessary and perceives it as a threat to national sovereignty. Hence, though the positive attitude towards the EU is hegemonic in the electoral race and debates, there is some discontent aired in social media. Recurring images depicting Latvia as a sold country were used by multiple pages (see Figure 16).

However, there are also movements, e.g. by Latvian Parliamentary Monarchy that sees Latvia as an EU state also as the future heartland:

*Returning to the true democracy, establishing strong power supported by all the people (nations) in Latvia, Latvia will become wealthy, flowering, European Union state, thanks to transit of commodities, energetic resources, tourism and science. [Latvian Parliamentary Monarchy Facebook page]*



**Figure 16:** A widely used image by nationalist movements in social media. The image portrays the contour of Latvian map in candles, and a sign "SOLD" stamped onto it. *Source: Facebook.*

On the forum of Veterans and Supporters of National Power Union, the posted information help to conclude that the discussions in this group very much tends to glorify or at least to represent various ideas of national-socialism, at some point even, ideas close to Nazism ideology via the anti-Semitic expressions. In one of the posts the author (commemorating the sudden death of an active defender of nationalism) wrote: *"his death has not frightened Latvians, but instead it has activated them for the fight for their race, nation and the Homeland Latvia!"*, hence it is visible that the general rhetoric revolves around the need to fight the enemy, get rid of all the "dangerous elements", and introduce Lettic Latvia. In addition to that, discussions clustered also around the commemoration of the March 16th (Legionary day) by expressing the indignation why some political forces oppose this important event. Also various posts discussed the language referendum, hence pointing that the only language is Latvia is and should be Latvian. Also various posts are devoted to discuss some historical events, mostly associated with the second world war, especially expressing antagonism towards the Soviet Regime.

The **multi-ethnic nationalist groups** are less numerous and also attract less followers in sum, but posting is rather frequent, particularly on the pages of Patrioti.lv and Non-Citizens (up to several times a day). The content of posts is manifold, including linked articles and websites, photos and status updates. However, the goals of all pages tend remain centered on informing, and not so much on indoctrination or engagement.

Patrioti.LV is much more multiculturally oriented than its counterpart in Lithuania. Even the introductory texts are in Russian and in Latvian and introduces its goals rather as a youth organization than as a mentality club:

- *to promote the coalescence of Latvian youth realizing common projects;*
- *to organize international and internal seminars, conferences and discussions for youth about actualities and interesting topics;*
- *to organize the free time of the young adults;*
- *to support the children and youth sport;*

*/---/ All this can be attained ONLY TOGETHER working for the sake of our country. That is way do not select people according to nationality, sex, social origin, profession or other features. [Patrioti.LV Facebook page]*

Yet, there is some political allegiance and even populist discourse visible on the page. For example, the page Non-Citizens clearly states its allegiance to Centre of Harmony, but also proposes itself as a group for direct action:

*We are preparing to support Centre of Harmony in the voting for the allocation of voting rights to us...  
...but we also do not sit and wait, we are naturalizing, sharing experiences, where and how we passed it, where the more loyal examiners are. [Non-Citizens Facebook page]*

The community also encourages to sign for the initiation of referendum regarding the allocation of citizenship to all current non-citizens.

Some posts suggests that the page Non-Citizens is nostalgic about the soviet times. This assumptions can be made based on following discourse as well as the images the page is using (see Figure 17).



**Figure 17:** Photo depicting a popular march from the Soviet times, the slogan says: "Long live Soviet Latvia as the 14th Soviet Republic". *Source: Facebook.*

Antagonism directed against the "political elite" for continuously provoking and encouraging with their policies and activities the distinction between citizens ("the good") and non-citizens ("the evil"/ "aliens"). Meanwhile, they also attack the "Latvian state", for example, in one posted comment community refers to Latvia as "this land of fools". In various posts the antagonism borders with hate speech. The antagonism towards National Alliance, more precisely, the leader of "Everything for Latvia!" Raivis Dzintars is evident from the very title of the community.



**Figure 18:** A photo manipulation, reading: "Two kinds of inhabitants live in Latvia - citizen; alien". On the left hand side the prime minister Valdis Dombrovskis is pictured, while on the left hand side, a cadre from the horror movie "Alien" is depicted. *Source: Facebook.*

The pages that carry more **socio-economical** messages in general use a similar pattern of communication to the prior types: they are also rather passive posters and rely primarily on an informing discourse with some elements of indoctrination. What is even stronger perhaps is the resentment towards the ruling government and the current policies. There is a clear antagonist discourse of kleptocracy (the rule of the thieves) and/or plutocracy (the rule of the wealthy), and additionally calls to confront that through demonstrations, strikes and rallies.

However, as with all the previous examples, this does not translate into online activism. They differ from the previous groups greatly due to the fact that also other users can post on their page, but this opportunity is mostly used by other groups with similar aims. However, the posts are rarely discussed in comments. For example, the page of the Usurers of the temple (314 likes), has practically no interaction from others – out of ten posts, only one has received a comment and two posts have received 1-2 likes from followers.

It is also noteworthy that these pages have often gotten some content from Polish movements – videos, news etc. This seems to be the case particularly with Solidarity, but also with the page Democracy.lv. Additionally, there seems to be some relation between these movements, particularly Solidarity and the extra-parliamentary parties People's Control and Social Democratic Workers Party whose political propositions they mediate.


### 3.3.3 INTERLINKS

The level of interlinkages varies a great deal between the different types of movements. Either there are no interlinks at all as for example in the case of Unity or there are more culturally, not politically oriented interlinks. For example the Latvian patriots page

Patriotai.lv is interlinked with sites such as “Latvia” and “I love Riga” rather than with political movements. This was the case e.g. with Latvian Green Party who interlinked all kinds of lifestyle initiatives (e.g. Riga’s bicycle week), but no more politically inclined movements. In some cases, the connections were even rather curios, e.g. between the Latvian Christian Party and a rather radical animal rights movement PETA.

It is quite popular to like pages of collegial organizations abroad, e.g. extensive lists between the Democrats movements in Latvia and in Poland, the Christian Democrat Party is connected to its colleagues all over the world etc. It almost seems that showing one’s allegiance to one or the other foreign politician is part of identity building.

The interlinkages between political movements in Latvia are by far the strongest amongst the nationalist movements – as also in Lithuania – but also the socio-economic groups. They are interconnected through liking one another’s pages, but they also often share each other’s status updates, use the same images, and it also occurs that several of these pages are founded and/or managed by the same person - Edvīns Puķe. There are clear indications that he manages the pages of Solidarity, page “Yes, for the renewal of the Latvia’s Constitution from 1922”, “Democratic Centre...” and other pages. Several posts matched between “God bless Latvia” and Latvia Revival as well as between “Democratic Centre...” and Latvia’s Revival. The strong linkages between the various national and social movements is visible from Figure 19.



**Figure 19:** (legend below): Interlinks between various Latvian Facebook communities. *Source: Authors.*





### 3.3.4 CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, the Latvian social media scene is somewhat disconnected and passive. This is partially due to the dissection of the scene between various social media environments, but even in case of movements that are rather popular (liked by hundreds of people), they remain quite passive and preaching. There is not much discussion and being a member of various groups or pages are perhaps rather considered as status symbols or expression of political views than of political activity or deliberation.

The most viable group (and practically the only one) of online movements tends to be the national movement scene which is intertwined with a social democratic element that cannot be called exactly a labor movement, but preaches somewhat more social democratic ideas. However, even that group seems somewhat artificial and not really engaging with people.

All in all, it is difficult to call the pages analyzed social movements in the practical sense, since there is very little attachment or two-way deliberation about the issues concerned. There are interlinkages between some movements, but this rather marks their common descent and same purposes, not its viability and possibility for coalescing.

## 3.4 ESTONIA

### 3.4.1 ONLINE POLITICAL MOVEMENT SCENE IN ESTONIA

The scene of online political movements is rather vibrant in Estonia. The number of pages analyzed for this project was 48 (as much as in Lithuania) and the average number of members per community analyzed was 1392 likes, so almost comparable to Lithuania, but times higher than in Latvia, despite the differences in the native speaking population. The vibrancy of Facebook among Estonians is probably also related to the fact that Estonian social media scene (at least social media in Estonian) is quite densely centered in Facebook, in one channel. However, concerning this number it must be taken into account that due to the qualitative aims of the inquiry, vibrancy of the social media scene and limited resources for analysis, some minor groups (whose page was passive and who had very few followers) were omitted from the analysis. Including those groups, the number might be lower.

The largest followership of all pages analyzed belonged to a political initiative group “Down with Tallinn TV – money to kindergartens” with 14,505 followers; the smallest was Estonian Marxist movement with just 17 followers.

As with also Latvia and Lithuania, the pages analyzed were grouped, using the open code method. In case of Estonia, the most prominent group – particularly according to the number of followers, but also according to the number of movements were **single initiative groups**. This included movements that promoted closing down Tallinn TV (“Down with Tallinn TV...” group with 15,505 likes, “Delete Tallinn TV” with 2552 likes) and a counter-movement promoting shutdown of ETV2 to finance a cut social scheme, “ETV2 finances for reimbursing student loans” with 501 likes. But the more popular initiatives were also “A worthy salary for a teacher” with 10,773 likes and “Reimbursing student loans must be continued” with 3639 likes or “Support a farmer” with 1096 likes.

As usual, also the **parties** and particularly parliamentary parties were rather well presented in social media. Reform party (2815 likes) had the most followers, followed by Social Democratic Party (1397 likes) and Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica (1200 likes), Centre Party had somewhat less Facebook supporters (409 likes). On the other hand, the three less represented parties (SDE, IRL, KE) had also separate pages for their youth groups (Centre Youth 248 likes, IRL Youth 498 likes, Young Social Democrats 726 likes) as well as local units (the latter was not analyzed), while Reform Party’s page seemed to be implicitly oriented to youth anyway; see for example Figure with illustrations for the Reform Party Facebook page ( Figure 20).

Some of the extra-parliamentary parties were somewhat less represented as Estonian Greens had received 534 likes, Estonian Independence Party 776 likes, Estonian Christian Democrats 82 likes and Estonian Conservative People’s Party (formerly People’s Union of Estonia, ERL) 142 likes.



**Figure 20:** Images from Reform Party Facebook page. *Source: Facebook*

The third group in size represented various **nationalist movements**, the largest of which, “Proud to be Estonian” scored 6,060 likes and Friends of Estonian Legion scored 1007 likes, while the rest had a more modest followership (Estonian National Movement

with 166 likes, Free Patriotic Citizen 297 likes, and a community, Centre for Patriotic Upbringing scored 317 likes).


Different from Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia also had a number of feminist or sexual minorities' movements and green movements, which were not only non-political "hobby clubs", but also aired particular political demands and even organized political action. Amongst the **feminist and sexual minorities movements**, the largest was an awareness portal / advocacy group "Difference enriches" (4,038 likes), an initiative called "With dill and without dill" (in Estonian "Tilliga ja tillita", could also be translated as "With dick and without dick", 595 likes), Estonian Gay Youth (484 likes), Café HMSX (206 likes), Feminism Builder (200 friends<sup>11</sup>) and an initiative group "Women to the Parliament" (106 likes). Among the **green movements** (in addition to the party Estonian Greens), there were also initiative groups ("Lets drop dirty energetics" with 1,177 likes, "No to nuclear power plant" with 107 likes and "No to phosphorite" with 170 likes) as well as self help communities with some more political messages (Estonian Movement of Eco-Communities with 1,282 likes) as well as associations that were also dealing with political advocacy (Estonian Green Movement with 741 likes, Estonian Wind Energy Association with 688 likes).

In comparison to Latvia and Lithuania, also the **labor movements** were rather active and numerous – many trade unions had quite active Facebook pages or communities, though not exactly an impressive followership (e.g. Estonian Transport Trade Union with 223 likes, Independent Estonian Sailors' Trade Union with 110 members, Estonian Trade Union Confederation with 111 likes, Estonian Health Workers' Association with 152 likes and Estonian Nursing Association with 463 likes).

Finally, another group of movements that was discovered through the interlinks analysis was the so-called **hacktivist movement** – a group of online initiatives that dealt with freedom of speech on the internet, copyright issues, etc. This movement centered around NGO Estonian Internet Community (1,125 likes) and other anti-ACTA movements (e.g. "NO to ACTA" with 1,189 likes, "Vote for free internet" with 885 likes, a community called "Mart Laar space" with 1,809 likes and group "#OCCUPY tALLiNn-estonia" with 672 likes).

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<sup>11</sup> This group has not created a page, but a collective user of the name Feminism Builder, hence it does not collect „likes“, but „friends“.



**Figure 21:** Types of online movements on Facebook in Estonia. The number in brackets indicates the amount of movements in the respective group, the number on the diagram is the total of likes the pages in the respective groups accumulated. *Source: Authors.*

### 3.4.2 RHETORIC USED IN SOCIAL MEDIA GROUPS

The **political parties and their youth organizations** used more or less the same strategy as in other countries analyzed. The parties used Facebook most of all for sharing articles by or about themselves, announce the members' radio or television performances, send holiday or birthday greetings etc. Hence, the pages were mostly used for the purpose of informing, with some accents of indoctrination. The presence of more populist rhetorical elements is rather modest. Rather, either position- or content-oriented excerpts from articles are posted, neutral comments made or questions posed. For example, Centre Youth asked its followers, based on an article from the party's newspaper:


*Max Kaur's [a party member] idea: B-category driving license only starting from 21 years of age and higher responsibility demanded from driving schools! - - What do you think about the proposition? [Centre Youth Facebook page]*

Posting varied according to parties, but was quite active amongst all – around one post per day or slightly less. What differed between Estonian parties and Latvian and Lithuanian parties was the fact that also the posts sharing articles triggered discussion: almost half of the posts triggered comments from followers – both criticism and praise, but also more or less rational argumentation. For example, when Reform Party announced support for increasing child support benefits, there were both commentators who reminded that the prime minister (who is also the party leader) had earlier been

rather arrogantly against it as well as those who criticized that a right wing party should not be putting so much emphasis on benefits, those who exclaimed with gratitude as well as those who criticized the particular scheme's details.

Most parties had also enabled others than the group manager to post on their Facebook wall, and this function was also used for reposting related materials or addressing pleas, sometimes also for asking about party's position etc. The only party who had not enabled posting by others was Reform Party, who only featured a recommendations section.

The youth organizations of parties additionally shared images of social events, but also organized political events, e.g. protest activities. For example, IRL Youth organized a rally against bus lanes that were formed in Tallinn overnight by the city government ruled by Centre Party and kept actively posting about it (see Figure 22).



**Figure 22:** Screen shot from the Facebook page of IRL Youth when they were organizing a rally against the creation of bus lanes overnight by Tallinn city government. *Source: Facebook.*

**Political initiative groups** were by far the most popular political social media pages covered in the analysis. They differed to an extent from their Lithuanian counterpart, since most of these communities were not just self-expressive in their content (e.g. showing a critical attitude towards some actor or issue, but in most cases also aimed to engage with their auditorium, e.g. rally people to join demonstrations – either offline or

online, but also to act as an advocacy group and inform their peers about changes underway concerning the issue or also their success or failure in changing the situation.

As in Lithuania, there were some political initiative groups that were more closely related to particular political parties, and other that seemed to be non-partisan citizen initiatives. For example the site “Delete Tallinn TV” seemed to be run by a member of the Reform Party (although there were no official signs about this), and this page was among the few that the Reform Party endorsed. There was a similar initiative tackling other policies, “ETV2 finance to reimburse student loans” which seemed to be run by the Centre Youth, who were interlinked to the community, which also shared posts from the blog of Centre Youth. The link was visible also according to power lines, since in a way, this community seems to be a clear protest community, opposing itself to the community “Down with Tallinn TV – money to kindergartens”, which is not downright partisan, though highly critical of the Tallinn city government led by the Centre Party. The most direct link between a political initiative group and a party is seen in the group “IRL will abolish land tax on land under home”, where the affiliation with Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica is visible already in the name. It must be admitted, though, that the partisan groups were not that active during the period analyzed, and the activities on the wall tended to correlate more with the time of the elections.

The more popular and more vibrant pages were non-partisan (or at least did not seem to feature particular links to particular parties), e.g. “Down with Tallinn TV – money to the kindergartens” and “A worthy salary for a teacher”. Although both started out as mobilizing pages to hold rallies, the page “Down with Tallinn TV” it later turned in parallel also into a civic initiative where volunteers participated in making repairs to different kindergartens.

*Happy news! Positive supplementary budget, 8 million euros more! For kindergartens AND schools as much as ... 524 thousand euros... ☺ We need money NOW to renovate the electrical systems in kindergartens! We need money NOW to repair rooms that are currently not used, so that the city government does not have to evade laws and stuff children into kindergartens like chicken in the cages of egg factory. /---/ None of this is done! Question – where does the lion's share of this money go to? [Down with Tallinn TV – money to kindergartens Facebook page]*

The political initiative groups thus often functioned as interest group organizations (and some of them were most likely started up by interest group organizations, e.g. the group “Reimbursement of student loans must continue” with more than 3,600 likes was initiated by Federation of Estonian Student Unions who has scored slightly over 1,000 likes. The functionality behind this is that the reimbursement of study loans does not concern only the present students, but also the past students, their parents and other related groups.

Posting frequency in political initiative groups is on average around one post per week, but depends on whether any actions are currently organized by the group, whether any decisions are currently made or whether the topic is debated in the media. The level of engagement by followers depends on post and on community. For example, on the page “A worthy salary for a teacher” almost all posts also get commented. The most active commenting followed news articles informing that the parliament began to process its pay raise, the article where the minister of finance calculates how good it is to live in Estonia (taking into account the growth of economy and the level of prices), or the comment where minister of education is quoted: “More must be done for less money, otherwise the Chinese will do it for us”.

Concerning rhetoric, there is quite strong anti-establishment sentiment the city government and the national government are criticized, even if not directly in posts then in comments or in posts made by followers. There is also some hostility toward political parties, particularly toward the Centre Party in Tallinn city government, less so with the national government coalition parties.

**Trade unions** rather function as interest groups, sharing useful information or discussing collective agreements etc, rather than plan political action or campaign for particular goals in front of a larger audience. Information is being shared about activities in Estonia, sometimes discussions are also triggered about developments elsewhere (e.g. trade union organizations, activities, logos etc).

Posting frequency remains rather low averaging one post per week. Discussion is rather modest in comparison to the previously analyzed pages. It remains in almost all cases it phatic, or then asking for further details, commenting on event photos etc. However, in some instances, e.g. on the Transport Trade Union’s Facebook page, there is also some more substantive discussion over topical issues.

There are also quite clearly political statements that put forth demands to politicians. For example, on the page of Trade Unions where the strike of teachers is explained:

*who didn't know, then the fight is for that kind of an Estonia where caring means among other things, a capability to listen and search for solutions also to the problems of such people for whom everyday life means counting cents and choosing: food, accommodation expenses or culture? Who do not want to take the power to themselves, but want that the elected power sees and hears them, and would not close their ears while repeating Estonia's position in all sorts of charts as a mantra. [Trade Unions Facebook page]*

Though this was not part of the initial movement allocation, then the connections between various movements led also to a **hacktivist movement** – a cluster of movements that dealt with internet freedom in one format or another.

The centerpiece of the movement is NGO Estonian Internet Community, who has actively been campaigning against ACTA and also on various copyright issues. This is clearly a political movement that started a petition against ACTA. Their ACTA discourse is clearly political and it is constructed through antagonism between internet users and politicians, as seen from their rhetoric.

*ACTA is now dead for a while. European democracy still has hope and thank to everyone who has helped more or less to make this happen! [NGO Estonian Internet Community Facebook page]*

*If ACTA were to be adopted, it would be clear that that we cannot trust our politicians hiding away in the back rooms and have to take it into our own hands as citizens... [NO to ACTA Facebook page]*

In addition, there were a number of other communities, for example the community called “Mart Laar’s space” which was devoted to an incident concerning the then defense minister Mart Laar who apologized for deleting some critical remarks from his Facebook page by replying: “I ran out of space”. This became an issue of mockery with a load of internet memes on the topic. This community was founded to protest a cover-up of problems that were facing his party at that point. There were also some slightly less popular movements such as Vote for free internet and #OCCUPY tALLiNn-estonia, which received somewhat less attention and discussion.

Some of the movements, such as “Mart Laar’s Space” and “NO to ACTA” were more like one-off initiatives and their Facebook pages have become inactive already in winter/spring, 2012. However, others, like Estonian Internet Community and Vote for free internet are still active, though have shifted to other topics than ACTA.

All of these movements had the same aims and also mutually shared content, mobilized people to participate in the same events etc. The emphases differed to an extent – whereas Estonian Internet Community and “Vote for free internet” centered more on sharing informative articles on the issue, then “NO to ACTA” and “Mart Laar’s space” shared more memes, both domestic and/or translated photo manipulations and caricatures as well as international memes in English (see Figure 23).





**Figure 23:** Memes from pages of hacktivist movements on Facebook. First meme caricatures Estonian national Tiger Leap program that aimed for wide spread and usage of internet in 1990 and early 2000's and then envisions a jailed tiger as the consequences of ACTA. Second meme is a manipulation of Reform Party's campaign poster and the campaign slogan "You can count on it!", envisioning prime minister Andrus Ansip with a tin hat (that he suggested that anti-ACTA activists should wear if they are so paranoid) and a sign – You can count on it that ACTA will come. Third meme features Mart Laar and says – I didn't erase – Internet ran out of space. *Source: Facebook.*

The communities feature rather vibrant discussion based on the posts made by page moderator, but there are also frequent posts by other users on the page. Discussions are often substantial and just phatic, also raising more critical questions about the community's activities.

**Eco-movements** form quite a prominent segment in online political movements. Though they tend to focus more on life-style issues, practical advice (given e.g. in the Eco-communities movement page) and promotion of responsible consumption (e.g. fair trade), or aesthetics of ecological lifestyle (e.g. photos of windmill parks in Estonian Wind Energy Association page), there is also some more politically oriented messages – e.g. propositions on energy policy (e.g. Estonian Wind Energy Association), shared petitions and open letters (e.g. on the page Let's Stop Dirty Energetics), etc (see Figure 24).

The content is thus not only informing, but also indoctrinating, establishing a lifestyle movement. However, the community is not as vibrant as e.g. the hacktivist communities were. The posting frequency is not as high and there seems to be slightly less discussion and engagement in this field. These are rather communities of belonging and not active membership. Posts do collect comments, but rather phatic ones. The shift in energy production is somewhat debated, but is probably a rather complex topic that is difficult

to be debated with popular engagement altogether. Yet, there is not much populist mobilization with slogans either.



**Figure 24:** Post by Facebook page "Let's stop dirty energetics" campaigning for an online petition that would curb government support for energy production that is not environment friendly. *Source: Facebook.*

The **feminist and sexual minorities movements** are – similarly to eco-movements only mildly political and rather aiming to inform and indoctrinate potential participants. Some of the communities analyzed (e.g. Café HMSX and Women to the Parliament) had become passive, featuring only occasional posts and almost non-existent discussion among followers. The others were moderately active, posting about once a week and the portal Difference enriches, which is a campaign page managed by Tallinn University of Technology's Institute of Law and funded by the EU. There the posts are mostly informative, articles and citations from other sites and rarely touch politics – if, then in terms of the civil partnership legislation that is currently in development in Estonia. Comments are rather rare and phatic. Hence, this group does not really function as a political movement, using populist strategies.

**National movements**, that were one of the most vibrant movement types in Latvia, but also in Lithuania, seem to be somewhat on a downturn in Estonia. The communities have not attracted as much followers and are not as active grounds for discussion. The movements in this group tend to function as extra-parliamentary political movements that are not so much carrying a cultural nationalist or a radical right wing message, but are rather opposing the ruling political elite and their political style. Also eurosceptical positions are aired and there are several negative remarks over European Stability

Mechanism and EU policies. In some cases, being in the EU is compared to being in the Soviet Union (see Figure 25).



**Figure 25:** Caricature from Estonian National Movement's Facebook page, where officials are bowing toward Moscow in year 1981 and toward Brussels in 2011, while the pheasants/ordinary Estonians are asking: "Something has changed, right?" Source: Facebook.

Different pages, however, have different undertones – whereas the community Center for Patriotic Upbringing and the page “Friends of Estonian Legion” sympathize with militarism, page “We are proud to be Estonians” discusses a broad range of issues from consuming Estonian products to loving Estonian nature and doing community work (*talgud*) then Estonian National Movement and Free Patriotic Citizen are clearly more politically oriented, discussing issues that are topical particularly in political discourse.

Different discourses also mean different rhetoric –the rhetoric of e.g. “We are proud to be Estonians” and “Friends of Estonian Legion” are first and foremost not so much informing in a political sense (though e.g. the Friends of Estonian Legion does spread information about the actions of the legion, the situation of the veterans and Estonian government’s actions concerning the militarists’ interests), but rather indoctrinating, bearing its antagonisms (the clearest is antagonism against Russia who is depicted as the first and foremost threat to Estonia, but there is rather critical rhetoric also on the government’s address). The posts also receive quite a lot of comment and active guest posting, some of the phatically favoring the movement’s ideology/ideals, others discussing particular details about individuals etc. Hence, their content is not as relevant from the perspective of politics and populism.

Meanwhile, the Free Patriotic Citizen and Estonian National Movement communicate more like political parties, posting articles either from their own homepage or blogs, or mainstream media. The comments they trigger, however, are often very critical. (e.g. “*Do something, don’t just blabber*” or “*Blaaa-blaaaa-blaaaa!*” on Free Patriotic Citizen’s wall). The movements themselves aim to remain polite and only use a mild amount of cultural nationalism in their rhetoric, not using more radical discursive constructions.

In one instance, Free Patriotic Citizen did share an article from its blog by Margus Sardis, titled rather exclusively and intolerantly “Homos do not deserve the right to adopt”. One day after publishing the community manager had commented below: “The author is expressing his personal position.”

### *3.4.3 INTERLINKS*

In case of Estonia, the level of interlinks is more evenly spread. Unlike in Latvia and Lithuania where the nationalist movements tended to be the most interlinked, this type of movements was rather modestly enjoined in mutual networks. Rather, the community best interlinked seems to be the hacktivists. There are good interconnections amongst most of the movement types (with the exception of nationalist movements), but they usually are linked via one or a few “hub movements” that are liked other movements and that other movements have liked back. For example, the Transport Trade Union amongst labor movements, “Difference enriches” among feminist and sexual minority movements and Estonian Green Movement among eco-movements.









Another difference from the other Baltic States is that the parties are rather thoroughly interlinked. The most remarkable example of this is Social Democratic Party which is – together with its youth organization – very well linked with the labor movement scene.

Concerning parties, also some direct links with certain (partisan) initiatives become evident through interlinks, but this was already covered in section 3.4.2. Additionally, parties often featured interlinks with their local (youth) organizations and pages in Russian as well as pages of individual politicians. Social movements often interlink corresponding international pages.

All in all, however, the linkages were rather evenly spread and aside from the hacktivist community which amplified its messages through multiple channels, there were not many such grounds.



**Figure 26:** Interlinks between Estonian political Facebook communities (see legend below). *Source: Authors.*

- |   |                                 |   |  |
|---|---------------------------------|---|--|
|  | Parties and youth organizations |  | National movement groups                     |
|  | Political initiative groups     |  | Feminist and sexual minority movement groups |
|  | Trade union movement groups     |  | Green movement groups                        |
|  | Hacktivist political groups     |  | Groups interlinked but ont analyzed          |

### *3.4.4 CONCLUSIONS*

To conclude, the Estonian political scene in social media is rather vibrant and heterogeneous, covering topics (feminism and sexual minorities, green movements, hacktivist movements) that were more or less absent from the analyses on Latvia and Lithuania (the main reason for this being that those groups did not have political demands), but also missing out topics more represented over there. One remarkable difference was the rather modest representation of nationalist movements in Estonia – the number of movements, their followers as well as the weak representation of a distinct political agenda was somewhat surprising. The page of “Friends of Estonian Legion” which stood out as the most radical due to its inclination toward history, militarism and some allusions of Nazism, was also organized rather like a club of people interested in history and acting as a pressure group to have the Estonian Legion veterans officially honored.

Also the interconnectedness associated with populist and radical movements was quite frail, particularly among the nationalist movements, but also in many other fields. Perhaps due to the sampling method used, perhaps due to other reasons, but there were not many movements found that could be regarded as radical. Many of them were recognized advocacy groups – such as the trade unions – who participate in politics through the already existing engagement models and in case those tend to lack, use pressuring measures such as strikes. Others, e.g. the Estonian Internet Community are not as institutionalized, but also they aim first and foremost to act as a consultation partner for the public authorities, and only in case this is not enough, go and protest. In some groups, there was also the DIY element – or if something’s broken, help to fix it. A good example of this is the movement “Down with Tallinn TV” which became a channel for organizing community work and fixing kindergartens. Finally, there is also a number of single-issue groups that are good enough to pressure the government, but do not qualify as a sustainable populist movement simply because its scope and aims that often impact some quite particular interest group, and not “the people” as a whole.

Thirdly, it also occurred that the posts in Facebook often also drew a significant amount of debate. There were almost always also some more critical remarks, not just phatic approvals of the page manager’s posts. Often simple informing or indoctrinating posts drew more comments than questions or introductions to debates made by the page manager to start a discussion. This may suggest that the social media is not exactly a populist ground for Estonian movements, but rather an elitist ground for a deliberation over the issue. The assumption of elitism comes from the fact that some issues that are discussed are rather complex, requiring a level of knowledge to meaningfully participate in the debate.

Hence, in terms of dynamics, there is not much indication of populism in Estonian online politics. On the level of rhetoric there is a clear antagonism present in a lot of discourses. The most obvious one is against the political establishment – the government, the city government, etc. Sometimes the antagonism is constructed against some particular party or ideology as well. Other exclusive and antagonistic discourses are either suppressed or are those antagonism in the context simply irrelevant.

### 3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The pilot study of online populism indicated that use social media as a channel for populist mobilization is possible, but not used by many. The most successful political forces in doing so were some Lithuanian parties such as the Labor Party (prior to the elections, also the winner of the elections) and some more marginal parties like Young Lithuania and The Way of Courage. Their rhetoric was quite visibly populist and indoctrinating, but also engaging, mobilizing followers into discussions. This might have been affected by the pre-electoral period in Lithuania that induced political debates and made online discussions a part of the political campaign. Online initiatives related to the electoral campaign were also visible in case of Estonia and Latvia, particularly in the form of partisan political initiatives that had faded or declined after the election date.

Concerning social movements, then their goals and online action repertoires differed. The Estonian social movements seemed to be more eager to make political claims and demand political change (changing the priorities in policy making, changing legislation) online than the movements in other states (this also explains their volume in the sample). And even though these communities often served quite populist aims (e.g. take money from the establishment's priorities and give it to the people's priorities), their discourse often undertook less political (and thus also less populist) tones and emphasized the need for DIY changes or tended to address the issue as an interest group issue, hence not constructing a homogeneous and majoritarian "people", but rather segmented interest groups they were advocating for. In Lithuania (and to an extent also in Latvia), the social movements were rather self-expressive than oriented to change; membership in communities did not translate neither into online engagement nor offline engagement.

The analysis gave an initial picture of action repertoires and discourses used in social media politics, as well as the interlinked movement constellations. From the results, it is visible that particularly in Latvia and Lithuania (in case of nationalist movements), but to an extent also in Estonia (in case of hacktivist movements), there are movement segments that are very well interlinked and do develop a rhizome-like formation. The

analysis indicates that particularly in Lithuania and Estonia, these different parts of the rhizome use slightly different action repertoires or raise slightly different topics, but remain mutually supportive. What needs further analysis, though, is the user dynamics – how much does the followership overlap and whether it enables to engage different segments of the people into a unified movement.

This pilot study demonstrated that although social media can be easily used by more marginal political initiatives for populist mobilization, it also has some fundamental features that prevent it from turning into a closed unanimous and homogeneous assembly of the “people”, the populist publics. Online movements are open to a variety of people, and even the most homogeneous communities can express some dissent, even if it is just the result of trolling. Additionally, the political discussion groups can sometimes turn into elite chat rooms, since the issues contemporary politics engage with can often also be complex (e.g. energy policy) and meaningful online discussion also presumes quite good knowledge. Hence, these groups often evolve into deliberative publics, particularly because most of the movements analyzed do not have charismatic leaders who single-handedly take the job of explaining issues.



## CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of electoral manifestos and parties' self-representations in the media as well as social media activities of various political actors gave an abundant picture of usage of populist discursive strategies as well as policy populism that is potentially cultivated by various parties. However, it also gave a thorough insight into the gradations of populism that are used as well as enables us to make conclusions about the success of populist strategies in the Baltic States altogether.

Here are some remarks derived from the above analysis – some of them more grounded also with previous research, others as observations drawn from one election cycle that should rather be treated as hypotheses for further and more thorough research.

**1. There is no Baltic populism, rather Lithuanian populism and Estonian-Latvian populism.** The analysis gave further proof over the discrepancies between the Baltic States, which is very often considered as a homogeneous block of states that do not even need to be differentiated. Lithuania proved to be very different from the two other Baltic States both in the contents as well as in success of the populist strategies. As already evident from Tables 4, 6 and 8, there is way more populist sentiment among Lithuanian parties. Also, whereas in Estonia and Latvia the left-leaning parties tended to represent slightly stronger gradations of populism than the right-leaning parties (which is also inherent in the foundational opposition between populism and liberalism), the coherence between the left-right scale and populism was greater in Lithuania: there is a selection of populist socialists as well as non populist socialists; more rational national conservatives and ultra-populist national conservatives etc.

All in all, the populist discourse present in Lithuania was closer to populism that is practiced in the Central Eastern European block more widely – unlike in Estonia and Latvia, there are successful national chauvinist parties that promote statist governing and presidential regimes, use the securitization paradigm to mobilize voters and undermine more diplomatic competitors. This has its foundation already in history, but might also be explained with political culture in general as well as with a larger population – it is rather difficult to be a successful CEE-style populist in a small country with a low power distance.

**2. Populism is a more common strategy among 'newcomers' and 'faders'.** When looking at the profiles of parties and their history, it tends to suggest that populism is a strategy more often used by those parties who have not yet gained enough ground in the party system, or who, on the contrary, tend to be losing out in the competition. For

example, the National Resurrection Party in Lithuania was a new party formed just before the 2008 elections, and it got its attention with a number of populist rhetorical strategies (as well as a charismatic leader common to populist politics) and it went from 0 to 15% of the total vote (scoring the second best result) amongst 16 competitors. However, in 2011 the party ceased to exist as an independent unit and merged with Liberal and Centre Union, which scored a mere 2% in the 2012 elections. Another more populist “newcomer” was the Zatlers Reform Party in Latvia, which was perhaps not as populist in its policy style, but whose chairman Valdis Zatlers used very strong classical populist rhetoric. Also this newly emergent party did rather well in 2011 elections, however, by October, 2012, their popularity rating has dropped to only 3% (according to a survey conducted by “Latvijas Fakti”).

The newcomers were often also more active online, recruiting more followers, perhaps because this was one of the grounds for mobilizing supporters.

However, populism was a rather popular strategy also amongst parties that had been rather mainstream (and parliamentary) parties, but who experienced a decrease in popularity. Those parties tended to pull a ‘stunt’ prior to the elections, which in no cases analyzed proved to be very successful. Here examples are People’s Union of Estonia as well as Estonian Greens, previously parliamentary parties (and ERL even a government party until the corruption scandal swept their chairman Villu Reiljan out of political competition) and LPP/LC which renamed itself as Slesers Reform Party, which has also belonged to the government earlier, but scored a mere 2,4% in 2011.

Estonian Greens, whose rating was balancing around the electoral threshold prior to elections, but tended to drop towards the end, went to the elections with a rather non-populist manifesto, but used more radical rhetoric and made more radical propositions towards the end of the campaign in the media, almost desperately campaigning for popular support. This, however, did not bring success.

**3. Baltic exeptionalism in terms of general theories of populism, derived from the Western experience.** The analysis also showed that some issues that are classically associated with populism manifest themselves in a rather different light in the three cases analyzed. First of all, when analyzing the construction of ‘the people’ by the parties, nationalist rhetoric is often associated with populism. The contemporary surge of right-wing radicalism and conservative communitarianism in the Western countries can easily be translated also into the vocabulary of the populist struggle between the establishment and the people, since for a long time, the position of the establishment has been striving towards consolidation of the multicultural model of adaptation or integration and tolerance toward ethnic minorities and immigrants. The right-wing

populists challenge this disposition and propose a counter-hegemony of national pride and intolerance. In the case of the Baltic States however, there is no establishment consensus over the benefits of the multicultural model, rather the discourse of nationalism and concurrent intolerance towards immigrants tends to be hegemonic. This is characteristic already on the linguistic level, where there is no distinction between a nation and an *ethnie* and the words (*tauta, rahvus*) used rather tilt towards an exclusive and even primordial construction.

Another discrepancy with the general theory comes with the concept of Heartland. The metaphor of Heartland seems to be constructed based on the example of a society that has been stably and evolutionarily developing for decades (if not centuries). The clearest examples that also Paul Taggart (2004) seems to be drawing on are the Southern states of the USA, where a radical change – even if it is merely a shutdown of a factory is considered as a grand disruption. In the CEE and particularly the Baltic States, where the history has been rather turbulent (and perhaps also lacking the golden age that is not disputed in public discourse), it is difficult to formulate a mobilizing discourse based on the past. Rather, the people have been facing the future with optimism (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1998) and regarding the post-Soviet transition as a change for the better. Hence, also the narrative analogue of a Heartland tends to lie in the future. The lack of a populist Heartland discourse remembering the golden era in the past can be explained by the ideological scale that is practiced more or less in all three Baltic States, where the liberal and conservative parties have allied as the dominant right wing. In the Western world, the cleavages tend to be running between the allied liberals and social democrats on the dominant side and conservatives on the other side as the oppositional force. Hence, the conservatives do not need to use populism as much. Albeit, depictions of the Heartland in the future are also consistent with the Soviet era political culture and rhetoric of “building communism”, through which the aspired state of being would be achieved.

Thirdly, and what is perhaps the most peculiar of the situation in the Baltic States, is that all three elections that were analyzed took place under the emphasis of the economic and financial crisis that struck the Baltic States most severely. As noted by Taggart, but also many other analysts, populism tends to be surging in the times of crisis, accumulating the public dissatisfaction with the situation. However, in all three Baltic States, rather non-populist parties willing to install austerity measures (or having done so previously and promising to continue). Perhaps this could be explained by political culture that demonstrates the dominance of rational values (particularly in Estonia and Latvia) over traditional ones according to World Values Survey, but also the dominance

of right-wing parties over social democratic forces in Estonia and Latvia. Hence, there was not much alternative to the austerity measures that could have been envisioned.

**4. Populists not very successful in the Baltic States. How come?** If in Lithuanian case most of the elected parties had a mixed strategy with some populism, then Estonian and Latvian cases the “non-populist” or even elitist stance was clearly more effective. Still, overall, it may be claimed that populism is not challenging the liberal status quo in the Baltic States.

One explanation would be that limited size of political communities and importance of individual interactions make populism unattractive strategy. Parties or other political movements do not need to mobilize large groups of people in order to get to power, rather they need to persuade certain number of key actors. This strategy is seen in all states, parties targeting “organic intellectuals” in their campaigns.

In addition, particularly in Estonia, but also in Latvia, the campaigns tend rather to follow the logic of political marketing. Based on Pippa Norris’ distinction of pre-modern, modern and post-modern campaigning, it can be said that the Baltic States, once they came through the transition period, obtained rather post-modern campaigning technologies (including political marketing). Populism, on the other hand, could rather be associated with pre-modern (and to some extent, also modern) generation of campaigning. This would also explain why more populist parties score below the electoral threshold: their campaign strategies are out of date in the course of development of the Baltic politics.

The “unsucces” of populist politics could also be explained by certain nationalistic tendencies present in Estonia and Latvia with the certain will from both citizens and political actors to avoid full-fledged “ethnic conflicts” and therefore opting for “rational” more than “emotional” measures. Also, the weakness of left ideologies and “Soviet/non-Soviet” cleavage makes it harder to mobilize “those who are less represented”.

And finally, concerning the geopolitical position of the Baltic States, it is also difficult to gain through radical antagonism with its external “Others” – be it Russia who would be rather easy to fret with the development of a popular and populist radical party or the European Union and NATO where the membership of the Baltic States relies on an establishment consensus, but more serious questioning of these memberships could put the Baltic States in front of a very decisive question.

**5. Lack of populism is both a positive as well as a negative sign.** As already noted in the introduction, populism is criticized in one scholarly tradition, but regarded as a positive phenomenon in another. Hence, also the lack of populism in Estonia and Latvia

can also be regarded both as a positive as well as a negative phenomenon. It is a positive tendency, since it reduces the risks of instability in the political system and the tendency that the electorate would empower radicals, whose political experience is limited and political actions are unpredictable. However, on the other hand, it can also be regarded as negative since politics that have distanced themselves from the people and the needs of the people can be counterproductive in social and economic development, potentially leading into stagnation.

Particularly in Estonia, but to an extent also in Latvia, there is a willingness rather to depoliticize fields of life, rather than to make them an issue of political contention. This seems to be also regarded as positive by the wider public, since politics is rather associated with politicians – in other words, the political establishment – and not with democracy and popular engagement. Hence, also populism is seen as a tool of the political establishment simply used to manipulate the publics, and this could very well be so, since the willingness of the people themselves to engage in politics is low. This was also evident from the social media analysis, particularly in the case of Latvia and Lithuania.

However, the political dynamics in other countries also give some ground to the prediction that periods where populist politics hit the low point, are followed by a resurgence, hence following a sinusoidal logic. However, in order to ground this, further research is needed.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: ELECTORAL MANIFESTO ANALYSIS: GUIDELINES FOR WP II OF “POPULISM IN THE BALTIC STATES”

The analysis of the party manifestoes is in general, a discourse analysis with some insights of qualitative content analysis. The main source of inspiration is discourse-historical content analysis method, and also preceding discursive analyses of populism (e.g. Wodak, 2003; Caiani & della Porta, 2010; Groppo, 2003, etc).

The analysis requires answering to the following questions:

1. How are ‘the people’ constructed in the manifesto?
2. How is ‘the other’ constructed (whom the party opposes)?
3. Analyze the distance between the Self and Other
4. Does the manifesto indicate a ‘heartland’ the populists look at nostalgically/anti-heartland they contest with?
5. What are the topics/policies that are outlined, using populist discourse?
6. What issues does the manifesto oppose or criticize?
7. How radical are the measures that are proposed, toward ‘the other’ and ‘the system’?
8. How elaborate are their policy proposals?

Below you will find more precise guidelines, more specific questions (marked as a, b, c or i, ii etc). These work as a checklist; in the analysis, you will only have to answer those questions that are relevant in the case studied. The meaning and point of all the questions is also explained in italics.

#### **I Keynote questions for the analysis**

##### **IDENTITY POLITICS**

1. How are ‘the people’ constructed? *The aim of this question is to indicate, which groups the (potentially populist) party claims to represent.*
  - a. Please indicate, which groups are referred to in the party manifestos (e.g. the people, the workers, the natives, etc). All synonyms to the in-group whom the party claims to represent should be outlined, and the in-group described via them. Please note that this only encompasses all collective denominators and metaphoric imaginary figures, not singular figures like Mr X, the future minister of justice; or ‘we’ as ‘me and my colleague here’.

- b. What kind of adjectives, connotations, metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches are used to describe this group? *This indicates how the party positions their target group.*
  - c. Is the in-group an inclusive or an exclusive category? *The aim of this question is to understand, whether the identity politics of the respective party deal with open categories that anyone is able to feel as a part of; more closed categories, meaning that there are certain preconditions to membership (e.g. the petit bourgeoisie can be seen as a fairly open group that anyone can join who tries hard enough); or the groups referred to are viewed as exclusivist containers, e.g. you are born Latvian, you cannot enter this group in any other way).*
  - d. How is this group represented by the current policies? Is it a group that is overlooked by the current power elite, or someone fairly actively addressed by the policies, more recent reforms etc? *This is an 'objective' question open to your expert judgment, and it is needed in order to place this group in relation to others and the system.*
2. How is 'the other' constructed? *The aim of this question is to indicate, whom the (potentially populist) party opposes. Sometimes identity is not constructed directly, based on the key characteristics of the group, but through opposition, mobilizing the group by indicating, who the 'enemy' or the 'adversary' is.*
  - a. Please indicate which groups or persons are referred to in the party manifestos (e.g. the immigrants, the elites, etc). All synonyms that refer to the out-group whom the party claims to oppose should be outlined, and the in-group described via them. If there are also singular agents the manifesto criticizes or opposes, outline them separately. Please note that the external group can also be constructed through irony (e.g. 'We are like Uganda'). Also, there might sometimes be no direct group mentioned and the negative characterizations can be made also indicating just an anonymous 'they', or using indirect speech (e.g. instead of 'the government has pushed this state to the verge of a catastrophe', it is said that 'this country has been pushed to the verge of catastrophe'). If it is done so, please note that pronouns or indirect speech is used to refer to 'the other'.
    - i. Can 'the other' category be also differentiated into the internal other and external other? *Internal other - who are like 'we' by some qualities (e.g. nationality, state of residence, religion, race, work relations, etc), but do not qualify because of others (e.g. attitude, origin, class, education etc). External other - who are not 'we' at all (e.g. immigrants).*
    - ii. Does the party manifesto also oppose the establishment in its various forms (e.g. opposition toward the government institutions, bureaucracy, the politicians in the government, mainstream/establishment media, etc)? How is the establishment defined? *Anti-establishment position is one of the key characteristics*

*of populism. Please indicate, which forms of the establishment the party opposes (if it does): is it the principles of the system altogether (e.g. opposing any form of democracy, bureaucracy etc as ideal types), just the way how the system is currently enacted, or just the people who compose the establishment at the moment. Also please note, which parts of the establishment (government, bureaucracy, media, etc) is opposed.*

iii. Does the manifesto refer to intellectuals, and if, in what way?

*Populists are known to oppose the intellectual elites, hence, ridiculing or opposing intellectuals can be an indicator of populism. However, populists can also put forth an oppositional elite (e.g. political scientists who have been bought by the mainstream parties vs. the true knowers). In this case, mark both the elite they oppose and the elite they endorse.*

b. What kind of adjectives, metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches are used to describe 'the other'? *The aim of this question is to indicate how radical the opposition is: are they referred to rather neutrally as the not-we, or is this opposition primed with hate speech?*

3. Analyze the distance between the Self and Other (radical mutual exclusion; negative predispositions; cautiousness towards the other, neutral/proactive relationship). *Similar to questions 1b and 2b, the aim of this question is to indicate the radicalism in populist rhetoric. E.g. if we are analyzing the discourse of an anti-immigrant party, it would be needed to indicate, if they simply exercise a cautious attitude toward immigrants, because they can be a threat to the social system/culture/etc, or they demand the expulsion of all people of immigrant origin, because they are 'the plague of modern times'.*

a. What kind of rhetoric is used in opposing the self and other in order to mobilize support? *This question enables us to look at more specific discursive strategies.*

- i. towards the other (e.g. scapegoating, victim-perpetrator reversal, blaming the victim, trivialization, denial, other emotive language )
- ii. towards the self (referring to insecurity, inequality, vulnerability; pathos, gang spirit, heroization, other emotive language).

b. Analyze the intensity of this opposition (providing an alternative within the existing political competition; demanding a radical change in political competition, demanding a radical change in the power elite, demanding a change in the institutional structure, demanding a change within the regime). *I.e. a party can criticize the government, but actually does not want the eradication of all that has existed previously, but rather, provide some alternative input.*

4. Does the manifesto indicate a 'heartland' the populists look at nostalgically? How is it described? *The heartland can be utopian (a time and place and order of things that has never been) as well as something that has existed, though its depiction is*

*not necessarily historically accurate (e.g. an idealized picture of how things were during the interwar republic, during the Soviet time, etc). Please note that the populists might also construct an anti-heartland, a time, place and order of things they definitely do not want to achieve (e.g. the Soviet time; or if Estonia were a European-type welfare state with its own 'welfare queens'). Please bring that out, as well.*

- a. How are the present conditions elaborated? Can this be viewed as 'a time of crisis' and if, then what kind of a crisis is this? Could the present be termed as the anti-heartland?

## POLICY ISSUES

5. What are the topics that are outlined, using populist discourse? *The aim of this question is to give an overview of policy issues or fields (e.g. employment, education, finance, trade) that are at the centre of debates in which populist discourse is used. (It would be especially good, if you could also indicate the level of radicalism in each debate; via quotes, for example.)*
  - a. Do the policy proposals include aspirations to 'democratize' the governance system? (E.g. give more power to the citizens, transform the representative system, decentralize power, stress on direct democracy etc.) How? *Give particular attention to this policy issue (institutional design and democratic institutions), because this is often at the heart of populist policy-making.*
  - b. Do the policy proposals include willingness to change the redistribution system? How and to what extent (from moderate redistributions to radical one) ? Is this backed in accordance with their identity politics? *Redistribution (reversing or changing the inequality that results from the ruling system) is also often mentioned to be at the heart of populist policy making (though especially in Latin America), so pay particular attention to that policy field as well.*
6. What issues (particular policies or decisions; e.g. the policy towards the EU, social policy, agricultural policy, etc.), does the manifesto oppose or criticize? *Protest and anti-politics are at the heart of populist politics. Hence, also indicating, which policy solutions do they oppose and how, gives a key for unlocking the nature of populism in the region. Please give an overview of the extent of protest rhetoric in the manifesto (i.e. whether you can find scarce examples or it is dominant) and also the issues they oppose.*
7. How radical are the measures that are proposed, toward 'the other' and 'the system'?
  - a. Do the policy proposals propose taking direct action, concrete measures, changing legislation etc? *This will enable us to indicate the level or radicalism: whether their propositions aim for gradual change via the system, or a revolutionary shift.*

- b. Do the policy proposals aim to change the system or revolutionize the current situation; reform the state of the art moderately, or are their proposals simply expressive acts that involve no concrete measures? *This will also enable us to give an estimation of the level of radicalism in populist discourse.*
- 8. How elaborate are the policy proposals? *This question will enable us to differentiate between parties that aim to participate in the democratic public deliberation vs those who propose magical solutions that are by no means a subject for further discussions. This question enables us to analyze the potential policy-making style of various parties, incl. populists.*
  - a. Are the policy proposals presented in a rationalist deliberative style, or in an oversimplified way, as magical solutions?
  - b. If the policy proposals are argued then based on what? Whether on facts (incl the amount and character/source of facts), or claims referring to general knowledge/belief; or nothing at all?

### **Instructions for writing up the analysis**

When writing up, please structure the text according to the parties (every manifesto gets its own chapter). These chapters should also be structured internally (either with subtitles or just with paragraph spaces, broadly following the questions for analysis as the structuring units).

In the written analysis, you should also use quotations to illustrate your assessments. Please write/copy all the quotations both in English as well as in their original language.

## APPENDIX 2: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SPEECH ACTS : GUIDELINES FOR WP III OF “POPULISM IN THE BALTIC STATES”

### I Sampling

**Channels.** 3-4 media channels should be used, which would have to be three major representative channels, featuring various types of media (broadsheet vs tabloid; broadcast vs press, if possible).

*E.g. in the Estonian case, the channels are: 1) ERR (Estonian Public Broadcasting), particularly the debating show „Elections Studio“; 2) Postimees, the largest daily, a broadsheet; 3) Õhtuleht, second tabloid in readership; and 4) Delfi, the largest online news portal*

*PS: In case you do not have access to the necessary content, e.g. some articles are available only in the paid version, let me know about the 1) publication/channel; 2) the pricelist; and 3) instructions on how can this be paid*

**Timeframe.** The timeframe from which the articles should be selected, is one month prior to the elections.

**Compiling the sample.** The sample of articles analyzed should include opinion articles, interviews or more important comments by the leading figures of the party. By more important comments, we mean topics or speech acts that got wider attention from the publics; e.g. an answer from a politician at a party press conference. By the leading figures of the party, we mean people from the executive committee/board of the party or other major spokespersons. This is the minimum requirement. If you wish you can also include more marginal people or comments. For compiling the sample, various strategies can be used. We suggest using online search engines for the channels (and using the party name, nicknames and abbreviations as the keywords (in case of no results, you can also try out the names of politicians), but also alternative strategies can be undertaken for gathering additional data.

### II Research strategy & writing up

In order to ease the workload, the main research framework (identity politics + policy change) is the same. We suggest structuring the written analysis according to parties (and not media channels, for example). In addition to answering the 8 questions, you should also provide details on the following:

- 1) The channels and sampling strategy chosen + an explanation, why these channels.
- 2) The complete references to the articles used in the analysis (with English translations of the titles)

- 3) The details on the spokespersons (e.g. head of the party, secretary of the party, prominent figure of the intra-party opposition, etc) – this can be done within the analysis, you don't need a separate chapter etc for this.
- 4) Is there a difference between speech acts of different spokespersons, media outlets or issues? Please give an overview of the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the speech acts.
- 5) A general estimation on the coherence of the collection of speech acts, or difference in communication strategy within various media channels, transformation in time or in relation to particular events, etc.

Please note that you should treat every single text separately (try to answer every one of the eight questions according to every text. Rather, you should treat all of the extracted material as a whole (albeit a heterogeneous one).

## APPENDIX 3: ANALYSIS OF POPULISM ONLINE: GUIDELINES FOR WP IV OF “POPULISM IN THE BALTIC STATES”

### I Aims

The main aim of this task is to develop an understanding of populism in more interactive contexts than the electoral manifestos, or the journalistic public sphere. For as e.g. Laclau puts it, there is no populism if the people are not engaged. Internet is a convenient platform that engages people of various backgrounds, Web 2.0 offers an interactive platform, and also offers an interesting ethnographic environment.

In order to do this we a) broaden the scope and include movements that remain outside; and b) analyze the means that various parties and movements use for interacting with the people online.

Again, we will use populism as an analytical tool and proceed from the point of view of ‘presumption of innocence’, not predetermining any parties as populist and others not.

The result of this WP is answers to the following **research questions**:

- an overview of online activities of parties and social movements
- a map of parties and social movements and their interlinks
- the content repertoires and level of populism exercised via online media
- the level and mode of engagement social movements and parties practice in their social media strategy

### II Sampling

In this WP, both social media and web pages are analyzed. In case of social media, the preferred environment is Facebook. Also the instrument of analysis is developed based on the characteristics of Facebook. However, if there are also other influential social media networks in use, you can also analyze the content of those.

In this WP, a two-tiered snowball sample is used:

- 4) Search for websites and social media pages and groups of all parties included in WP II and WP III.
- 5) Based on these findings, detect also other communities, blogs, etc that are linked or promoted on the websites or social media pages of the parties.
- 6) Use the social media search engine in order to track down other social movements. For queries, use keywords from the table of social movements below.
- 7) Find other communities interlinked with the social media communities, blogs or websites.



NB! Only analyze political content! Commercial advertising should be left out of the sample, as should simply cultural or religious groups that manifest no political demands or do not portray themselves as political.

In order to search for alternative movements, you can use two strategies:

- a) focus on the loaded keywords that have also emerged from your previous analysis (e.g. the word Lettic in the case of Latvia, or the issue of emigrants in all cases, etc)
- b) use general denominators, e.g. party, movement, political, union, community, activists, popular, populist, democratic etc for the search.
- c) search for various types of social movements. You can use the distinction between 6 different major social movements proposed in the social movements reader, edited by David Snow et al (2007): the labor movement, feminist and women's movements; environmental movements, antiwar and peace movements, ethnic and nationalist social movements and religious movements. Kitschelt has also distinguished between four types of right wing radicalism: Nazi nostalgia, welfare chauvinism, right wing authoritarianism and populist anti-state movements. The following list proposes possible keywords, but the actual list depends on your country's linguistic specificities.
  - Labor – labor, Marxist, workers, socialist, trade union, employees, solidarity, capitalist,
  - Feminism – women, feminine, gender, equality, segregation, chauvinism
  - Peace – peace, war, anti-war, military, army, troops, bloodshed, antifa
  - Environmental – environment, climate, animals, animal rights, nature, green, sustainability, earth, ecosystem, communitarian
  - Ethnic or nationalist – national, ethnic, Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania(n), homeland, Russian, Polish, secession, separatist, independence, sovereign, globalization, purity, race, white power, fascist, emigrant,
  - Religious – Christian, cleric, religion, secular, sceptic, sionism, islam, Buddhist, hindu, revivalism, etc.

However, these words can also overlap, e.g. the word 'socialist' might indicate a nationalistic movement, etc. The keywords are not the basis for outlining cleavages or networks later on.

Data can be either gathered from the public profile (if available e.g. through personal profile or through friends), or via creating a 'test tummy' profile and visiting pages as such. Please note that some content can be hidden from the public and viewing all closed communities will not be possible under any circumstance.

### III Frame for analysis

Facebook pages	Facebook groups
1. Name	1. Name
2. № of likes/people talking about this/recommendations	2. № of members
3. General information (copy-paste of the intro is fine; also, what kind of a political aim or ambition does the group have)	3. General information (copy-paste of the intro is fine; also, what kind of a political aim or ambition does the group have)
4. Posting frequency (how many posts per week/per month/etc)	4. Posting frequency (how many posts per week/per month/etc)
5. Interlinks (provide names of communities or pages 'liked' by the page; list of blogs & websites)	5. Interlinks (provide names of communities related to the group; list of blogs & websites referenced)
6. Content type (a) whether the content is statements; links to articles, photos, memes, etc. Please also mark source where possible. (b) whether page used for informing & indoctrination or for provoking discussion & engagement (c) whether calls for offline or online participation	6. Content type (a) whether the content is statements; links to articles, photos, memes, etc. Please also mark source where possible. (b) whether page used for informing & indoctrination or for provoking discussion&engagement (c) whether calls for offline or online participation
7. Topics – what issues are discussed	7. Topics – what issues are discussed
8. Rhetoric (a) construction of 'the people'? (b) is antagonism constructed? Who is the enemy/adversary? How radical is it? (c) depth of discussion vs magic solutions	8. Rhetoric (a) construction of 'the people'? (b) is antagonism constructed? Who is the enemy/adversary? How radical is it? (c) depth of discussion vs magic solutions
9. Discussion (a) amount of posters (whether just the group manager, a couple of activists or a wide range of discussants) (b) amount of commentators (whether none, just a couple of activists or a wide range of discussants) and average number of comments and likes (per post) (c) character of discussion – whether just likes, just phatic comments or more elaborate discussions	9. Discussion (a) amount of posters (whether just the group manager, a couple of activists or a wide range of discussants) (b) amount of commentators (whether none, just a couple of activists or a wide range of discussants) and average number of comments and likes (per post) (c) character of discussion – whether just likes, just phatic comments or more elaborate discussions
Other remarks	Other remarks

Blogs	Websites
1. Name+address	1. Name+address
2. № of visitors (if counter available)	2. № of visitors (if counter available)
3. General information of blog and blogger (if distinguishable author(s) ; also, what kind of a political aim or ambition does the group have)	3. General information (copy-paste of the 'about us' is fine; also, what kind of political aim or ambition the group has)
4. Posting frequency (how many posts per week/per month/etc)	4. Whether the webside is updated or 'dead' (e.g. still info of the last election as the main news, etc).
5. Interlinks (provide a list of blogs, social media communities and websites endorsed in the blog).	5. Interlinks (provide a list of blogs, social media communities and websites endorsed in the blog).
6. Content type (a) please provide an overview of the website architecture – e.g. if there is also a calendar of offline events etc.) (b) whether page used for informing & indoctrination or for provoking discussion & engagement (c) whether calls for offline or online participation	6. Content type (a) please provide an overview of the website architecture) (b) whether page used for informing & indoctrination or for provoking discussion & engagement (c) whether calls for offline or online participation
7. Topics – what issues are discussed	7. Topics – what issues are discussed
8. Rhetoric (a) construction of 'the people'? (b) is antagonism constructed? Who is the enemy/adversary? How radical is it? (c) depth of discussion vs magic solutions	8. Rhetoric (a) construction of 'the people'? (b) is antagonism constructed? Who is the enemy/adversary? How radical is it? (c) depth of discussion vs magic solutions
9. Discussion (a) amount of bloggers (b) amount of commentators (whether none, just a couple of activists or a wide range of discussants) and average number of comments (per post) (c) character of discussion – whether just likes, just phatic comments or more elaborate discussions in the commentary section	9. Discussion If there are any interactive appliances on the website, please describe their form, content and vibrancy.
Other remarks	Other remarks

#### **IV Writing up**

The work on WP IV should follow these steps:

First of all, all research assistants form a list of keywords that can potentially be used; in original language and in English. This list shall be shared with other research assistants so that everyone can develop their list. (You are not forbidden from pursuing with the second assignment in the mean time, though, you will just get to further your list based on others' ideas as well.)

Secondly, you fill in the form of 9 questions about each page found.

And thirdly, you should give a short summary of the results which enable to answer the four research questions. Additionally, you may try to image the network of interconnected movements/pages and other channels. For this, additional tips and guidelines will be provided.

## APPENDIX 4: MEDIA TEXTS ANALYZED

### Lithuania

[Grumadas 11.09 08.10] Partijos balsas: Grumadas [*Voice of the party: Grumadas*] 11.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-grumadas-82-5869>

[Ozolas 04.09] Naujojoje Sovietų Sąjungoje (ES) [*In the new Soviet Union (EU)*] 04.09.2008 Respublika [http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvas\\_politika/naujojoje\\_sovietu\\_saju\\_ngoje\\_es/](http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvas_politika/naujojoje_sovietu_saju_ngoje_es/)

[Ozolas 02.10] Nebūk kvailas, būk čigonas [*Don't be stupid, be a gypsy*] 02.10.2008 Respublika [http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/kitos\\_lietuvas\\_zinios/nebuk\\_kvailas\\_bu\\_k\\_cigonas/](http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/kitos_lietuvas_zinios/nebuk_kvailas_bu_k_cigonas/)

[Ozolas 20.09] Rusija Lietuvai pardavė kalnus [*Russia sold mountains to Lithuania*] 20.09.2008 Respublika [http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/verslas/rusija\\_lietuvai\\_pardave\\_kalnus\\_foto/](http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/verslas/rusija_lietuvai_pardave_kalnus_foto/)

[Ozolas 27.09] Vienuolika klausimų: Romualdas Ozolas [*Eleven questions: Romualdas Ozolas*] 27.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-romualdas-ozolas-81-7617>

[Panka 30.09] Seimo rinkimuose Centro partiją remiantis Lietuvių tautinis centras prisistatys medelių sodinimu [*Lithuanian national center, supporting Centre party in the elections to Seimas, will introduce themselves by planting trees*] 30.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12227759311220782103-seimo-rinkimuose-centro-partij%C4%85-remiantis-lietuvi%C5%B3-tautinis-centras-prisistatys-medeli%C5%B3-sodinimu.htm>

[Jurgelis 06.10] J.Jurgelis. Valdžia ir jos nuodėmės [*J.Jurgelis. The government and its sins*] 06.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/jjurgelis-valdzia-ir-jos-nuodemes.d?id=18781891>

[Jurgelis 24.09] J.Jurgelis. Apie nesuvaldomos korupcijos valdymą [*J.Jurgelis. About the control of incontrollable corruption*] 24.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/jjurgelis-apie-nesuvaldomos-korupcijos-valdyma.d?id=18650678>

[Mogeniene 23.09] L.Mogenienė: valstiečiai irgi rašo DELFI komentarus [*L.Mogenienė: the peasants are also writing the comments in DELFI*] 23.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/lmogeniene-valstieciai-irgi-raso-delfi-komentarus.d?id=18634907>

[Prunskiene 23.09] Prunskienė baletu nešoktų net dėl rinkėjų [*Prunskienė would not dance ballet even for the voters*] 23.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/prunskiene-baletu-nesoktu-net-del-rinkeju-78-7246>

[Prunskiene 30.09] Mes dirbame! [*We are working!*] 30.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/mes-dirbame-82-8054>

[Prunskiene 05.10] Vienuolika klausimų: Kazimira Danutė Prunskienė [*Eleven questions: Kazimira Danutė Prunskienė*] 05.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vienuolika-klausimu-kazimira-danute-prunskiene-81-8626>

[Prunskiene 11.09] K. Prunskienė: leisčiau sau pretenduoti į premjeres [*K. Prunskienė: I would let myself to be the candidate for the Prime Minister*] 11.09.2008 Respublika <http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos-politika/k-prunskiene-leisciau-sau-prenduoti-i-premjeres/>

[Skardžius 09.10] A.Skardžius. Teisines užkardas valstybės ir privataus sektoriaus bendrame kelyje būtina pašalinti nedelsiant [*A.Skardžius. The legal barriers for the cooperation between public and private sector should be removed immediately*] 09.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/askardzius-teisines-uzkardas-valstybes-ir-privataus-sektoriaus-bendrame-kelyje-butina-pasalinti-nedelsiant.d?id=18825116>

[Valstiečiai 17.09] Pagrindinės partijos pasisako už išlaidų krašto apsaugai didinimą [*The main parties are in favor of defense spending increase*] 17.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12216364021220395293-pagrindin%C4%97s-partijos-pasisako-u%C5%BE-i%C5%A1laid%C5%B3-kra%C5%A1to-apsaugai-didinim%C4%85.htm>

[Akstinavicius 10.09] Partijos balsas: Arvydas Akstinavičius [*The voice of the party: Arvydas Akstinavičius*] 10.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas-arvydas-akstinavicius-78-5747>

[Genzelis 09.10] Vienuolika klausimų: Bronislavas Genzelis [*Eleven questions: Bronislavas Genzelis*] 09.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vienuolika-klausimu-bronislavas-genzelis-81-9091>

[Genzelis 24.09] B.Genzelis. „Apšviestieji“ ir oligarchinės valstybės kūrimas [*B.Genzelis. „The enlightened“ and the creation of oligarchic state*] 24.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/bgenzelis-apsviestieji-ir-oligarchines-valstybes-kurimas.d?id=18647820>

[Baikštyte 22.09] Kandidatų diskusijoje su emigrantais Londone liejosi aistros [*Passions flowed in the discussion between the candidates and emigrants in London*] 22.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12220587111221579758-kandidat%C5%B3-diskusijoje-su-emigrantais-londone-liejosi-aistros-nuotraukos.htm>

[Indriūnas 18.09] A.V. Indriūnas. A.Paulauskas ir NATO: šmeižto kampanija tęsiasi [*A.V. Indriūnas. A.Paulauskas and NATO: defamation campaign continues*] 18.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/av-indriunas-apaulauskas-ir-nato-smeizto-kampanija-tesiasi.d?id=18578939>

[Navickis 22.09] Š.Navickis. „Krautuvininkai“ ir „valstybininkai“ [*Š.Navickis. "Shopkeepers" and "statesmen"*] 22.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/snavickis-krautuvininkai-ir-valstybininkai.d?id=18623058>

[Navickis 26.09] Š.Navickis. „Krautuvininkai“ ir „valstybininkai“ (II dalis) [Š.Navickis. "Shopkeepers" and "statesmen" (II part)] 26.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/snavickis-krautuvininkai-ir-valstybininkai-ii-dalis.d?id=18674577>

[Navickis 09.09] Š.Navickis. „Sisteminės partijos“ ir jų sistemos [Š.Navickis. „Systemic parties“ and their systems] 09.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/snavickis-sistemines-partijos-ir-ju-sistemas.d?id=18474255>

[NS 17.09] Pagrindinės partijos pasisako už išlaidų krašto apsaugai didinimą [The main parties are in favor of defense spending increase] 17.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12216364021220395293-pagrindin%C4%97s-partijos-pasisako-u%C5%BE-i%C5%A1laid%C5%B3-kra%C5%A1to-apsaugai-didinim%C4%85.htm>

[Paulauskas1 29.09] Partijos balsas: Paulauskas [The voice of the party: Paulauskas] 29.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-paulauskas-82-7872>

[Paulauskas2 29.09] Vienuolika klausimų: Artūras Paulauskas [Eleven questions: Artūras Paulauskas] 29.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-arturas-paulauskas-81-7866>

[Paulauskas 26.09] Socialliberalai – prie valdžios dėl skaičiaus [Social liberals – in power because of the number] 26.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/socialliberalai-prie-valdzios-del-skaiciaus-78-7748>

[Paulauskas 22.09] Ministras pasirinko viešąjį transportą [Minister chose public transport] 22.09.2008 Respublika <http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos-politika/ministras-pasirinko-viesaji-transporta-foto/>

[Kadzys 09.09] Partijos balsas: Kadžys [The voice of the party: Kadžys] 09.9.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-kadzys-82-5052>

[Matulevicius 06.10] A.Matulevičių ir J.Prapieštį sujungė noras tirti politikų susitarimus [A.Matulevičius and J.Prapieštis were joined by the desire to investigate the arrangements of politicians] 06.10.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-1223306899122111468-a-matulevi%C4%8Di%C5%B3-ir-j-prapiest%C4%AF-sujung%C4%97-noras-tirti-politik%C5%B3-susitarimus.htm>

[Matulevicius 19.09] Mūsų komandos skaičius – laimingas! [The number of our party is lucky!] 09.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/musu-komandos-skaicius-laimingas-82-6605>

[Matulevicius 30.09] Vienuolika klausimų: Algimantas Matulevičius [Eleven questions: Algimantas Matulevičius] 30.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-algimantas-matulevicius-81-7936>

[Matulevičius 09.10] „Pilietininkų“ lyderis rinkėjus papirkinėjo dovanomis [*The leader of Civic Party bribed the voters with gifts*] 09.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/naujienos/pilietininku-lyderis-rinkejus-papirkinejo-dovanomis-79-9480>

[Astra 16.09] „Už stiprią Lietuvą!“ [*For a strong Lithuania!*] 16.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/uz-stipria-lietuva-82-6464>

[Buskevicius 12.09] Partijos balsas: Buškevičius [*The voice of a party: Buškevičius*] 12.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-buskevicius-82-6028>

[Buskevicius 08.10] Vienuolika klausimų: Stanislovas Buškevičius [*Eleven questions: Stanislovas Buškevičius*] 08.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-stanislovas-buskevicius-81-9087>

[Sarkanas 10.10] G.Šarkanas. Demokratijos nykimas – narystės Europos Sąjungoje kaina [*G.Šarkanas. Loss of democracy - the price of membership in the European Union*] 10.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/gsarkanas-demokratijos-nykimas-narystes-europos-sajungoje-kaina.d?id=18837365>

[Sarkanas 06.10] G.Šarkanas. Valstybinė cenzūra grįžta į Lietuvą? [*G.Šarkanas. State censorship is returning to Lithuania?*] 06.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/gsarkanas-valstybine-cenzura-grizta-i-lietuva.d?id=18777675>

[Sarkanas 30.09] G.Šarkanas. Sunki atsivertimo našta [*G.Šarkanas. Severe burden of the conversion*] 30.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/gsarkanas-sunki-atsivertimo-nasta.d?id=18715579>

[Paleckis 06.10] „Frontas“: Seimo įstatymai kuriami „maximose“? [*“Front”: parliamentary laws are designed in Maxima?*] 06.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/frontas-seimo-istatymai-kuriami-maximose.d?id=18778733>

[Paleckis 26.09] Vienuolika klausimų: Algirdas Paleckis [*Eleven questions: Algirdas Paleckis*] 29.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-algirdas-paleckis-81-7572>

[Paleckis 09.09] Partijos balsas: Paleckis [*The voice of the party: Paleckis*] 09.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-paleckis-82-5239>

[Pocius 19.09] „Frontas“ į premjeres kviečia D. Grybauskaitę [*“Front” asks D.Grybauskaitė to Prime Ministers*] 19.09.2008 Respublika <http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos-politika/frontas-i-premjeres-k-viceia-d-grybauskaite/>

[Austrevicius 09.10] Liberalas P.Auštrevičius siūlo finansinės krizės krečiamai Islandijai suteikti paskolą [*Liberal P.Auštrevičius suggests to provide financial loan to Iceland in crisis*] 09.10.2008 Delfi

<http://www.lrytas.lt/-12235694611221665590-liberalas-p-au%C5%A1trevi%C4%8Dius-si%C5%ABlo-finansin%C4%97s-kriz%C4%97s-kre%C4%8Diamai-islandijai-suteikti-paskol%C4%85.htm>

[Austrevicius 22.09] P.Auštrevičius. Kas ir kaip gali suvaldyti šalies viešųjų finansų krizę? [*P.Auštrevičius. Who and how can manage the country's public financial crisis?*] 22.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/paustrevicius-kas-ir-kaip-gali-suvaldyti-salies-viesuju-finansu-krize.d?id=18619294>

[Balzekiene 10.09] O.Balžekienė. Pinigai „Žalgiriui“ – parama ar investicija? [*O.Balžekienė. The money for "Žalgiris" - support the investment?*] 10.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/obalzekiene-pinigai-zalgiriui-parama-ar-investicija.d?id=18486756>

[Kaseta 17.09] A.Kašėta. Ką Lietuva privalo daryti po įvykių Gruzijoje? [*A.Kašėta. What Lithuania has to do after the events in Georgia?*] 17.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/akaseta-ka-lietuva-privalo-daryti-po-ivykiu-gruzijoje.d?id=18566250>

[LRLS 17.09] Pagrindinės partijos pasisako už išlaidų krašto apsaugai didinimą [*The main parties are in favor of defense spending increase*] 17.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12216364021220395293-pagrindin%C4%97s-partijos-pasisako-u%C5%BE-i%C5%A1laid%C5%B3-kra%C5%A1to-apsaugai-didinim%C4%85.htm>

[Masiulis 23.09] Elektroninis balsavimas rinkimuose žadamas 2011 metais [*E-voting promised in local elections in 2011*] 23.09.2008 Respublika [http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos\\_politika/elektroninis\\_balsavimas\\_rinkimuose\\_zadamas\\_2011\\_metais/](http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos_politika/elektroninis_balsavimas_rinkimuose_zadamas_2011_metais/)

[Masiulis 26.09] Partijos balsas: Masiulis [*The voice of the party: Masiulis*] 26.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-masiulis-82-7628>

[Masiulis 04.10] Vienuolika klausimų: Eligijus Masiulis [*Eleven questions: Eligijus Masiulis*] 04.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-eligijus-masiulis-81-8512>

[Masiulis 19.09] E.Masiulis. Už ką balsuoti per rinkimus? [*E.Masiulis. For whom to vote in the elections?*] 19.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/emasiulis-uz-ka-balsuoti-per-rinkimus.d?id=18593029>

[Vidugiriene 22.09] Kandidatų diskusijoje su emigrantais Londone liejosi aistros [*Passions flowed in the discussion between the candidates and emigrants in London*] 22.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12220587111221579758-kandidat%C5%B3-diskusijoje-su-emigrantais-londone-liejosi-aistros-nuotraukos.htm>

[Tomasevski 01.10] Vienuolika klausimų: Valdemaras Tomaševskis [*Eleven questions: Valdemaras Tomaševskis*] 01.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-valdemaras-tomasevskis-81-7991>



[Tomasevski 07.10] Tebūna politika švari! [*Let the politics be clean!*] 07.10.2008 15min  
<http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/tebuna-politika-svari-82-9007>

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[Garbaravičius 07.10] R.Garbaravičius. Valdžia turi tarnauti, o ne valdyti [*R.Garbaravičius. The government has to serve, not control*] 07.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=18796195>

[Juknevičienė 30.09] R.Juknevičienė: Lietuva nenugalima, nes atsisakė šauktinių? [*R.Juknevičienė: Lithuania is unbeatable because it gave up conscript army?*] 30.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/rjuknevicienne-lietuva-nenugalima-nes-atsisake-sauktiniu.d?id=18716246>

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[Uspaskich 09.09] „Koalicijos Darbo partija + Jaunimas“ kandidatų sąrašai — internete [Coalition's Labour Party + Youth list of the candidates is on the Internet] 09.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/naujienos/koalicijos-darbo-partija-jaunimas-kandidatu-sarasai-internete-79-5442>

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[LiCS 17.09] Pagrindinės partijos pasisako už išlaidų krašto apsaugai didinimą [*The main parties are in favor of defense spending increase*] 17.09.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12216364021220395293-pagrindin%C4%97s-partijos-pasisako-u%C5%BE-i%C5%A1laid%C5%B3-kra%C5%A1to-apsaugai-didinim%C4%85.htm>

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[Sakalas 25.09] Tiesos sakymai politiko lūpomis [Truth-telling by the lips of the politician] 25.09.2008 Respublika [http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos\\_politika/tiesos\\_sakymai\\_politiko\\_lupomis/](http://www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos_politika/tiesos_sakymai_politiko_lupomis/)

[Sakalas 02.10] A.Sakalas. Pagaliau rinkimai [A.Sakalas. *Finally the elections*] 02.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=18735668>

[Sakalas 11.09] A.Sakalas. R.Paksas: aš būsiu LR prezidentas [A.Sakalas. *R.Paksas: I will be the President of Lithuania*] 11.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/asakalas-rpaksas-as-busiu-lr-prezidentas.d?id=18501471>

[Grumbinas 18.09] V.Grumbinas. Municipalinis būstas – realus kelias [V.Grumbinas. *Municipal housing is the real way*] 18.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/vgrumbinas-municipalinis-bustas-realus-kelias.d?id=18581391>

[Stoma 20.09] S.Stoma. Sugrįžimas į Aleksotą ir Vilijampolę [S.Stoma. *A return to Aleksotas and Vilijampolė*<sup>12</sup>] 20.09.2008 Delfi <http://blog.delfi.lt/sauliusstoma/date/2008/09/20/>

[Stoma 02.10] S.Stoma. Apie žmonių lygybę, arba Paprasta istorija iš Slobodkės Holivudo [S.Stoma. *On human equality, or the Simple story from the Hollywood of Slobodkė*<sup>13</sup>] 02.10.2008 Delfi <http://blog.delfi.lt/sauliusstoma/date/2008/10/02/>

[Stoma 09.10] S.Stoma. Valinskas Grūto parke [S.Stoma. *Valinskas in Grūtas park*<sup>14</sup>] 09.10.2008 Delfi <http://blog.delfi.lt/sauliusstoma/date/2008/10/09/>

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<sup>12</sup> Aleksotas and Vilijampolė are micro-districts of Kaunas – a second biggest city in Lithuania. S.Stoma was a candidate in a single-winner district of Aleksotas-Vilijampolė, but lost to Homeland Union candidate Rytas Kupčinskas (57,05% to 42,95% in the second re-vote round). Nevertheless, S.Stoma was elected to Seimas by ranked voting.

<sup>13</sup> Slobotkė is the slang name of Vilijampolė micro-district in Kaunas. The district is famous for mafia, vandals and neo-Nazis.

<sup>14</sup> Grūtas Park (unofficially known as Stalin's World) is a sculpture park of Soviet-era statues and an exposition of other Soviet ideological relics from the times of the Lithuanian SSR, located near Druskininkai, about 130 kilometres southwest of Vilnius.

[Stoma 10.09] S.Stoma. Su Rusija mums reikia šaltosios taikos [*S.Stoma. With Russia we need a cold peace*] 10.09.2008 Delfi <http://blog.delfi.lt/sauliusstoma/1831/>

[Valinskas 09.09] Partijos balsas: Valinskas [*Party's voice: Valinskas*] 09.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/partijos-balsas-valinskas-82-5240>

[Valinskas 25.09] Valinsko katė maiše [*Valinskas' cat in the bag*] 25.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/valinsko-kate-maise-78-7543>

[Valinskas 19.09] A.Valinskas: vagis - ir politikoje vagis [*A.Valinskas: a thief is also a thief in politics*] 19.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/avalinskas-vagis-ir-politikoje-vagis.d?id=18593960>

[Žilinskas 14.09] Rokas Žilinskas prieš alkoholį Seimo salėje [*Rokas Žilinskas against the alcohol in the hall of the Seimas*] 14.09.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/naujienos/rokas-zilinskas-pries-alkoholi-seimo-saleje-79-6252>

[Mazuronis 10.10] Šių metų biudžeto skylę bus sunku užkišti [*It will be hard to plug the hole in this year's budget*] 10.10.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12236400981223315373-%C5%A1i%C5%B3-met%C5%B3-biud%C5%BEeto-skyl%C4%99-bus-sunku-u%C5%BEki%C5%A1ti.htm>

[Mazuronis 06.10] Vienuolika klausimų: Valentinas Mazuronis [*Eleven questions: Valentinas Mazuronis*] 06.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/klausimai/vieniolika-klausimu-valentinas-mazuronis-81-8676>

[Mazuronis 02.10] Mes dirbsime tautai! [*We will work for the nation!*] 02.10.2008 15min <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/rinkimai-2008/partijos-balsas/mes-dirbsime-tautai-82-8353>

[Paksas 12.10] A.Kubilius apie koalicijas nekalba, R.Paksas susidėtų su Darbo partija [*A.Kubilius does not talk of coalitions, R.Paksas would associate with the Labour Party*] 12.10.2008 Lietuvos Rytas <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12238108141222079929-a-kubilius-apie-koalicijas-nekalba-r-paksas-susid%C4%97t%C5%B3-su-darbo-partija.htm>

[Paksas 09.10] R.Paksas neleis K.Prunskienei siekti prezidento posto? [*R. Paksas will prevent K.Prunskienė from seeking the presidency?*] 09.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/rpaksas-neleis-kprunskienei-siekti-prezidento-posto.d?id=18823733>

[Paksas 17.09] „Tvarkiečiai“<sup>15</sup> nori naujos Konstitucijos [*Order and Justice members want a new Constitution*] 17.09.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/tvarkieciai-nori-naujos-konstitucijos.d?id=18571451>

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<sup>15</sup> „Tvarkiečiai“ is a slang word used for the party's members, which is hardly translatable into English.

[Valiukeviciute 07.10] O.Valiukevičiūtē nežino, uz kā balsuoja? [*Valiukevičiūtē does not know what she is voting for?*] 07.10.2008 Delfi <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/ovaliukeviciute-nezino-uz-ka-balsuoja.d?id=18795180>

## Latvia

[Diena 23.08.2011.] Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standards: KDS kandidāts Aleksandrs Zeimuļs-Priževičs. (*Evaluate the candidates: standard of politicians: KDS candidate Aleksandrs Zeimuļs-Priževičs.*) Tuesday, August 23, No195(6141), p.7

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicy.*) (duration: 122 minutes) Available: (<http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3717>)

[LTV1 05.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: nodarbinātība, pievilcīga uzņēmējdarbības vide un darba vietas (*"Choose the future!" The topic for the discussion: employment, creation of attractive environment for business and labour*) (duration: 106 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3749>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3778>

[Diena 24.08.2011.] Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standards: LSDSP kandidāts Aigars Krīgalis. (*Evaluate the candidates: standard of politicians: LSDSP candidate Aigars Krīgalis.*) Wednesday, August 24, No.96(6142), p.9.

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicy.*) (duration: 122 minutes) Available: (<http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3717>)

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[Diena 02.09.2011.] PCTVL pārstāvis atsakās no politika standarta testa. (*PCTVL representative refuses from politician standard test.*) Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), p.10

[LTV1 24.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!". Diskusijas temats: bezdarbs. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: unemployment.*) (duration: 97 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3703>

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicy.*) (duration: 122 minutes) Available: (<http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3717>)

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[LTV1 07.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: izglītība un drošība. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: education and security*) (duration: 101 minute) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3758>

[LTV1 08.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: kā mazināt plaisu starp varu un sabiedrību un iespējamā vēlēšanu sistēmas maiņa. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: how do decrease the gap between power and society and possibility for change of electoral system.*) (duration: 103 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3764>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3778>

[LTV1 16.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Premjera amata kandidātu debates. (*"Choose the future!" Debates of prime minister candidates*) (duration: 124 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3809>

[Diena 30.08.2011.] Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standards: Pēdējās partijas kandidāts Mārtiņš Kozlovskis. (*Evaluate the candidates: standard of politicians: The Last party candidate Mārtiņš Kozlovskis.*) Tuesday, August 30, No.201(6147), p.6.

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicy.*) (duration: 122 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3717>

[LTV1 05.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: nodarbinātība, pievilcīga uzņēmējdarbības vide un darba vietas (*"Choose the future!" The topic for the discussion: employment, creation of attractive environment for business and labour*) (duration: 106 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3749>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3778>

[Diena 24.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Otru iespēju "nopērt" Saeimu politiķi varētu vairs nedot. Pozīciju tēma: ko mainīt Latvijas politiskajā sistēmā. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The second chance to "quilt" the Saeima politicians might not give. The topic of positions: what to change in Latvian political system. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 24, No.196(61482), pp.6/7;

[Diena 26.08.2011a.] Ārkārtas vēlēšanu izaicinājums. (*Challenge of extraordinary elections.*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), p.4 (A column written by deputy candidate of SC, Andris Elksniņš).

[Diena 26.08.2011b.] "Ar varu Latvijas sabiedrību saliedēt neizdosies, jādod iespēja: Pozīciju temats: nacionālie un valodu jautājumi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*By force amalgamation of Latvian society will not succeed: The topic of positions: national and language issues. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), pp.6/7;

[Diena 30.08.2011.] ZRP un SC viens otru nenoraida. (*ZRP and SC do not refuse one another.*) Tuesday, August 30, No.201(6147), p.5

[Diena 31.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Grib gan taupīt, gan tomēr arī paaugstināt vecuma pensijas: Pozīciju temats: valsts ekonomika, budžets, nodokļi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Want both - to save and increase pensions: Topic of*

*positions: state economy, budget, taxes. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, august 31, No.202(6148), pp.8/9;

[Diena 02.09.2011.a] "Partiju pozīcijas: Politīķi izglītības līmeni vērtē zemu, bet piedāvājumi bikli: Pozīciju temats: vidējā un augstākā izglītība. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Politicians evaluate the level of education as low but proposals are shy: Topic of positions: secondary and higher education. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*), Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), pp.6/7;

[Diena 05.09.2011.] Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politīķa standards: SC kandidāts Viktors Paškovs. (*Evaluate the candidates: standard of politicians: SC candidate Viktors Paskovs.*) Monday, September 5, No.206(6152), p.6

[Diena 06.09.2011] "Iešu pie pieminekļa 9.maijā, arī ja būšu premjers". (*Will go to the monument in May 9 also, if I will be prime minister*) (interview with the leader of Centre of Harmony Nils Usakovs), Tuesday, September 6, No.207(6153), pp.8/9;

[Diena 07.09.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Galvenais - lai būtu lētāk, atjaunojamie resursi pēc ram. Partiju pozīciju temats: Latvijas enerģētikas nākotne. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The most important – to be cheaper, renewable resources after: Topic of positions: Latvian future of energetics. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, September 7, No.208(6155), pp.8/9.

[Delfi 18.08.2011a.] Arī SC lūdz prezidentam sasaukt Saeimas ārkārtas sēdi par grozījumiem pensiju likumā. (*SC also asks to president to announce extraordinary session of Saeima regarding amendments in pension law.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ari-sc-ludz-prezidentam-sasaukt-saeimas-arkartas-sedi-par-grozijumiem-pensiju-likuma.d?id=40171247>

[Delfi 18.08.2011b.] SC iesaka mazāk domāt par eiro ieviešanu un vairāk rūpēties par sociālajiem jautājumiem. (*SC recommends to think less about introduction of euro and more care about social issues.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/sc-iesaka-mazak-domat-par-eiro-ieviesanu-un-vairak-rupeties-par-socialajiem-jautajumiem.d?id=40171443>

[Delfi 20.08.2011.] Urbanovčs: Okupācija ir dievība un kults. (*Urbanovics: Occupation is deity and cult.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/urbanovics-okupacija-ir-dieviba-un-kults.d?id=40203289>

[Delfi 26.08.2011.] SC: FM noraidījusi iespēju Saeimā pieņemt lēmumu par priekšlaicīgas pensionēšanās iespējas termiņa pagarinājumu. (SC: FM has refused the opportunity in Seima to take decision on chance of prolongation of prematurely pension term.) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/sc-fm-noraidijusi-iespeju-saeima-pienemt-lemumu-par-priekslaicigas-pensionesanas-iespejas-termina-pagarinajumu.d?id=40304251>

[Delfi 31.08.2011.] Jānis Urbanovičs: Bankas būtu jāapliek ar speciālu nodokli. (*Janis Urbanovics: Banks should be imposed with special tax.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/janis-urbanovics-bankas-butu-jaapliek-ar-specialu-nodokli.d?id=40394093>

[Delfi 02.09.2011.] Politisko partiju apvienības "Saskaņas centrs" frakcijas paziņojums. (*The announcement of fraction of political party alliance "Centre of Harmony".*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/politisko-partiju-apvienibas-saskanas-centrs-frakcijas-pazinojums.d?id=40429183>



[Delfi 05.09.2011a.] SC gatava aizmirst par pašvaldību vēlēšanu tiesībām nepilsoņiem apmaiņā pret vēstures moratoriju. (*SC is ready to forget about municipality election rights for noncitizens in exchange of history moratorium.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/sc-gatava-aizmirst-par-pasvaldibu-velesanu-tiesibam-nepilsoniem-apmaina-pret-vestures-moratoriju.d?id=40460919>

[Delfi 05.09.2011b.] SC cer uzvarēt Saeimas vēlēšanās. (*SC hopes to win in Saeima elections.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/sc-cer-uzvaret-saeimas-velesanas.d?id=40458775>

[Delfi 05.09.2011c.] A.Elksniņš lūdz ģenerālprokuroru pārbaudīt informāciju par A.Štokenberga iespējamām likumpārkāpumiem. (*A.Elksnins asks for solicitor general to check the information on the possible A.Stokenbergs legal offence.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/aelksnins-ludz-generalprokuroru-parbaudit-iformaciju-par-astokenberga-iespejamiem-likumparkapumiem.d?id=40468193>

[Delfi 05.09.2011d.] SC ekonomikas ministra amata kandidāts būs bijušais SPRK padomes loceklis Zariņš. (*SC's candidate for the minter of economy will be the former member of SPRK board Zarins.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/sc-ekonomikas-ministra-amata-kandidats-bus-bijusais-sprk-padomes-loceklis-zarins.d?id=40470217>

[09.09.2011.] Ušakovs: SC baidās no deokupācijas aktualizēšanas. (*Usakovs: SC is afraid of actualization of deoccupation.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/usakovs-sc-baidas-no-deokupacijas-aktualizesanas.d?id=40529687>

[LTV1 24.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!”. Diskusijas temats: bezdarbs. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: unemployment*). (duration: 97 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3703>

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*“Choose the Future!” Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicy*). (duration: 122 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3717>

[LTV1 31.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: lauksaimniecība un pensijas. (*“Choose the Future!” Topic for the discussion: agriculture and pensions*) (duration: 90 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3729>

[LTV1 05.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: nodarbinātība, pievilcīga uzņēmējdarbības vide un darba vietas (*“Choose the future!” The topic for the discussion: employment, creation of attractive environment for business and labour*) (duration: 106 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3749>

[LTV1 07.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: izglītība un drošība. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: education and security*) (duration: 101 minute) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3758>

[LTV1 08.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: kā mazināt plaisu starp varu un sabiedrību un iespējamā vēlēšanu sistēmas maiņa. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: how do decrease the gap between power and society and possibility for change of electoral system.*) (duration: 103 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3764>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3778>

[LTV1 14.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: medicīna un satiksmes joma. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: health care and traffic*) (duration: 92 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3786>

[LTV1 16.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Premjera amata kandidātu debates. (*"Choose the future!" Debates of prime minister candidates*) (duration: 124 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3809>

[Diena 24.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Otru iespēju "nopērt" Saeimu politiķi varētu vairs nedot. Pozīciju tēma: ko mainīt Latvijas politiskajā sistēmā. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The second chance to "quilt" the Saeima politicians might not give. The topic of positions: what to change in Latvian political system. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 24, No.196(61482), pp.6/7;

[Diena 26.08.2011.] "Ar varu Latvijas sabiedrību saliedēt neizdosies, jādod iespēja: Pozīciju temats: nacionālie un valodu jautājumi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*By force amalgamation of Latvian society will not succeed: The topic of positions: national and language issues. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), pp.6/7;

[Diena 29.08.2011.] "Vēlas pacelties no zemākā punkta." (*Wants to tower from the lowest point.*) Monday, August 29, No.200(6146), pp.6/7

[Diena 31.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Grib gan taupīt, gan tomēr arī paaugstināt vecuma pensijas: Pozīciju temats: valsts ekonomika, budžets, nodokļi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Want both - to save and increase pensions: Topic of positions: state economy, budget, taxes. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 31, No.202(6148), pp.8/9;

[Diena 01.09.2011.] "Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standarts" (*Testing the candidates: Politicians standard. ŠRP-LPP/LC representative Jānis Juknis*) Thursday, September 1, No.203(6149), p.11;

[Diena 02.09.2011.a] "Partiju pozīcijas: Politiski izglītības līmeni vērtē zemu, bet piedāvājumi bikli: Pozīciju temats: vidējā un augstākā izglītība. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Politicians evaluate the level of education as low but proposals are shy: Topic of positions: secondary and higher education. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*), Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), pp.6/7;

[Diena 07.09.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Galvenais - lai būtu lētāk, atjaunojamie resursi pēc ram. Partiju pozīciju temats: Latvijas enerģētikas nākotne. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The most important - to be cheaper, renewable resources after: Topic of positions: Latvian future of energetics. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, September 7, No.208(6155), pp.8/9.

[Diena 08.09.2011.] "Ticiet, Saeimas deputātam ir ļoti daudz brīvā laika." (*Believe, Saeima deputities have lot of free time. Interview with leader of ŠRP-LPP/LC Ainārs Šlesers*) Thursday, September 8, No.209(6155)

[Diena 09.09.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Daudz bērnu tik drīz nedzims, un mājās arī neviens nebrauks. Partiju pozīciju temats: demogrāfija un migrācija. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Many children will not born so soon, and to home also no one will return. Topic of positions: demography and migration. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, September 9, No.210(6156), pp.10/11;

[Delfi 25.08.2011.] Ainārs Šlesers: Mūsu izglītības reforma: par Latvijas studentu izglītību maksās ārzemnieki. (*Ainars Slesers: Out reform in education: for the Latvian student education will pay foreigners.*) Available:

<http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ainars-slesers-musu-izglitibas-reforma-par-latvijas-studentu-izglitiba-maksas-arvalstnieki.d?id=40286397>

[Delfi 26.08.2011.] Šlesers: Vilka pieļautais par LPP/LC likvidēšanos ir izdomājumi tirgus sievu līmenī. (*Slesers: Vilka telling regarding the likvidation of LPP/LC is invention in the level of market seller.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/slesers-vilka-pielautais-par-lpplc-likvidesanos-ir-izdomajumi-tirgus-sievu-limeni.d?id=40314663>

[Delfi 31.08.2011.] Ainārs Šlesers: Valdis Zatlers viendzimuma partnerattiecību jautājumos viedokli maina kā lokans zutis. (Ainars Slesers: Valdis Zatlers changes his opinion on same sex marriage as a limber eel.) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ainars-slesers-valdis-zatlers-viendzimuma-partnerattiecibu-jautajumos-viedokli-maina-ka-lokans-zutis.d?id=40385799>

[Delfi 14.09.2011.] Ainārs Šlesers: premjeram Dombrovskim jārikojas izlēmīgi un Air Baltic valsts daļas jāpārdod starptautiskā biržā par maksimālo cenu. (*Ainars Slesers: prime minister Dombrovskis must act decisively and to sell Air Baltic's state share in international market on the maximum price.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ainars-slesers-premieram-dombrovskim-jarikoja-izlemigi-un-air-baltic-valsts-dalas-japardod-starptautiska-birza-par-maksimalo-cenu.d?id=40622963>

[Delfi 15.09.2011.] Aināra Šlesera atklātā vēstule Valsts prezidentam Andrim Bērziņam. (*Open letter by Ainars Slesers to the State president Andris Berzins.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ainara-slesera-atklata-vestule-valsts-prezidentam-andrim-berzinam.d?id=40633853>

[Delfi 17.09.2011.] Šlesers pirms balsošanas peldējies; atzīst, ka katras vēlēšanas ir kā pirmās un pēdējās. (*Slesers before voting have swimed; admits that every elections is like the first and last.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/slesers-pirms-balsosanas-peldejies-atzist-ka-katras-velesanas-ir-ka-pirmas-un-pedejas.d?id=40670467>

[LTV1 24.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!". Diskusijas temats: bezdarbs. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: unemployment*). (duration: 97 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3703>

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicity*). (duration: 122 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3717>

[LTV1 31.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: lauksaimniecība un pensijas. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: agriculture and pensions*) (duration: 90 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3729>

[LTV1 05.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: nodarbinātība, pievilcīga uzņēmējdarbības vide un darba vietas (*"Choose the future!" The topic for the discussion: employment, creation of attractive environment for business and labour*) (duration: 106 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3749>

[LTV1 07.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: izglītība un drošība. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: education and security*) (duration: 101 minute) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3758>

[LTV1 08.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: kā mazināt plaisu starp varu un sabiedrību un iespējamā vēlēšanu sistēmas maiņa. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: how do decrease the gap between power and society and possibility for change of electoral system.*) (duration: 103 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3764>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3778>

[LTV1 14.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: medicīna un satiksmes joma. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: health care and traffic*) (duration: 92 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3786>

[LTV1 16.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Premjera amata kandidātu debates. (*"Choose the future!" Debates of prime minister candidates*) (duration: 124 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3809>

[Diena 07.09.2011.] Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standards: TK kandidāts Normunds Ozoliņš. (*Evaluate the candidates: standard of politicians: TK candidate Normunds Ozoliņš.*) Wednesday, September 7, No.208(6154), p.6.

[Delfi 09.08.2011.] "Tautas Kontrole" iesūdz LTV tiesā par neaicināšanu uz diskusijām. (*People's control instituted proceedings against LTV for not inviting to the discussions.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/tautas-kontrole-iesudz-ltv-tiesa-par-neaicinasanu-uz-diskusijam.d?id=40530919>

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*"Choose the Future!" Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicity.*) (duration: 122 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3717>

[LTV1 05.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: nodarbinātība, pievilcīga uzņēmējdarbības vide un darba vietas (*"Choose the future!" The topic for the discussion: employment, creation of attractive environment for business and labour*) (duration: 106 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3749>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3778>

[Diena 17.08.2011.] Ar ko atšķiras Zatlera Reformu partija no Vienotības. (*Whereby Zatlers' Reform Party differs from Unity.*) Wednesday, August 17, No.190(6136), pp.6/7

[Diena 24.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Otru iespēju "nopērt" Saeimu politiķi varētu vairs nedot. Pozīciju tēma: ko mainīt Latvijas politiskajā sistēmā. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The second chance to "quilt" the Saeima politicians might not give. The topic of positions: what to change in Latvian political system. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 24, No.196(61482), pp.6/7

[Diena 26.08.2011b.] "Ar varu Latvijas sabiedrību saliedēt neizdosies, jādod iespēja: Pozīciju temats: nacionālie un valodu jautājumi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*By force amalgamation of Latvian society will not succeed: The topic of positions: national and language issues. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), pp.6/7;

[Diena 31.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Grib gan taupīt, gan tomēr arī paaugstināt vecuma pensijas: Pozīciju temats: valsts ekonomika, budžets, nodokļi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Want both - to save and increase pensions: Topic of positions: state economy, budget, taxes. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, august 31, No.202(6148), pp.8/9;

[Diena 02.09.2011.a.] “Partiju pozīcijas: Politikā izglītības līmeni vērtē zemu, bet piedāvājumi bikli: Pozīciju temats: vidējā un augstākā izglītība. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs” (*Party positions: Politicians evaluate the level of education as low but proposals are shy: Topic of positions: secondary and higher education. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of “Dienas mediji” Guntis Bojārs*), Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), pp.6/7;

[Diena 07.09.2011.] “Partiju pozīcijas: Galvenais - lai būtu lētāk, atjaunojamie resursi pēc ram. Partiju pozīciju temats: Latvijas enerģētikas nākotne. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs” (*Party positions: The most important – to be cheaper, renewable resources after: Topic of positions: Latvian future of energetics. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of “Dienas mediji” Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, September 7, No.208(6155), pp.8/9.

[Delfi 24.08.2011.] Dombrovskis: Latvijas mērķis ir iekļūt pasaules 20 efektīvāko ekonomiku vidū. (*Dombrovskis: The goal of Latvia is to get within 20 most effective economies in the world*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/dombrovskis-latvijas-merkis-ir-ieklut-pasaules-20-efektivako-ekonomiku-vidu.d?id=40277063>

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[Delfi 30.08.2011a.] Nodokļu politikā partijas sola stabilitāti. (*Parties promise stability in tax policy sector.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/nodoklu-politika-partijas-sola-stabilitati.d?id=40359023>

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[Delfi 01.09.2011.] Tikai SC un Nacionālā apvienība vēlas samazināt ministriju skaitu. (*Only SC and National Alliance wants to decrease the number of ministries.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/tikai-sc-un-nacionala-apvieniba-velas-samazinat-ministriju-skaitu.d?id=40415481>

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[Delfi 07.09.2011.] Partiju reitingu līderiem domas dalās par lielākajiem riskiem Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstībai. (*Party poll leaders differ in opinions on the biggest risks for the development of Latvian economics.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/partiju-reitingu-lideriem-domas-dalas-par-lielakajiem-riskiem-latvijas-tautsaimniecibas-attistibai.d?id=40499437>

[Delfi 09.09.2011.] Āboltiņa: ZRP atņem vēlētājus “Vienotībai” un sašķel latviešu elektorātu; Zatlers neesot gribējis iepīties intrigās. (*Aboltina: ZRP deprives “Unities” voters and splits Latvian electorate: Zatlers did not want to let in for intrigues.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/aboltina-zrp-atnem-veletajus-vienotibai-un-saskel-latviesu-elektoratu-zatlers-neesot-gribejis-iepities-intrigas.d?id=40529291>

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[Delfi 17.09.2011.] “Vienotība” par koalīciju vispirms runās ar ZRP; sarunas sāks jau svētdien. (*“Unity” coalition talks will start with ZRP; talks will begin already on Sunday.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/vienotiba-par-koaliciju-vispirms-runas-ar-zrp-sarunas-saks-jau-svetsdien.d?id=40677817>

[LTV1 24.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!”. Diskusijas temats: bezdarbs. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: unemployment*). (duration: 97 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3703>

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*“Choose the Future!” Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicity*). (duration: 122 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3717>

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[LTV1 07.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: izglītība un drošība. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: education and security*) (duration: 101 minute) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3758>

[LTV1 08.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: kā mazināt plaisu starp varu un sabiedrību un iespējamā vēlēšanu sistēmas maiņa. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: how do decrease the gap between power and society and possibility for change of electoral system.*) (duration: 103 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3764>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3778>

[LTV1 14.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: medicīna un satiksmes joma. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: health care and traffic*) (duration: 92 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinas&id=3786>

[LTV1 16.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Premjera amata kandidātu debates. (*"Choose the future!" Debates of prime minister candidates*) (duration: 124 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3809>

[Diena 17.08.2011.] Ar ko atšķiras Zatlera Reformu partija no Vienotības. (*Whereby Zatlers' Reform Party differs from Unity.*) Wednesday, August 17, No.190(6136), pp.6/7

[Diena 24.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Otru iespēju "nopērt" Saeimu politiķi varētu vairs nedot. Pozīciju tēma: ko mainīt Latvijas politiskajā sistēmā. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The second chance to "quilt" the Saeima politicians might not give. The topic of positions: what to change in Latvian political system. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 24, No.196(61482), pp.6/7

[Diena 25.08.2011.] "Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standarts: ZRP Jānis Upenieks" (*Testing the candidates: Politicians standard: ZRP representative Jānis Upenieks*) August 25, No.197(6143), 2011, p.9.

[Diena 26.08.2011b.] "Ar varu Latvijas sabiedrību saliedēt neizdosies, jādod iespēja: Pozīciju temats: nacionālie un valodu jautājumi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*By force amalgamation of Latvian society will not succeed: The topic of positions: national and language issues. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), pp.6/7;

[Diena 31.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Grib gan taupīt, gan tomēr arī paaugstināt vecuma pensijas: Pozīciju temats: valsts ekonomika, budžets, nodokļi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Want both - to save and increase pensions: Topic of positions: state economy, budget, taxes. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 31, No.202(6148), pp.8/9;

[Diena 01.09.2011.] Mērķi cēli, to īstenotāji vēl nav iepazīti. (*Goals are noble, their implementators have not been known.*) Thursday, September 1, No.203(6149), pp.10/11

[Diena 02.09.2011.a.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Politiķi izglītības līmeni vērtē zemu, bet piedāvājumi bikli: Pozīciju temats: vidējā un augstākā izglītība. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Politicians evaluate the level of education as low but proposals are shy: Topic of positions: secondary and higher education. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*), Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), pp.6/7;

[Diena 07.09.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Galvenais - lai būtu lētāk, atjaunojamie resursi pēc ram. Partiju pozīciju temats: Latvijas enerģētikas nākotne. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The most important - to be cheaper, renewable resources after: Topic of positions: Latvian future of energetics. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, September 7, No.208(6155), pp.8/9.

[Diena 15.09.2011.] Par jaunu sākumu! Valda Zatlera uzruna tautai. (politiskā reklāma). (*For the new beginning! Address by Valdis Zatlers to the people. (political advertisement)*). Thursday, September 15, No.215(6161), p.7

[Delfi 17.08.2011.] Zatlers: politisko kapitālu neizveidoju dažu minūšu laikā. (*Zatlers: I did not created political capital in several minutes.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/zatlers-politisko-kapitalu-neizveidoju-dazu-minusu-laika.d?id=40162529>

[Delfi 18.08.2011.] Valdis Zatlers par valdības vadītāja rīcībspēju “airBaltic” lietā. (*Valdis Zatlers on the action of government leader in the “airBaltic” case.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/valdis-zatlers-par-valdibas-vaditaja-ricibspeju-airbaltic-lieta.d?id=40163531>

[Delfi 22.08.2011.] ZRP izglītības ministra kandidāts Ķīlis piedāvā sešus izglītības sistēmas reformas virzienus. (*ZRP education minister candidate Ķīlis offers six direction in education system reform.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/zrp-izglitibas-ministra-kandidats-kilis-piedava-sesus-izglitibas-sistemas-reformu-virzienus.d?id=40235711>

[Delfi 24.08.2011.] Zatlera partija ar ZZS nesadarbosies nekādā gadījumā. (*Zatlers' party will not cooperate with ZZS in any case.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/zatlera-partija-ar-zzs-nesadarbosies-nekada-gadijuma.d?id=40263689>

[Delfi 25.08.2011a.] Valdis Zatlers: ZRP Saeimā veidos parlamentārās izmeklēšanas komisiju, lai noskaidrotu, kur pazudusi “airBaltic” nauda. (*Valdis Zatlers: ZRP will establish parliamentary investigation commission in Saeima to ascertain where disappeared the “airBaltic” money.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/valdis-zatlers-zrp-saeima-veidos-parlamentaras-izmeklesanas-komisiju-lai-noskaidrotu-kur-pazudusi-airbaltic-nauda.d?id=40287823>

[Delfi 25.08.2011b.] Turpinās Zatlera un Lemberga savstarpējā zākāšanās. (*The mutually abuses between Zatlers and Lembergs continues.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/turpinas-zatlera-un-lemburga-savstarpeja-zakasanas.d?id=40292533>

[Delfi 06.09.2011.] Partiju reitingu līderi pagaidām izvairīgi prognozē otrā krīzes viļņa iespējamību Latvijā. (*Party poll leaders currently elusively prognosis the possibility of second wave of crisis.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/partiju-reitingu-lideri-pagaidam-izvairigi-prognoze-otra-krizes-vilna-iespejamibu-latvija.d?id=40480271>

[Delfi 08.08.2011.] Zatlers: jālaiž pie teikšana paaudze bez “āža kājas”. (*Zatlers: the generation without “goat leg” should be let power.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/zatlers-jalaz-pie-teikšanas-paaudze-bez-aza-kajas.d?id=40512633>

[Delfi 09.09.2011.] Āboltiņa: ZRP atņem vēlētājus “Vienotībai” un sašķel latviešu elektorātu; Zatlers neesot gribējis iepīties intrigās. (*Aboltina: ZRP deprives “Unities” voters and splits Latvian electorat: Zatlers did not want to let in for intrigues.*) Available: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/aboltina-zrp-atnem-veletajus-vienotibai-un-saskel-latviesu-elektoratu-zatlers-neesot-gribejis-iepities-intrigas.d?id=40529291>

[LTV1 24.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!”. Diskusijas temats: bezdarbs. (*“Choose the future!” Topic for the discussion: unemployment*). (duration: 97 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3703>

[LTV1 29.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: godīgums un tiesiskums. (*“Choose the Future!” Topic for the discussion: honesty and juridicy*). (duration: 122 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3717>

[LTV1 31.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: lauksaimniecība un pensijas. (*“Choose the Future!” Topic for the discussion: agriculture and pensions*) (duration: 90 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3729>

[LTV1 05.09.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!” Diskusijas temats: nodarbinātība, pievilcīga uzņēmējdarbības vide un darba vietas (*“Choose the future!” The topic for the discussion: employment, creation of attractive environment for business and labour*) (duration: 106 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinass.lv/?n=zinass&id=3749>



[LTV1 07.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: izglītība un drošība. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: education and security*) (duration: 101 minute) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3758>

[LTV1 08.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: kā mazināt plaisu starp varu un sabiedrību un iespējamā vēlēšanu sistēmas maiņa. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: how do decrease the gap between power and society and possibility for change of electoral system.*) (duration: 103 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3764>

[LTV1 12.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: demogrāfija. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: demography*) (duration: 110 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3778>

[LTV1 14.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: medicīna un satiksmes joma. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: health care and traffic*) (duration: 92 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3786>

[LTV1 16.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Premjera amata kandidātu debates. (*"Choose the future!" Debates of prime minister candidates*) (duration: 124 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3809>

[Diena 17.08.2011.] "Saimnieki savā zemē: ZZS ministru veikums (politiskā reklāma)" (*Masters in our own land: Achievements of ZZS's ministers (political advertisement)*), Wednesday, August 17, No.190 (6136), 2011, p.3.

[Diena 23.08.2011.] Egle, Ināra. "ZZS arī turpmāk neplāno būt "daudz citādāka"". (*ZZS also hereinafter is not planning to be "differen"*) Tuesday, August 23, No.195(6141), pp.8/9;

[Diena 26.08.2011.] "Ar varu Latvijas sabiedrību saliedēt neizdosies, jādod iespēja: Pozīciju temats: nacionālie un valodu jautājumi. Diskusiju ar politistisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*By force amalgamation of Latvian society will not succeed: The topic of positions: national and language issues. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), pp.6/7;

[Diena 31.08.2011a.] "Saimnieki savā zemē: Izglītības un zinātnes darbinieku veikums strādājot 10.Saeimā un Dombrovska valdībā – Tas ir ZZS veiksmes stāsts! (politiskā reklāma)" (*Masters in our own land: Achievements of education and science sector working in 10<sup>th</sup> Saeima and in the Dombrovskis government – It is the success story of ZZS! (political advertisement)*), Wednesday, August 31, No.202(6148), 2011, p.3.

[Diena 31.08.2011b.] "Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standarts: ZZS Ilze Vītola" (*Testing the candidates: Politicians standard: ZZS representative Ilze Vītola*) August 31, No.202(6148), 2011, p.6.

[Diena 31.08.2011c.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Grib gan taupīt, gan tomēr arī paaugstināt vecuma pensijas: Pozīciju temats: valsts ekonomika, budžets, nodokļi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Want both - to save and increase pensions: Topic of positions: state economy, budget, taxes. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 31, No.202(6148), pp.8/9;

[Diena 24.08.2011a.] "Saimnieki savā zemē: ZZS ministru veikums (politiskā reklāma)" (*Masters in our own land: Achievements of ZZS's ministers (political advertisement)*), Wednesday, August 24, No.196 (6142), 2011, p.3.

[Diena 24.08.2011b.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Otru iespēju "nopērt" Saeimu politiķi varētu vairs nedot. Pozīciju tēma: ko mainīt Latvijas politiskajā sistēmā. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais

redactors Guntis Bojārs” (*Party positions: The second chance to “quilt” the Saeima politicians might not give. The topic of positions: what to change in Latvian political system. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of “Dienas mediji” Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 24, No.196(61482), pp.6/7;

[Diena 02.09.2011.] “Partiju pozīcijas: Politīķi izglītības līmeni vērtē zemu, bet piedāvājumi bikli: Pozīciju temats: vidējā un augstākā izglītība. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs” (*Party positions: Politicians evaluate the level of education as low but proposals are shy: Topic of positions: secondary and higher education. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of “Dienas mediji” Guntis Bojārs*), Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), pp.6/7;

[Diena 07.09.2011a.] “Saimnieki savā zemē: ZZS ministru veikums (politiskā reklāma)” (*Masters in our own land: Achievements of ZZS’s ministers (political advertisement, interview with Uldis Augulis, minister of transportation)*), Wednesday, September 7, No.208 (6154), 2011, p.3.

[Diena 07.09.2011b.] “Partiju pozīcijas: Galvenais - lai būtu lētāk, atjaunojamie resursi pēc ram. Partiju pozīciju temats: Latvijas enerģētikas nākotne. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs” (*Party positions: The most important – to be cheaper, renewable resources after: Topic of positions: Latvian future of energetics. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of “Dienas mediji” Guntis Bojārs* ) Wednesday, September 7, No.208(6155), pp.8/9.

[Diena 09.09.2011.] “Partiju pozīcijas: Daudz bērnu tik drīz nedzims, un mājās arī neviens nebrauks. Partiju pozīciju temats: demogrāfija un migrācija. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs” (*Party positions: Many children will not born so soon, and to home also no one will return. Topic of positions: demography and migration. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of “Dienas mediji” Guntis Bojārs* ) Friday, September 9, No.210(6156), pp.10/11;

[LTV1 24.08.2011.] “Izvēlies nākotni!”. Diskusijas temats: bezdarbs. (“Choose the future!”*Topic for the discussion: unemployment*). (duration: 97 minutes) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3703>

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[Diena 20.08.2011.] "Skrējieni uz Jēkaba ielu. 15.08.-21.08.: Māris Zanders piedāvā ieskatu partiju priekšvēlēšanu aktivitātēs dažādās informatīvajās vidēs" (*Run to the Jēkaba street. 15.08.-21.08.: Maris Zanders offers inside into parties' pre-election activities in various information environments*) Saturday, August 20, No.193(6139), p.3;

[Diena 24.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Otru iespēju "nopērt" Saeimu politiķi varētu vairs nedot. Pozīciju tēma: ko mainīt Latvijas politiskajā sistēmā. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: The second chance to "quilt" the Saeima politicians might not give. The topic of positions: what to change in Latvian political system. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, August 24, No.196(61482), pp.6/7;

[Diena 25.08.2011.] Egle, Ināra. "VL-TB/LNNK bez zīmes ar jaunām asinīm. Visu Latvijai! Dominantes ietekmē uzsvāru varētu likt no ekonomiskajiem uz nacionālajiem jautājumiem". (*VL-TB/LNNK without new blood. Influence of Everything for Latvia! dominance the emphasis could be putted from economic to national issues*) Thursday, August 25, No.197(6143), pp.10/11;

[Diena 26.08.2011.] "Ar varu Latvijas sabiedrību saliedēt neizdosies, jādod iespēja: Pozīciju temats: nacionālie un valodu jautājumi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*By force amalgamation of Latvian society will not succeed: The topic of positions: national and language issues. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Friday, August 26, No.198(6144), pp.6/7;

[Diena 27.08.2011.] "Pārbaudām kandidātus: Politika standarts: VL-TB/LNNK Romāns Naudiņš" (*Testing the candidates: Politicians standard: VL-TB/LNNK representative Romāns Naudiņš*) Saturday, August, 27, No.199(6145), p.9;

[Diena 31.08.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Grib gan taupīt, gan tomēr arī paaugstināt vecuma pensijas: Pozīciju temats: valsts ekonomika, budžets, nodokļi. Diskusiju ar politisko partiju pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Want both - to save and increase pensions: Topic of*

*positions: state economy, budget, taxes. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*) Wednesday, august 31, No.202(6148), pp.8/9;

[Diena 02.09.2011.a] "Partiju pozīcijas: Poliitīki izglītības līmeni vērtē zemu, bet piedāvājumi bikli: Pozīciju temats: vidējā un augstākā izglītība. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Politicians evaluate the level of education as low but proposals are shy: Topic of positions: secondary and higher education. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs*), Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), pp.6/7;

[Diena 02.09.2011.b ] "Pārbaudām kandidātus: Poliitika standarts" (*Testing the candidates: Politicians standard. VL-TB/LNNK representative Ieva Stefensena*) Peiktdiena, Friday, September 2, No.204(6150), p.10;

[Diena 05.09.2011.] "Starp lāpu gājieniem un nodokļiem. Dienas ekspresrecenzija par partiju vēlēšanu programmu. Ko sola VL-TB/LNNK, un kā tas izpildāms." (*Between torchlight procession and taxes express-review by Diena of party electoral manifestos. What VL-TB/LNNK promises and how to achieve it.*) Monday, September 5, No.206(6152), p.3;

[Diena 06.09.2011] "Iešu pie pieminēkļa 9.maijā, arī ja būšu premjers". (*Will go to the monument in May 9 also, if I will be prime minister*) (interview with the leader of Centre of Harmony Nils Usakovs), Tuesday, September 6, No.207(6153), pp.8/9;

[Diena 09.09.2011.] "Partiju pozīcijas: Daudz bērnu tik drīz nedzims, un mājās arī neviens nebrauks. Partiju pozīciju temats: demogrāfija un migrācija. Diskusiju ar politisko spēku pārstāvjiem vada Dienas mediju galvenais redaktors Guntis Bojārs" (*Party positions: Many children will not born so soon, and to home also no one will return. Topic of positions: demography and migration. Discussion with party representatives is led by the redactor-in-chief of "Dienas mediji" Guntis Bojārs* ) Friday, September 9, No.210(6156), pp.10/11;

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[LTV1 07.09.2011.] "Izvēlies nākotni!" Diskusijas temats: izglītība un drošība. (*"Choose the future!" Topic for the discussion: education and security*) (duration: 101 minute) Available: <http://ltvzinas.lv/?n=zinas&id=3758>

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## Estonia

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[Blok 25.02] Andrus Blok. Online-intervjuu: vastas Rahvaliidu juht Andrus Blok. [*Online interview answered by the leader of the People's Union Andrus Blok*] 25.02.2011 Postimees <http://poliitika.postimees.ee/393765/online-intervjuu-vastas-rahvaliidu-juht-andrus-blok/>

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## APPENDIX 5: LINKS TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT PAGES ANALYZED

### Lithuania

<a href="#">Homeland Union</a>
<a href="#">Critical mass of the citizens, who are not fallen out with logic</a>
<a href="#">“Vilnius Energy” makes me sick</a>
<a href="#">Ronald Reagan Club</a>
<a href="#">LITHUANIAN YOUTH COUNCIL</a>
<a href="#">THE LEAGUE OF YOUNG CONSERVATIVES</a>
<a href="#">Valdemar Tomaszewski (link)</a>
<a href="#">Labor Party</a>
<a href="#">YOUTH ORGANISATION “LABOUR”</a>
<a href="#">A DAY WITH A PARLIAMENT MEMBER</a>
<a href="#">Liberal and Centre Union</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian Centre Party</a>
<a href="#">Association of youth organizations in Klaipėda "Round Table"</a>
<a href="#">What a government does</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian Social Democratic Part</a>
<a href="#">The union of social democratic youth</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian Social Democratic Union</a>
<a href="#">LIBERALS</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian liberal youth</a>
<a href="#">The Grand Vilnius referendum</a>
<a href="#">Socialist People's Front-Klaipėda</a>
<a href="#">Party Order and Justice</a>
<a href="#">New Union (Social Liberals)</a>
<a href="#">Young Lithuania</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian national centre</a>
<a href="#">political party “The way of courage”</a>
<a href="#">National Union</a>
<a href="#">I am Voting – Not emigrating</a>
<a href="#">What is going on in politics</a>
<a href="#">Democratic Labour and Unity party</a>
<a href="#">The union of lithuanian emigrants</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian Trade Union Solidarity</a>
<a href="#">Vilnius Trade union “solidarity”</a>
<a href="#">Women information centre</a>

<a href="#">For the withdrawal of Lithuanian troops from Afghanistan</a>
<a href="#">Aš už taiką // Taika // Peace</a>
<a href="#">The National Youth</a>
<a href="#">Lithuanian jewish community</a>
<a href="#">Public Discussion Forum "The people, the citizens, the state"</a>
<a href="#">Youth movement for Lithuania's energetic independence</a>
<a href="#">Patriots.LT</a>
<a href="#">The movement of Seimas election boycott</a>
<a href="#">Cristian Party</a>

## Latvia

<a href="#">The Unity FB page</a>
<a href="#">The Unity FB group</a>
<a href="#">Zatler's Reform Party FB page</a>
<a href="#">Everything for Latvia- For Fatherland and Freedom FB page</a>
<a href="#">Everything for Latvia (Visu Latvijai) FB group</a>
<a href="#">The Latvian Green Party FB page</a>
<a href="#">Centre of Harmony FB page</a>
<a href="#">For Presidential Republic FB page</a>
<a href="#">The Last Party (Pēdējā partija, PP) FB page</a>
<a href="#">Christian Democratic Union (Kristīgi Demokrātiskā savienība)</a>
<a href="#">National-patriotic union "God, bless Latvia" The Third Way (Nacionāli patriotiskā apvienība "Dievs svētī Latviju" ) FB page</a>
<a href="#">Latvia revival – Riga's Party FB page</a>
<a href="#">Democrats.lv FB page</a>
<a href="#">Community "Non-citizens) FB page</a>
<a href="#">PatriotsLV FB pages</a>
<a href="#">Democratic Centre and non-partisan social workers FB page</a>
<a href="#">Latvian Parliamentary Monarchy FB page</a>
<a href="#">Common Language FB page</a>
<a href="#">Beautiful future FB page</a>
<a href="#">For the People, Believe, Truth and Homeland in draugiem.lv</a>
<a href="#">Veterans and Supporters of National Power Union group in draugiem.lv</a>
<a href="#">Solidarity</a>
<a href="#">ATTAC Latvia</a>
<a href="#">Yes, for the renewal of the Latvia Constitution from 1922</a>
<a href="#">Usurers out of the temple</a>

## Estonia

<a href="#">Estonian Christian Democrats</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Independence Party group, also offline</a>
<a href="#">Centre Party</a>
<a href="#">Centre Youth (Kesknoored)</a>
<a href="#">Support a farmer</a>



<a href="#">Conservative People's Party of Estonia</a>
<a href="#">Estonian National Movement</a>
<a href="#">Worthy Pay for Teachers</a>
<a href="#">Friends of Estonian Legion</a>
<a href="#">Reform Party</a>
<a href="#">Delete Tallinn TV</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Greens</a>
<a href="#">Feminism Builder</a>
<a href="#">Women to the Parliament</a>
<a href="#">Tilliga ja tillita (with dill/dick and without dill/dick)</a>
<a href="#">Difference enriches</a>
<a href="#">Café HMSX</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Gay Youth</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Marxist movement</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Transport Trade Union</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Sailors' independent trade union</a>
<a href="#">NGO Estonian Internet Community</a>
<a href="#">Central Union of Trade Unions</a>
<a href="#">Trade Unions</a>
<a href="#">NO TO ACTA</a>
<a href="#">Mart Laar's space</a>
<a href="#">Vote for free internet</a>
<a href="#">#OCCUPY-tALLiNn-estonia</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Health Workers Association</a>
<a href="#">Reimbursing study loans must be continued</a>
<a href="#">Down with Tallinn TV - money to kindergartens</a>
<a href="#">Voice of citizen</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Nursing Association</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Green movement</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Eco communities' movement</a>
<a href="#">Estonian Wind Energy Association</a>
<a href="#">Let's stop dirty energetics</a>
<a href="#">No to nuclear power plant</a>
<a href="#">No to phosphorite</a>
<a href="#">We are proud to be Estonians!</a>
<a href="#">Free Patriotic Citizen</a>
<a href="#">Young social democrats</a>
<a href="#">Social Democratic Party</a>
<a href="#">Center for Patriotic Upbringing</a>
<a href="#">Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica</a>
<a href="#">IRL will abolish land tax on land under home</a>
<a href="#">IRL Youth</a>
<a href="#">ETV2 finances for reimbursing student loans</a>